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This thesis consists of six chapters. The main aim in my thesis is to examine 
what distributive justice is and to look into how Walzer attempts to solve the problem 
of distributive justice. Many scholars challenge Walzer's view on justice. These 
objections will be fully examined in my thesis. I shall show the strengths and 
weaknesses of Walzer's distributive theory. 
In the first chapter I shall first discuss Walzer's thought briefly. In Chapter 2,1 
shall introduce how social meanings of social goods shape Walzer's theory of 
distributive justice in detail. 
Then I shall argue that Walzer cannot make a clear boundary between different 
social goods in Chapter 3. Moreover, by knowing their social meanings alone one 
cannot determine their appropriate distributions. 
In Chapter 4,1 shall discuss the relationship between citizenship and recognized 
needs of the people, and I shall argue that a government is committed to the provision 
of security and welfare to its citizens. My major claim is that the fact that different 
societies have different sorts of communal provision does not itself show that people 
have a correct shared understanding of the social meaning of welfare and security. 
Next, I shall study Walzer's idea that morality requires interpretation in Chapter 
5. The best interpretation of a distributive principle of a social good, according to 
Walzer, is not necessarily identical to the majority opinion of the citizens and current 
practices of that society. I shall argue that Walzer fails to offer a plausible way to 
interpret social meanings. Also, Walzer cannot defend the idea of shared 
understandings that can be used to determine distributive principles. 
Finally, in Chapter 6,1 shall describe that some scholars' challenge of Walzer on 
the grounds that his conservative that it will lead to conventionalism. I shall try to 
undermine this challenge but I shall argue that Walzer cannot defend his interpretation 
thesis anyhow. Walzer restates his distributive theory in his later works. He later 
concedes that justice should meet some minimalist requirements that run across all 
cultures. I shall examine his minimalism (which is a form of universalism) and further 
argue that his particularism has admitted universal elements. The rest of the thesis is 
my attempt to improve some of his arguments in order to see whether his theory can be 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The more complex and specific the construction the more surprising it is 
when a consensus is actually reached. The social processes that make this 
possible are mixed processes, involving force and fraud, debate and consent, 
long periods of habituation; overall, they remain mysterious. (Walzer, 
1993) 
Michael Walzer, a prominent Jewish-American intellectual, is a distinguished 
political philosopher in contemporary American. Once a Vietnam War protester in the 
1960s and 1970s, he is Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study 
in Princeton, New Jersey. While he has written on a widen range of topics from the 
relation between religious and revolutionary discourses to the ideas of just and unjust 
wars, his most influential contributions are to current debates about distributive justice 
and social criticism. 
His political theory has advanced a highly original view of philosophy because 
he tries to bridge philosophy and social policy in the most engaging and fruitful way. 
He offers a defense of pluralism and group difference, moving quickly from theory to 
practical issues, concrete examples, and hard questions. His Spheres of Justice 
established him as one of the most thoughtful of the recent communitarian critics of 
liberalism. He published the book in 1983. Discourse on distributive justice in the 
Anglo-American world at that time was dominated by two powerful accounts. These 
accounts were John Rawls' A Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia. In response to these accounts, Walzer presents a sophisticated original 
theory of equality that marks a major contribution to the debate over how to fashion a 
just society. 
Though hundreds of articles and reviews have been published on the thought of 
Walzer, they are inadequate in at least two aspects. First, most of these articles and 
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reviews only focus on one particular aspect of Walzer's thought, especially in two 
fields: (1) his earlier theory of justice on war and his theory of distributive justice in 
relation to liberal tradition. (For example, many scholars are concerned about whether 
individual rights conflict with the value of a community; and whether there is a neutral, 
abstract, and objective moral standard which is universally applicable) (2) To study 
Walzer's distributive justice based on his celebrated work The Spheres of Justice, and 
then assess the validity of Walzer's arguments. Apart from these, few of them write 
book reviews on Walzer's recent writings, such as (1) Interpretation and Social 
Criticisms, (2) The Company of Critics, (3) Thick and Thin, and (4) Pluralism, Justice, 
and Equality. Very few scholars, however, make comprehensive discussion on 
Walzer's theory of justice as a whole with reference to his effective critics. Second, 
Walzer's account of distributive justice has been extensively analyzed and debated, in 
both academic journals and university seminars. However, many of them have 
misunderstood Walzer. According to some, Walzer is a conventionalist, a relativist or 
a conservative. I shall explain later in my thesis that they are wrong to classify Walzer 
as a conventionalist, a relativist or a conservative. ^  Because of the inadequacies 
mentioned above, I propose to carry out an in-depth study of Walzer's political 
philosophy and to assess his real contributions. 
To begin with, I shall delineate my approach in this thesis. In § 1.2,1 shall sketch 
John Rawls’ theory of justice and then outline Walzer's response to it in order to 
distinguish Walzer's philosophical approach from liberalism. In § 1.3, I shall briefly 
describe Karl Marx's influence on Walzer's political philosophy. Next, I shall explain 
how Walzer inherits a socialist tradition. Finally, I would like to explain Walzer's 
1 Brian Barry argues that Walzer's philosophy would best be described as conventionalism. See Brian 
Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice", in David Miller & Michael Walzer (eds.) Pluralism, 
Justice, and Equality, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996), p.75. Meanwhile, Michael Rustin thinks 
that Walzer is a relativist. See Michael Rustin, "Equality in Post-modem times", op. ciL, p.31. Finally, 
Joshua Cohen criticizes Walzer that his theory of justice is "intrinsically conservative." See Joshua 
Cohen, "Michael Walzer: Spheres of Justice’” The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), p.463. 
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reason to defend equality. 
1.1 The approach of this thesis 
The main aim in my thesis is to examine what distributive justice is, and to look 
into how Walzer attempts to solve the problem of distributive justice. His account of 
distributive justice begins with a theory of social goods, and argues that each particular 
good should be distributed in accordance with its meaning which arises in the 
conception and production of the good. Different societies may have different reasons 
for producing the same thing at different times. Therefore, a social good may have 
different meanings at different times. Since social meanings can change over time, the 
distributive principle of a social good can change over time, too. Meanwhile, different 
social goods may have different social meanings. For this reason, Walzer argues that 
there is no single standard to determine their distributions. 
Walzer argues that social meaning is not a matter of individual opinion; it is 
derived from the shared understandings of the members of a given society. They have 
shared understandings on the social meanings of the goods. We find our way to 
distributive justice through an interpretation of those meanings. But the best 
interpretation is not the sum of all the opinions of the members. It will sometimes 
confirm and sometimes challenge the current practice of society. On Walzer's view, 
social criticism can only be thought of as an interpretive activity that challenges the 
current practices in the name of meanings recognized and shared in that same society. 
I shall fully explain his view in Chapter 5. 
Many scholars disagree with Walzer's views on justice. The objections can be 
grouped under four general headings. First, there are objections to his idea that a 
distribution should be determined by social meaning. In particular, some have 
objected that distributive principles arrived at would be too conservative Second, 
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members of a given society may share no social understanding at all. Third, 
interpretation of social meanings is arbitrary and it cannot serve as a standard of social 
criticism. Finally, Walzer's account on justice has no help to solve all the problems 
concerning distributive justice. He cannot really give a convincing reply to his rivals 
John Rawls and Robert Nozick. These objections will be fully examined in my thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I shall introduce how social meanings shape Walzer's theory of 
distributive justice in detail Walzer transforms the debate about distributive justice by 
offering a new conception of equality, and he explains how people can make a just 
distribution in accordance with his definition of equality. The chapter will cover 
several important concepts in his theory such as social goods, complex equality, 
dominance and monopoly, pluralism, sphere-specificity, autonomy of spheres, 
blocked exchange, and shared understandings. Chapter 3 is an extension of Chapter 2, 
but it will cover major criticisms on Walzer's theory of social goods. Some renowned 
scholars, such as Brian Barry, Amy Gutmann, T. M. Scanlon and Jeremy Waldron, do 
not agree with Walzer's claim that social meanings of social goods determine their 
distributions. I shall show how Walzer responds to his critics. At the end, I shall argue 
that Walzer cannot make a clear boundary between different social goods. Moreover, 
social meanings alone cannot determine their appropriate distributions. The weakness 
of Walzer's theory of social goods, as I shall show in Chapter 3, is that Walzer only 
offers an argument that every type of social good should constitute a distinct 
distributive principle. But this argument cannot explain that we should support a ban 
on slavery, murder, and polygamy. To solve this problem, Walzer could respond that 
citizens have a shared understanding of what citizenship means in their community. 
They have a shared understanding of what they should do in their community, such as 
paying tax and banning slavery and assassination. They also have a shared 
understanding of what they should not practice, such as polygamy. 
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In Chapter 4, Walzer argues that the idea of distributive justice presupposes a 
political community. I shall focus on his chapters on "membership" and "political 
power" and shall explore his notions of democratic citizenship and decentralized 
political power. Then I shall discuss (a) the relationship between citizenship and 
recognized needs of the people, and (b) whether a government should be committed to 
provide security and welfare to its citizens. On my view, the fact that different histories 
and cultures lead to different sorts, different priorities, and different degrees of needs 
does not by itself show that (1) the ancient Greek government, for example, was 
correct or incorrect to provide public baths and gymnasiums for its citizens. Neither 
does it show that (2) people had a correct shared understanding of the social meaning 
of welfare. 
But I agree that Walzer's theory of complex equality is constructive in narrowing 
the difference between people's starting points determined by the contingencies of 
their births and familial backgrounds. Nevertheless, I shall argue that people's shared 
sense of a duty to the government, for instance, does not necessarily lead to an 
agreement concerning the extent and form of taxation and other social duties such as 
military services. I shall also summarize Walzer's ideas derived from his theory of 
distributive justice. These ideas are stated as follows: (a) no one can be an all-around 
winner in a democratic and differentiated society; (b) we cannot survive in a stateless 
condition; (c) there exists a plurality of men and women; (d) people are equal; and (e) 
social meanings can be in conflict. I shall raise some problems concerning these ideas. 
In Chapter 5,1 shall introduce Walzer's thesis of interpretation. I shall expound 
Walzer's view that the best interpretation that is coherent with the values of a 
community is not necessarily identical with the opinion poll or survey search of the 
society. I shall argue that Walzer's classification of different paths in moral philosophy 
is either unclear or mistaken. Also Walzer cannot show that interpretation is the best 
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way to do moral philosophy. I shall explain my view that our attitude toward morality 
does not necessarily resemble the interpretation of laws and precedents carried out by 
lawyers and judges. A social criticism can create a new outlook on morality that is 
radically different from the original one. 
Also, I shall introduce how Walzer used his interpretation thesis for social 
criticism. I do not agree with Walzer's view that a social critic is always bound to his or 
her standpoint when the critic tries to look into other cultures. Walzer eventually 
argues that interpretation involves a search for "core values" within a given society. 
However, I shall argue that Walzer's "coherence principle" does not give a plausible 
way to find out the core values. Second, I shall argue that Walzer's interpretation on 
American society seems wrong. Even if he were correct, the core values that he 
interprets were too abstract to be useful as a guide for finding distributional principles 
of various goods. 
Further, I shall explain Dworkin's view that Walzer has tacitly relied on some 
hidden principles in his interpretation thesis. I shall go through the debate and then 
argue that Walzer is correct to emphasize that the same good would have different 
meanings in different circumstances, even in the same society. But I doubt that 
disagreements concerning how to distribute a social good can be solved by a public 
debate in the society as suggested by Walzer. Dworkin also argues that shared 
understanding is not possible in a complicated and pluralistic modem society. It seems 
that we can solve the Dworkin-Walzer debate by arguing that people agree about the 
reference, but not the social meaning of a good. I shall expound the arguments in detail, 
but I shall indicate that this solution is rather trivial. 
In Chapter 6，Walzer observes that people might not accept a critic's 
interpretation as to which distributive principles should be applied to a society. But I 
shall argue that there being some people protesting is neither a necessary, nor 
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sufficient, condition for the distributive justice. I will introduce and discuss some 
criticisms against Walzer's interpretation thesis，which were given by Georgia Wamke, 
Joshua Cohen, and Joseph Raz. I agree with Georgia Wamke's view that Walzer's 
interpretation thesis cannot justify its own particular interpretation against others. She 
argues that if we accept Walzer's interpretation thesis, we cannot criticize other 
societies. Wamke also correctly points out that aside from Walzer's interpretation, 
there are other perspectives that are also coherent to American society as well. Since 
we would have so many interpretive possibilities, thereby we would be unable to find 
out the best interpretation. 
Raz argues that social practices and institutions do not by themselves provide 
reasons for a moral claim. He argues that even if we assume that people rarely 
advocate moral arguments that do not have roots in the social practices of a society, he 
thinks that social practices do not justify moral reasons. On my view, social practices 
and institutions seem to constitute a large part in an interpretation. But actually Walzer 
allows a visitor to convince people to accept moral arguments that do not have roots in 
the social practices. Therefore, I think that Walzer can improve his thesis by saying 
that an interpretation needs not appeal to social practices. Besides, I think that Walzer 
does not clarify his "underlying ideas" or core values in detail. As a result, it is rather 
difficult to criticize our social practices with core values. 
Further, I would like to argue that Walzer's particularism and his theory of 
complex equality were not intended to be universal; but, unknown to Walzer, is 
universal. 
Walzer re-states his idea of distributive justice in his later writings. In Thick and 
Thin, Walzer holds that distributive principles should be made according to the social 
meanings of social goods. Nevertheless, the principles should be constrained by 
minimalism. They are to be constrained by truisms, such as "no one should murder 
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innocent people", "no one should betray a country", "cruelty is wrong", etc, which are 
applied or reiterated across human societies. Walzer attempts to respond to his critics 
by strengthening his arguments about justice. He posits a solution to explain (a) the 
world's numerous and diverse expressions of ethics as well as (b) how to make moral 
judgments across cultural boundaries. He hopes to encourage social and moral 
communication between diverse cultures of different communities. I shall introduce 
how he re-states his idea of distributive justice in his later works. After that, I shall 
raise some questions concerning his universalism but at the same time I wish to 
acknowledge his motivation for this project. I shall also discuss one important issue: In 
Think and Thin, Walzer holds that minimalism, or the thin morality, is universal. Is 
this relevant or related to Walzer's universalism in Spheres of Justice? Or are the two 
kinds of universalism completely related? My view is that these two universalisms are 
different, but are inter-related. The rest of the thesis is my attempt to improve some of 
his arguments in order to see whether his theory can be made more convincing or 
attractive. 
1.2 Criticisms on Rawls 
The liberal-communitarian debate has arisen since the 1980s gave rise to a major 
agenda for contemporary moral and political philosophy. Issues in the 
liberal-communitarian debate are extensive and far-reaching. It is, however, 
appreciated that the questions of distributive justice are at the center of the debate. 
Rawls and Walzer are two of the most distinguished philosophers in the debate. Rawls 
is in the liberal school of thought, while Michael Walzer is in the communitarian 
school of thought. To study Walzer's distributive theory, we cannot ignore Rawls. 
2 TT, 26. 
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This is because Walzer has expressed his opposition to Rawls' theory of justice in 
many ways throughout his major works. Although both try to give their answers as to 
how to solve distributive problems in pluralistic modem societies, they solve the 
problems in different ways. 
It is indubitable that our present world is a combination of different societies 
where people do not share the same beliefs and practices. Even within a society, it 
seems that we cannot agree on a single set of principles guiding all kinds of 
distributions. To solve this problem, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in 1970s. 
He imagines an "Original Position”，for which he answers the questions about the 
distribution of material goods, political power and of rights and liberties. 
Rawls argues that we do not deserve our place in the distribution of natural 
endowments. He holds a hypothetical contractual idea that contingent differences 
between people are morally irrelevant. Natural endowments, such as our place of birth, 
our intelligence and social status are irrelevant in a distribution, as they are contingent 
and matters of luck. According to Rawls, justice is not based on contingency and luck? 
Justice requires that the parties must be fairly situated and treated equally as moral 
persons. Any arbitrariness of fortune and natural endowments must be corrected in the 
original position. 
The Original Position is a hypothetical contractual situation with a set of 
constraints where ideally or theoretically defined rational men and women would 
choose by depriving of any knowledge of their particular interests, values and talents 
so that they know nothing of their standing in the social world. Each representative of 
different classes of people in society imagines himself absolutely free, mutually 
disinterested and unencumbered through the Veil of Ignorance. The only common 
knowledge each representative can have with others is such that it is necessary in the 
3 John Rawls (1999), 89. 
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consideration of social cooperation and that it is not bias towards a certain group of 
people.4 
Representative parties in the Original Position try to minimize their risks and to 
maximize their self-interests.^ They do not know the probabilities of their contingent 
social status, place of birth, talents, and even the stage of development about the 
societies they are living in.^  Moreover, they have to tailor principles not merely for 
themselves, but also for their descendants. Finally, Rawls argues that any rational 
person is presumed to seek more self-interests rather than less. As a result, they have to 
play safe in making their decisions. They are to adopt the alternative--the worst 
outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others. The procedural 
form is designed to ensure that no one is in a position to tailor principles to his or her 
advantage. He or she does not look at the social order from his or her situation but 
takes up a point of view that everyone can adopt on an equal footing. 
The design of the Original Position allows people with different and conflicting 
conceptions of goods to consent to an agreement in order to form a society as a system 
of fair social cooperation between free and equal persons. In this sense they share a 
common standpoint along with others and do not make their judgments from a 
personal slant. Rational men and women would choose one distributive system if they 
could finally reach an agreement to mutual benefits. According to the idea of pure 
procedural justice proposed by John Rawls, any agreement reached would be fair. 
Therefore, given that people properly follow the procedure, the outcome is fair 
whatever it turns out to be) They are thus finally provided with certain governing 
4 The only common knowledge they share includes general scientific laws, general facts about human 
society, economics, politics, human psychology, and all general facts. 
^ Spheres 5; OT, l ; /5 , 11. 
6 They cannot even assume that any of the contingent facts is more likely to happen, nor can they 
assume that these contingent facts have equal probability of happening. Therefore, representatives in the 
Original Position cannot rely on Principle of Insufficient Reason derived from utilitarianism. 
7 John Rawls (1999), 133. Rawls points out that it is a "maximin rule" for choice under uncertainty. 
8 John Rawls (1999), 85,453. 
principles for all political, social, and economic distributions. The distributive 
principle finally chosen should be a general and universal one that is widely known so 
that the conflicts of interest are settled without appeal to “force and cunning".^ Rawls 
argues that the representative parties in the Original Position would agree to the 
Difference Principle, according to which social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged only when they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged， 
Rawls argues that each representative as a moral person is moved by two 
highest-order interests, namely, the interests to realize and to exercise the "two powers 
of moral personality." These two powers are: (1) the capacity for a sense of right and 
justice, and (2) the capacity to decide, to revise, and to pursue a conception of the good 
rationally. Since one is deprived of the knowledge of one's particular interests, values 
and talents, one does not know his or her particular preference and conception of good. 
But Rawls argues that basic liberties, freedom of movement and choice of occupation, 
powers, income and wealth, as well as self-respect, are the primary goods that are 
all-purpose means for a wide range of final ends. They are necessary conditions for 
realizing the powers of moral personality. Although Rawls emphasizes that primary 
goods are not to be used in making comparisons in all situations, he maintains that 
primary goods enable us to make interpersonal comparisons in questions of political 
and socialjustice.il 
Walzer does not think that Rawls' distributive theory can solve the problems of 
political and social justice. Walzer doubts that those men and women would take their 
hypothetical choice if they returned to ordinary people with their own identity and 
goods in their hand. The problem is not that they have different interests, but that they 
have particular backgrounds of history, culture and membership. To search for unity 
9 John Rawls (1999), 117. 
10 John Rawls (1999), 53, 266. 
11 John Rawls, "Social unity and primary goods", in Amartya Sen and others (eds), Utilitarianism and 
Beyond, Cambridge University Press (1982), pp.161-163, 165-166. 
by abstracting from particular situations is to misunderstand what distributive justice 
is. History displays a great variety of arrangements and ideologies. Different societies 
would describe a just society in different ways, and they would urge different 
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principles for reward and punishment. 
However, Rawls fails to attend to such cultural particularity. According to 
Walzer, justice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only 
one way. The position put forward in Spheres of Justice focuses upon the question of 
what methodology is appropriate to the business of political theory. Walzer attempts to 
argue that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form: different goods 
ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures 
among different groups of people. ^ ^ He argues that the social world will one day look 
different from the way it does today, and distributive justice will take on a different 
character than it does for us. He denies that there are primary goods that can serve as a 
basis for distributive justice among different groups of people at different times 
because primary goods are so abstract that they would be of little use in dealing with 
particular d i s t r i b u t i o n s / 4 In other words, primary goods are not equally valuable to 
different groups of people. Primary goods have less value to some people, such as 
monks in temples or preachers in Christian churches, who prefer less primary goods 
rather than more, let alone maximizing the primary goods. 
Since Walzer doubts that distributive justice can be made in only one way, he 
thinks that no general moral or political principles are universally valid or useful. Thus 
Walzer's theory of justice, as he mentions at the beginning, is "radically 
particularist.”i5 He does not agree that doing political philosophy should separate 
12 tt, 2. 
13 Spheres, 4-6. Cf. TT, 33. 
认 Spheres, 8,318-319. 
Spheres, xiv. Although Walzer defends pluralism of particular social values, and pluralism of 
particular distributive principles, I do not think that he is "radical." Radical relativists commonly hold at 
least one of these views: (1) All knowledge and value judgments are relative to one's social background. 
12 
oneself at a great distance away from the social world in which one lives. He thinks 
that the effort of finding some external and universal standard is unnecessary. Instead, 
he prefers to "stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground.Based on his way of 
doing philosophy as a radical particularist, the main aim in my thesis is to examine 
what Walzer's theory of distributive justice is, and to look into how Walzer attempts to 
solve the problem of distributive justice. 
1.3 Influences from Marx 
To examine what Walzer's theory of distributive justice is, we cannot ignore 
Karl Marx's philosophy. This is because Karl Marx's philosophy has had an important 
influence on Walzer's theory of distributive justice. Marx is the philosopher who 
appears most frequently in Walzer's works. In Spheres of Justice, Walzer even humbly 
17 
says that most of his book is simply an exposition of Pascal's and Marx's thoughts. In 
fact, some quotations from Marx are highlighted several times in Walzer's arguments. 
I would like to note two of them, as they are similar to Walzer's theory.: 
(1) If one wishes to enjoy art, Marx argues, one must be an artistically 
cultivated person. 
(2) If one wishes to influence other people, one must be a person who 
really has a stimulating and encouraging effect upon others. 
Ultimately they are people's opinions. (2) All knowledge and value judgments are true in one place at 
one time, but they are not true in another place at another time. For example, the statement "earth is a 
square" was true in the Middle Age Europe, but the statement was wrong after the Enlightenment. 
Hence we cannot conclude that the statement is true or not. (3) There is no absolute or universal truth in 
our earth. I think all these views are implausible. Argument (1) commits the fallacy of accident converse. 
Human knowledge, such as physics, mathematics, and logic is static across different societies. They are 
not people's opinions. Radical relativists can only pin-point a feature of some social science and arts 
subjects. Argument (2) is wrong because when we specify the exact time and place in which the 
statement refers to, we can conclude that the statement is true or not. The statement saying that "it was 
raining in Hong Kong on 18 May 2002" is true if and if only it was raining in Hong Kong (including 
Kowloon and New Territories) on 18 May 2002. Finally, argument (3) is self-defeating because insofar 
as radical relativists assert that their thesis is correct, and that anyone who denies it is mistaken, they are 
making a claim to unconditional validity that is inconsistent with their thesis itself. Walzer holds neither 
of these views; hence, he is not a radical relativist. 
Spheres, xiv. 
n Spheres, 13 
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18 . Marx thinks that "love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. ” This 
idea serves as a guiding insight in Walzer's Spheres of Justice, and the similarities 
between Marx and Walzer will be examined when I introduce Walzer's theory of 
distributive justice in following chapters. 
1.4 Socialism, market, and democracy 
Walzer's exposition of Pascal and Marx's thoughts reflects his allegiance to a 
socialist tradition. ^ ^ Nevertheless, he has developed a remarkably different version of 
socialism than the traditional socialism. How his views on political philosophy reflect 
his allegiance to this tradition will be presented in this thesis. Socialist critique focuses 
on the unfairness of capitalism, such as unequal distribution of wealth, political power, 
free time, legal protection, and welfare provision. Besides, socialism condemns 
capitalism because it fails to realize man's creative ability and distorts genuine human 
relationships. The central ideal of socialism is to find out an appropriate way to 
allocate resources so that people can have rights and opportunities to choose 
20 
effectively concerning how they are to live their lives in their societies. Although 
there are many proposals to achieve this goal, they share the aim of altering the 
• 21 
distributional outcome of capitalism. 
However, Walzer and some other modem socialists, such as David Miller and 
G.A. Cohen, have shown their significant difference from traditional socialists. They 
18 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, qtd. in Spheres, 18. 
19 Joshua Cohen thinks that Walzer has drawn on socialists' values in criticizing the current structure of 
social and political conditions in the United States. See Joshua Cohen, "Michael Walzer: Spheres of 
Justice:, The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), p.457. 
20 David Miller, "In what sense must socialism be communitarian?", Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 
6 Issue 2 (Spring 1989), pp.52, 54-56. 
21 Ronald Dworkin favours a conception of equality of resources to compensate for inequalities in 
personal endowments. He holds that justice requires "equal initial resources" and "laissez-faire 
thereafter." He argues that if people start in the same circumstances with equal initial resources and do 
not cheat or steal from one another, then it is fair that people keep what they gain through their own skill. 
See G.A. Cohen, "Are freedom and equality compatible", Self-ownership, freedom, and equality, New 
York: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.l07. 
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acknowledge the values of markets and place emphasis on freedom and democracy. In 
this regards, philosophers usually categorize those modern socialists as “market 
socialists". ^^  
Market socialists acknowledge the values of markets. These values are welfare, 
freedom, and democracy. They think that markets can help them to achieve these 
values. On the contrary, government planning to control production in a large society 
is difficult in a way that meets consumers' demand. Collective production of resources 
according to central planning often fails to meet the needs of people because of 
misallocation of resources. On the other hand, the market can create an environment in 
which different material goods coexist. The market adjusts the supply of different 
material goods in response to people's demand. Suppliers of goods respond to market 
demand and deliver the goods to consumers. The price mechanism signals to the 
suppliers what the relative demand is for different goods. Meanwhile, suppliers have 
more incentive, in the form of potentially increased profits, when they produce the 
goods that have greater demand in relation to supply. The market allows people to 
choose the resources as they please, such as hairstyle and tastes in music, which suits 
their particular styles of life. ^ ^ The freedom of choice encourages the efficient 
allocation of resources from suppliers to consumers. The suppliers earn the profit they 
are looking for, and the consumers receive the material goods they want. Walzer 
acknowledges that the market is an important mechanism in distributions of goods. 
However, since it is Walzer's view that different goods ought to be distributed for 
different reasons, he does not think that markets should become a complete 
distributive system?^ This view will be explained in §2.4. 
Besides, market socialists place emphasis on freedom and democracy. David 
David Miller is a leading market socialist in the Anglo-American world. See David Miller, "Why 
Markets?", in Julian Le Grand and Saul Estrin (eds.)，Market Socialism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989, 
p.29. Walzer is also a market socialist because he also acknowledges the values of markets in this way. 




Miller, for instance, believes that the market brings two kinds of freedom to people, 
that is, (1) freedom of effective choice, and (2) political freedom. “Freedom of 
effective choice" means that people may choose the resources that suit their particular 
styles of life, as suppliers respond to demand and deliver the material goods to the 
people. “Political freedom" means that people have freedom to express their opinions 
in different publications and in mass media.^ ^ However, people can realize political 
freedom only when market economy and competition exist. Otherwise a government 
agency that judges which publication to be released and which channels to be 
broadcast would mould public opinions. Actually, there has never been a single set of 
agents making decisions for all distributions. Walzer emphasizes that no state power 
has ever substituted itself as an agent of distribution that regulates and captures all 
26 
sharing, dividing, and exchanging of every goods. 
In order to allow people to have the same degree of freedom of effective choice 
and political freedom, market socialists need a system of distributive justice. But such 
a system cannot gain people's support unless people see themselves as members of a 
community.之？ In seeing oneself as a member of a community, according to market 
socialists, one will find that one is participating in a particular way of life that is 
marked off from other communities. Distributive justice, according to market 
socialists, is a particular way of life that can be marked off from other communities. It 
gains people's support when people participate in it. Thus the idea of distributive 
justice becomes inseparable from communal relationships in the background. For 
instance, Walzer indicates that the idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded 
See David Miller, "Why Markets?", pp.33-34. 
26 Spheres, 4. 
27 The statement is backed by two major reasons. First, socialists claim that our ideas of distributive 
justice are powerfully affected by our perception of communal relationships generally prevailing in the 
set of people within which the distribution is going to occur. Second, socialists think that any moral 
view holding that people can make claims on one another that go beyond simple non-interference must 
presuppose a background set of social relationships. David Miller, "In what sense must socialism be 
communitarian?", pp. 58-59. 73. 
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community within which distributions take place. Language, history, and culture come 
• 2 8 
together to produce a collective consciousness among the members of a society. 
Market socialists propose two forms of democracy: industrial democracy and 
political d e m o c r a c y . 29 Industrial democracy is a framework of self-governing in 
enterprise. This means that workers have rights to give opinions in decision-making. 
On the other hand, a planned economy tries to determine a detailed shape of economy. 
It relies on gathering a large amount of information in order to make a comprehensive 
and detailed plan for all citizens. But such a comprehensive and detailed plan cannot 
be achieved unless there was an ideally omniscient government coordinating the 
information to the best of its ability. ^ ^ Market socialists think that democracy is 
important to let people see themselves as members of a community. As presented in 
this paper, market socialists think that it is futile to make a comprehensive and detailed 
plan for all citizens with a view to satisfying the real needs of citizens. Meanwhile, 
market socialists think that a planned economy pursuing in this way would sacrifice 
democracy. Therefore, market socialists do not support the claim of a comprehensive 
and detailed plan for all citizens. 
The second form of democracy is political democracy. Walzer argues that 
democracy is a way of allocating power and legitimating its use. He thinks that citizens 
must govern themselves. Those who can persuade the largest number of citizens 
would decide political issues for everyone in society. As Walzer puts the argument, 
"citizens come into the forum with nothing but their arguments. All political goods 
31 
have to be deposited outside: weapons and wallets, titles and degrees." 
Above all, modem socialists agree that the market helps them to achieve the 
values of welfare, freedom, and democracy. They think that these values help them to 
Spheres, 28-31. 
29 David Miller, "Why Markets?", p.35. 
30 See David Miller, "Why Markets?", p.38. 
31 Spheres, 304. 
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achieve the goal of socialism. Walzer further insists that the appropriate arrangements 
win his society are those of a decentralized democratic socialism. This society should 
be a strong welfare state run by local and amateur officials with an open civil service. 
The government should constrain the activity of market and protect religious and 
familial life. Moreover, there should be a system of honoring and dishonoring all 
considerations of rank or class. Finally, workers have the right to control their 
companies and factories. Meanwhile, citizens enjoy a politics of parties, movements, 
meetings, and public debate. Walzer thinks that these social arrangements allow 
people to become equal with each other. I shall explain fully about his idea of equality 
throughout the thesis, as “defense of equality" is the primary concern in his theory of 
distributive justice. 
1.5 Why should we need equality? 
But it may be objected that it is a mistake to pursue equality for its own sake.34 
There are three reasons for supporting the objection. 
First, the fact that a person A，for example, enjoys certain benefits does not 
provide any reason for another person (i.e., B) to be provided with such benefits. B's 
poor prospect is not due to a comparison with the prospects of A. The futility of 
unfortunate lives a person has suffered is independent from those who can enjoy a 
higher standard of living.^ ^ 
Second, pursuing equality for its own sake by calculating one's assets and 
3 6 
comparing one's situation with others does not serve one's interest. How much 
Spheres, 
33 Walzer admits that his entire book of Spheres of Justice is an answer of a complicated sort of these 
two questions: In what respects are we one another's equal? And by virtue of what characteristic are we 
equal in those respects? See Spheres, xii. 
Harry Frankfurt, "The moral irrelevance of equality", Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (2000), p.88. 
35 Harry Frankfurt, "The moral irrelevance of equality", Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (2000), p.94. 
36 Harry Frankfurt, "the moral irrelevance of equality", p.91. 
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wealth and property a person has is irrelevant to the well-being of another person. The 
proper way to determine how much resources a poor person should have is not by 
calculating the amount of resources that a rich man possesses, but by considering how 
resources will realize his or her rights to have relief from suffering and futility of poor 
lives. The reason why a person should enjoy these rights is not because other people 
enjoy these rights. The rights to which a person is entitled do not depend upon any 
comparison with the rights that others possess.^^ But this objection seems wrong; how 
much others have does affect our justification to have better well-being. Suppose that 
each of the majority citizens in a society owns 5 millions dollars. The minority groups 
of people who own less than 10 thousand dollars have more justification to ask for 
more welfare. On the contrary, suppose that each of the majority citizens owns less 
than 50 thousand dollars, the minority groups have less justification to ask for more 
welfare. Similarly, suppose that each of the most families owns a flat in the city, but 
others don't. Those families who do not own their flats have more justification to ask 
for their ownerships. Another example is that if there were only a few people who 
could afford their private cars in society, roads and petrol stations would be 
insufficient. Car owners would be very inconvenience. On the contrary, if too many 
people could afford private cars, road congestion would become very serious. Car 
owners would not enjoy the advantage of driving their own cars. Thus these two sets of 
examples show that how much others have does affect our well-being, and our 
justification to have better well-being . 
Third, instructing people to regard inequalities as morally intolerable encourages 
the development of attitudes of envy and resentment); It is argued that the attitudes of 
envy and resentment are destructive to a society. People compare themselves with 
those with better prospects and want to pursue equal benefits and advantages. They 
37 Harry Frankfurt, "The moral irrelevance of equality", p.96. 
Harry Frankfurt, "The moral irrelevance of equality", p.100. 
39 Harry Frankfurt, "the moral irrelevance of equality", pp.90-91. 
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think that it is morally intolerable to have inferior prospects when they compare with 
those people closer to the top whose prospects for living well are better. Equality 
among individuals may be an outcome of meeting a requirement to avoid being 
arbitrary in the attribution of benefits and disadvantages to each individual. However, 
it is objected that equality carries a moral goal in itself.*� 
I do not think that these three reasons can underlies Walzer's idea of equality. 
Walzer's idea of equality is a negative one. It does not aim at eliminating all 
differences in a society, but at eliminating the ability of a group of people to "grind the 
faces of the poor." Walzer emphasizes it's not the fact that there are rich and poor that 
cause people's need for equality. It is the fact that the rich "grind the faces of the poor”， 
impose "their poverty upon them,，，and "command their deferential behavior.，，4i In this 
regard, Walzer would agree that because a person enjoys certain benefits does not 
provide any reason for other persons to be provided with such benefits. He would also 
agree that the proper way to determine how much resources are important for some 
people to have is not by measuring the amount of resources that other people possess. 
Despite this, Walzer does not think that the development of attitudes of envy and 
resentment is destructive to a society. According to Walzer, we may envy our 
neighbor's “green thumb or his rich baritone voice or even his ability to win the 
respect of our mutual friends", but none of this will lead to destructive consequences."^^ 
It might be objected that green thumb, rich baritone voice, and one's ability to win the 
respect of one's mutual friends are not transferable goods, but money is. The poor 
undergo the experience of subordination when the rich grind the face of the poor. The 
experience of subordination animates envy and resentment. However, Walzer 
4° Harry Frankfurt, "the moral irrelevance of equality", p. 100. 
41 Spheres, xiii. Similarly, as Walzer indicates, it is not the existence of aristocrats and commoners or of 
office holders and ordinary citizens that produces the popular demand for the abolition of social and 
political difference. It is what aristocrats do to commoners, what office holders do to ordinary citizens, 
and what people with power do to those without it. 
42 Spheres, xiii. 
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observes that envy and resentment are uncomfortable passions, and no one enjoys 
them. Consequently, being a subordinate group, the people would try to eliminate the 
condition that produces these uncomfortable passions.'^^Therefore, the development of 
attitudes of envy and resentment would not bring destructive consequence to a society. 
Walzer defends equality because he wants to free the people from the experience of 
subordination. He wants to eliminate the power of transferable goods, such as money, 
so that by owning these goods, one cannot then transfer these into other goods, such as 
political power, better legal services, better education and better medical resources. 
Thus the aim of equality, according to Walzer, is not a hope for the elimination of all 
differences. 
43 Spheres, xiii. 
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Chapter 2: Complex equality and distributive justice 
What is our nature? What are our rights? What do we need, want, deserve? 
What are we entitled to? What would we accept under ideal conditions? 
Answers to these questions are turned into distributive principles, which are 
supposed to control the movement of goods. 
(Walzer, Spheres of Justice) 
2.1 Social goods and distributive spheres 
Walzer's descriptions of social goods and distributive spheres aim at capturing 
the plurality of social meanings and the complexity of distributive systems. What are 
"social meanings"? Why does Walzer say that distributive systems are complex? 
These questions will be answered in this section. 
Michael Walzer describes human society as a distributive community. People 
come together to share, divide, and exchange among them. Goods such as political 
right, reputation, and economic status come to a person because of other men and 
women. Distributive justice focuses on a social process in which people conceive and 
create goods, which they then distribute among themselves. All the goods with which 
distributive justice is concerned are social goods. Distributive principles attempt to 
solve the problems concerning the movement of social goods. For example, what do 
people need and deserve? What should people receive? How much should be 
distributed and paid for?45 
Apart from social goods, Walzer actually realizes that some goods are not social 
goods. Walzer distinguishes social goods from God's goods and privately valued 
goods.46 God's goods are natural goods that are not socially evolved. They do not 
involve labor in their creations. Examples of God's goods are sunshine, beaches on 
Spheres, 6. 
45 Spheres, 3-7. 
46 Spheres, 7. But Walzer is not sure whether there are only three kinds of goods in this world. 
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isolated islands, ice in the Arctic Ocean and germs in the air. Examples of privately 
valued goods, as given by Walzer, are the smell of new-mown hay and the excitement 
of an urban vista.47 According to Walzer, God's goods and privately valued goods do 
not have shared meanings because the conception and creation of those goods are not 
social processes. Only social goods are conceived and created under social processes. 
Walzer argues that distributive justice is only concerned with the distributions of 
social goods.48 Every social good has meaning because of the good's being conceived 
and created in society. People have to conceive its meaning before a good comes into 
their hands. According to Walzer, social goods like education, security and welfare, 
honour and recognition, work and free time, beautiful objects of every sort, and a piece 
of bread have values because their conception and creation are social processes. Since 
they are valued in the social processes, social goods have shared meanings. Walzer 
insists that no solitary person who is isolated from her society can value a social good. 
Any theory of justice presupposes a society in which language, history and culture 
come together to produce a collective consciousness."^^ Walzer argues that people 
already stand in a relation to social goods with a moral and material world in which 
they live. Without such a history, they would not have distributed the goods among 
t h e m s e l v e s . A s a result of this common culture, its members identify with each other 
and are "committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods" among 
themselves.But every society has its own language, history and culture, and, hence, 
every society develops a unique consciousness. Different societies can value a social 
good in different ways. It follows that some social goods may have different meanings 
in different societies. ^ ^ The same social good can be valued in one society and 
47 Spheres, 7. 
48 Spheres, 7. 
49 Spheres, 28. 
50 Spheres, 8. 
Spheres, 
52 There is no reason to believe that every good has different meanings in different societies because 
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disvalued in another society for different reasons. For example, bread can be a daily 
necessity, the body of Christ, the symbol of Sabbath, the means of hospitality, and so 
on. It carries different meanings in different places. It is unclear as to which social 
meaning is the most basic one, which can be conceived as a single criterion of 
distribution across different soc ie t i es . 
Walzer argues that it is the meanings of social goods that determine their 
distributions. If people understand the meaning of a social good, they understand how 
and for what reasons it ought to be distributed. In this sense a just or unjust distribution 
depends on the meaning of a social good at stake. Medieval Christians' condemnation 
of simony reveals that ecclesiastical office, given its shared understanding of meaning, 
ought never to have been sold or purchased. It should go to qualified candidates. But 
social meanings can change over time because they are historical in character. 
Therefore, just or unjust distributions change over time accordingly.^^ 
Walzer argues that Rawls' theory of justice fails to capture the plurality of social 
meanings and the real complexity of distributive systems. On Walzer's view, Rawls' 
theory of justice relies on an assumption that primary goods are universally and 
ahistorically useful across human societies.^ ^ This is because once we have settled 
down the distribution of primary goods, according to Rawls, we have solved all 
distributive problems. Thus finding out an appropriate distributive principle of 
57 
primary goods becomes the sole principle of distributive justice in Rawls, theory. 
some goods may, and actually do, have the same meaning in different societies. 
Spheres, 8. 
Spheres, 8. Bread would become a necessary good in a circumstance where the bread was just enough 
to feed all the people. However, in other circumstance where the gods demanded that bread should be 
baked and burned rather than eaten, the religious uses of bread were to conflict with its nutritional uses. 
We cannot conclude that which social meaning is more primary or basic than another. 
Spheres, 9. 
Spheres, 8. 
57 Regardless of what an individual's rational plans are in detail, Rawls argues that there are various 
things that an individual would prefer more of rather than less primary social goods. These primary 
social goods include rights, liberties, opportunities, and income and wealth. Rawls assumes that the 
members of society are rational persons able to adjust their conceptions of the good to their situation. 
Everyone is assured an equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of life he pleases as long as it does not 
24 
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Walzer states that there are many social goods in a society. Different types of 
social goods have different meanings, so social meanings are distinct.^^ Walzer argues 
that the social meaning of a social good determines its distribution, and distributions of 
different types of social goods are distinct, too. In other words, each type of social 
good constitutes a distributive sphere within which only certain criterion of 
distribution is appropriate. Ecclesiastical office has its distinct meaning so it 
constitutes its distributive sphere in accordance with its shared social meaning. Other 
social goods, such as market and bread, have different meanings so they constitute 
different distributive spheres.^ ^ As a result, there is no single criterion of distribution 
for every social good. Walzer has claimed that every social good has a criterion of 
distribution. Meanwhile, different societies can value a social good in different ways. 
It follows that there is no social good with a criterion of distribution that can guide all 
the distributions of other social goods. For this reason, Walzer argues that there are no 
social goods that can be regarded as basic or primary goods that are essential to all 
human societies， 
Walzer argues that when social meanings are distinct, distributions must be 
autonomous" So autonomy in Walzer's sense is a matter of social meaning and shared 
values that are not violated by other spheres. The condemnation of simony reveals that 
buying and selling is not appropriate in the sphere of ecclesiastical office because it is 
an intrusion from another sphere. Although market is open to all comers, church is not. 
violate what justice demands. Rawls argues that men share in primary goods on the principle that some 
can have more if they are acquired in ways that improve the situation of those who have less. Once the 
total arrangement is set up, no questions are asked about the totals of satisfaction or perfection. 
According to Rawls, this is the most feasible way to establish a publicly recognized objective and 
common measure that reasonable persons can accept. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999), p.79, 81. 
58 A hospital bed and a hospital pillow seem to be different social goods, but their meanings might be the 
same. They belong to the same type of social goods. 
59 Some orderings between different spheres seem possible in a specific society. For example, a 
university degree is more valuable than a car, and a dialysis is more valuable than an educational 
voucher, and obviously it is more valuable than a cup of coffee. Walzer is concerned with finding out 
the appropriate distributive principles in order to distribute these social goods. 
60 Walzer argues that there is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral and 
material worlds. See Spheres, 8. 
w Spheres, 10. 
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However，Walzer admits that no social meaning in any society is entirely distinct. 
One distributive sphere often affects the other spheres. Therefore, he does not argue 
for entire autonomy of sphere; he only looks for "relative autonomy. 
2.2 Problems of simple equality 
A complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution 
is just if everyone is entitled to the social goods they possess under the distribution. 
This includes the issues of how social goods may come to be held, and the issues 
63 
concerning the transfer of social goods from one person to another. How can we 
assure that everyone is entitled to the social goods? We may dream of a simple 
distributive condition, so that we are equal if both of us have fourteen hats. As Walzer 
mentions, we may dream of a society where everyone has the same share of political 
power. But it is impossible because someone will be elected a chairperson and 
someone will make a strong speech and persuade us to follow his lead. 
For the same reason, it is impossible to have to a society where everyone has the 
same amount of asset. This is because some people will save it and others will spend it. 
As a result, distribution of money will become unequal again. Finally, we want to be 
able to recognize different sorts and degrees of skill, wisdom, energy and so on in 
order to distinguish one individual from another. It is impossible to give everyone the 
same degree of honor and r e s p e c t . Some people have a larger degree of honor and 
respect than other people. This fact applies to the distribution of other social goods. 
62 ibid. I shall show that Walzer conditionally allows people to buy tertiary education opportunities. 
Different distributive spheres influence each other. For example, research products in some university 
faculties attract more monetary subsidies and in turn give more incentive and support to the staff of the 
faculties for further research. Political power also influences education and medical policies in many 
ways though government officials are not using their political power to exchange for better education 
and medical care for themselves and for their children. 
631 am inspired by Nozick's "Entitlement Theory." See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 
Basic Books, 1974. pp.151-152. 
64 Spheres, xi. 
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There are always some people who come to enjoy a monopoly of some social goods. 
Monopoly is the idea that a desired good is held in the hands of a certain class or a 
group of men and women, often a minority of the population who desire the good. 
Monopoly may be just or unjust but, according to Walzer, it is not, the most important 
social fact at issue in thinking about justice. Rather, Walzer indicates that the 
dominance of a wide range of goods by a social good is at the root of injustice.^^ What 
is dominance? Walzer calls a social good dominant when some individuals who have 
it command a wide range of other social goods because they have it.66 Money is an 
example. It seems that because of dominance, tyranny becomes possible. Pascal 
defines tyranny as a desire to control the whole world and also outside its own sphere. 
It is tyrannical to say that "I am handsome, so I should command respect." According 
to Pascal, to say that I am strong, therefore men should love me is tyrannical because it 
is the wish to obtain a thing that can only be had by another.^ ^ Pascal's idea influences 
Walzer, as Walzer mentions that a tyrant is a person who exploits a dominant good to 
master the people around him. 68 In a capitalist society, capital often becomes a 
dominant good. A group of men and women come to enjoy the monopoly and then 
convert the good into all sorts of other things, such as opportunities, powers, and 
reputations. 
But moral and political theories usually aim at reducing the extent of monopoly 
in order to achieve simple equality, rather than eliminating dominance of a social good. 
Some utilitarian theories insist that whatever social arrangement will, in fact, 
maximize the average utility among all people is just. John Rawls argues, on the 
contrary, that no inequality in what he calls "primary goods" is justified unless it 
improves the overall position of the worst-off class. Besides, some egalitarian theories 
沾 Spheres, 16-17. 
秘 Spheres, 10. 
67 Blaise Pascal, The Pensees, qtd. in Spheres, 18. 
68 Spheres, 279. 
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argue that justice lies in everyone having the same resources or the same buying 
abilities overall. Such philosophers try to find some formula that can be used to 
measure social justice in any society and to give "simple equality" to everyone in the 
society. Having acknowledged the plurality of social meanings and the real 
complexity of distributive systems, Walzer explains the difficulties of “simple 
equality." 
Walzer imagines a condition of simple equality where everyone has the same 
amount of assets and all social goods in a society are up for sale. People think that 
inequality is created chiefly because people have different levels of ability and to some 
extent because of luck. Simple equality allows people to have the same amount of 
assets; therefore, everyone has equal purchase ability. However, simple equality will 
not, in practice, generate a just distribution. Free exchange would enable new 
inequalities to arise.^ ^ 
In order to criticize the theory of simple equality, Walzer imagines a society in 
70 • 
which everyone has equal ability to buy an education for his children. People with 
higher educational background have advantages. This is because other social goods, 
such as job opportunities and government positions, would be offered only to people 
69 Here Walzer shares the same argument with Robert Nozick. Nozick argues that free exchange upsets 
equal distribution of assets. Suppose that everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in 
accordance with some dimension people treasure under distribution Dl. Wilt Chamberlain, a famous 
basketball player, is entitled to receive twenty-five cents from each ticket of admission. Eventually one 
million people choose to attend his basketball games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a 
much larger sum than the average income. Now Dl is replaced by a new distribution, D2. Nozick says 
that each of the audience chose to give twenty-five cents to Chamberlain. They could have spent it on 
going to the movies or on copies of academic magazines. But they all, at least one million of them, 
converged on giving twenty-five cents of their money in exchange for watching Wilt Chamberlain play 
basketball. Dl was the just distribution that simple equality supporters assumed acceptable, and people 
voluntarily transferred parts of their shares they were given under Dl . Besides, Wilt Chamberlain 
decides to put in overtime to earn additional money. Hence, Nozick thinks that D2 is also a just 
distribution. But D2 has upset the equal distribution of assets in Dl. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia, pp. 160-162. Walzer offers a similar example. He says that the sale of a novelist's book 
involves too much luck, and hence talking of desert makes little sense. The novelist is like any other 
entrepreneur, as he has bet on the market. It's a chancy business, and the novelist has a right to what he 
gets, after he has paid the costs of communal provision (discussion on communal provision will be 
addressed in the next chapter). Admirable qualities, such as initiative, enterprise, innovation, hard work, 
ruthless dealing, reckless gambling, and the prostitution of talent are sometimes rewarded and 




with educational certificates. Eventually buying education for children would turn out 
to be a good investment and the school would become a competitive world. Despite 
this, the children would not have the same degree of educational success. Students 
with natural talent in writing examinations have greater competitiveness, as they find 
it comparatively easier to win the educational success and certification. Walzer argues 
that the members of this group eventually claim that the good they control should 
dominate outside the school. These people who have better educational background 
want to earn a higher social status in terms of wealth, free time, medical services, or 
even political power. As a result, they monopolize the social good of education and 
because they have it, they command a wide range of other social goods such as offices, 
title, wealth, etc. In this example, Walzer shows that simple equality entails a 
dominant good (i.e., educational success and certification) in a society, which is 
monopolized by a group of people with natural talent in writing examinations. A 
society can have more than one dominant good at a time. 
The monopoly of dominant goods is criticized by three kinds of claims. These 
claims are as follows: (1) Monopoly is unjust: Proponents of this claim agree that all 
dominant goods should be redistributed so that it can be equally shared. Rawls' theory, 
being a theory of simple equality, is of this type. (2) To look for autonomous 
distribution of all social goods, because dominance is unjust. (3) A new dominant 
good should replace the currently dominant good because the existing pattern of 
^ 1 
dominance and monopoly is unjust. Walzer is not concerned with three of them. He 
is concerned with the first two kinds of claims, and in particular the second. This is 
because dominance contravenes the autonomy of a distributive sphere. Meanwhile, 
Walzer argues that the second claim best captures the plurality of social meanings and 
Spheres, 13. The third claim is Marx's view saying that the means of production is the dominant good 
throughout history, and Marxism is a historicist doctrine insofar as it suggests that whoever controls the 
prevailing means legitimately rules. See Allen Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp.244-282. 
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the real complexity of distributive systems. He thinks that a society in which different 
social goods are monopolistically held, but in which no particular good is generally 
convertible, is compatible with justice. Walzer agrees that monopoly of a dominant 
good entails i n j u s t i c e . ? � However, it is not by virtue of monopoly alone that causes 
injustice. For Walzer, the main culprit of injustice is dominance. 
Rawls, on the contrary, thinks that monopoly is a sign of injustice. Rawls' 
Second Principle permits a difference in social and economic advantages to the extent 
that positions and offices are equally open to all; therefore, everyone has a fair 
opportunity to the positions and offices. Rawls does not define the term "equally open 
to all" as careers are open to talented people. This is because the definition permits 
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by natural and social contingencies, 
such as wealth and good fortune. Suppose that in a certain society great prestige is 
attached to membership of a warrior class. To be a warrior, he or she should have great 
physical strength. In the past, only wealthy families could be recruited. Now the 
society allows that warriors can be recruited from all sections of society on the results 
of a suitable competition. This would normally be advanced as an example of equality 
as careers open to talents.？斗 However, equality as careers accorded to talents is not fair 
because wealthy families will still win the competition. Wealthy families receive 
better education and nourishment. The poor people, however, receive less education 
and nourishment so that their bodies are comparatively weak. The reason why the 
wealthy families receive sufficient education and nourishment, according to Rawls, is 
simply because they are more lucky than the poor families. 
To overcome the situation, equality as equality of fair opportunity, as Rawls 
argues, is an attempt to mitigate the influence of social contingencies and natural 
Spheres, 10-11. 
73 John Rawls (1999), 62-63. 
74 I owe this example to Bernard Williams. See Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Peter 
Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series, Oxford: Basil 
Balckwell, 1962, p.l26. 
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fortune on distributive shares. To accomplish this end it is necessary to ensure that the 
chances to acquire education and to intake sufficient nourishment should not depend 
on one's class position. Rawls writes that the school system should be designed to even 
out class barriers. In order to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of 
equality, Rawls proposes that "greater resources might be spent on the education of the 
less intelligent rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, for 
instance the earlier years of school."乃 
Rawls' Difference Principle imposes a constraint on talented men and women, 
that is, to bring the greatest possible benefit to the least advantaged social class. For 
example, a surgeon, with a certificate he has won in the harsh competitions in medical 
school, claims more than his equal share of wealth. His claim is justified if his 
entitlement to have an unequal share can maximize the situation of the least 
advantaged class， 
Nevertheless, Walzer criticizes that Rawl's theory of equality of fair opportunity. 
Walzer argues that Rawls allows members of a group of people in society, such as a 
group of surgeons, to monopolize the primary goods, so long as the well-being of the 
least advantaged class is maximized. To ensure that no particular group of people 
monopolizes the primary goods, Rawls demands a continual state of intervention in 
order to maintain the simple equality. However, state power would become the central 
object of competitive struggle.77 Having state power would then easily convert into 
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other social goods, making a path to dominance. Thus Rawls’ theory of equality of 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999), p.86. 
76 Spheres, 15. In Rawls' theory of justice, the idea is "maximin", that is, to maximize the well-being of 
(or the primary goods received by) the least advantaged. 
^^ Spheres, 14-15. 
Similarly, Walzer criticizes that Mill's principle of utility cannot function as the ultimate appeal in 
arguments about equality. This is because to maximize utility in the largest sense requires a central 
planning to coordinate. However, the power of the planners would be dominant if we relied on the plan 
to achieve equality. See Spheres, xv. Walzer does not think that the complaints of continual state 
intervention, and of the state power being a competitive struggle, apply to his theory. In the crucial point 
that Walzer has made, political power is only one among many spheres of social activity. Chapter 12 of 
Spheres of Justice offers a detailed discussion on the limit of political power. I shall explain this part in 
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fair opportunity, according to Walzer, not only fails to solve the problem of monopoly, 
but creates a new dominant good in a society. 
On my view, Walzer's distributive theory requires continual state of intervention, 
too. Walzer admits that a state is not only a "night watchman" protecting individuals 
from coercions and physical assaults, it is also a guardian of different distributive 
spheres, protecting churches, universities, and so on from dominanceSurely, these 
involve continual governmental intervention. Continual government intervention is 
helpful in ruling out domination of goods. Hence Walzer fails in the end to criticize 
Rawls' theory of justice with this argument. Walzer should give up the argument that 
continual governmental intervention must be a problem. 
To Walzer, Rawls' primary goods dominate all kinds of distributions in the basic 
structure of a society，Rawls does not seem to be aware that different goods, whether 
essential to the people or not, have their own criteria of distribution, nor is Rawls 
aware that the same type of social good may have different meanings in different 
societies. The problems of simple equality, as Walzer puts it, derive from treating 
monopoly as the central issue in distributive justice. Simple equality is concerned with 
the just distribution of the dominant good, or some primary goods. Walzer argues that 
the aim of a just society should not be to even out social life in a fruitless attempt to 
realize simple equality. For Walzer, distributive justice should focus on reducing or 
eliminating dominance. In this way there will be many inequalities, but there is no 
particular good that is convertible to other social goods. Autonomy of distributive 
spheres allows a variety of local monopolies held by different groups of men and 
women. But, for Walzer, monopoly is not the problem, if the dominant good no longer 
exist. The critique of dominance leads Walzer to formulate an “open-ended 
Chapter 4 of my thesis. 
79 Walzer, "Liberalism and Separation", p.327. Night-watchman state is often called a "minimal state". 
See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p.26. 
89 Spheres, 8. Rawls' two principles govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the 
distribution of social and economic advantages. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.53. 
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distributive principle": 
No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess 
some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the 
meaning of x.^ ^ 
The principle states that if y is a social good that can help one to command any 
good (or all goods), then y would be a dominant good. Imagine a society A in which 
money is exchangeable for commodities and education but not medical care, 
recognition, criminal justice, etc. Here, money is not yet a totally dominant 
good. Imagine a society B in which money is not only exchangeable for commodities 
and education but also medical care, recognition, criminal justice, and indeed 
everything. It is society B where money dominates other social goods. But the 
situation in society B rarely exists and no social good ever entirely dominates the range 
of goods. Therefore, Walzer observes that dominance is always incomplete. 
2.3 Complex equality and reduction of dominance 
Walzer's criticisms on simple equality are shaped by the influence from Karl 
Marx and Pascal. As previously stated (1.3), Marx and Pascal's philosophy gives a 
guiding insight of Walzer's Spheres of Justice. Walzer is inspired by Marx and Pascal 
to work out his theory of complex equality. But it is noted that Marx has a greater 
influence on Walzer's distributive theory. 
Marx agrees that social and productive process determines all values in a society. 
Social labor is a part of social and productive process and so Marx argues that social 
labor is the source of wealth and culture. According to Marx, isolated labor cannot 
81 Spheres, 20. 
^^ Spheres, 11. 
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create wealth or culture. Capitalists buy, in the form of commodity, the workers' 
capacity to produce commodities for the capitalists. The worker's capacity that the 
capitalists have bought is what Marx calls "labor power. 
Marx correlates labor power with distributive justice. In his Critique of The 
Gotha Programme, Marx criticized the appeal to equal distribution. According to 
Marx, if one's right is determined solely by how much labor one has spent. Then, one 
who is physically or mentally superior to other people can give more labor during the 
same period of time, or can work for a longer duration. Since one receives in wages the 
amount of labor power spent, this “equal right" in society is actually a "bourgeois 
right", that is, only an "unequal right for unequal labor." The cause of this unequal 
result is that unequal individuals are brought under a single point of view. In this way, 
bourgeois right tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment. It is a right of 
inequality in its content.It ignores the difference among the people. As Marx puts it, 
...one worker is married, another not; one has more children than 
another and so on and so forth. 
In this regard, to seek for equal share in a social consumption fund, for example, 
will not achieve equality. Actually one will receive more than other people will. On the 
other hand, some will receive less than another. This is because different people have 
different levels of satisfaction in their social consumption. Therefore, Marx argues that 
the distribution of “to each according to his effort (or labor)" is not just, because 
different people have different natural endowments, such as strength and duration, and 
they often have different needs. ^^  
In this regard，Marx introduces another distributive maxim: from each according 
83 Allen W. Wood, "Marx on Right and Justice", Karl Marx, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1984)， 
P.133. 
Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Allen W. Wood (ed.), Marx Selections, New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company (1987), p.189. 
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to his ability, to each according to his needs.^ ^ It suggests that we pay equal attention 
to the different qualities, and to the individuality of every man and woman, that we 
find ways of sharing our resources that match the variety of their needs, interests, and 
capacities.87 
The argument for complex equality begins from our understanding of various 
social goods. Pascal and Marx put their arguments for complex equality in their own 
way.88 Pascal describes that there are different groups of people in a kingdom. Some 
are strong, some are handsome, and some are intelligent, etc. Each man reigns in his 
own, but not elsewhere outside his own sphere. Sometimes they meet and fight for 
universal dominion but nobody can win this as they simply misunderstand one another. 
Pascal then thinks that it is tyrannical to hope that one should command respect simply 
because he is handsome. Marx made a similar argument. He describes that if one 
wishes to enjoy art, one must be an artistically cultivate person. Meanwhile, if one 
wishes to influence other people, one must be a person who really has a stimulating 
and encouraging effect upon others. On the contrary, if one cannot make oneself a 
beloved person, according to Marx, his or her love is impotent and a misfortune. 
Inspired by Pascal and Marx, Walzer argues that equality is a complex relation 
of persons, mediated by the social goods we make, share, and divide among ourselves. 
It requires, then, a diversity of distributive criteria that mirrors the diversity of social 
goods.89 To him, monopoly is not prohibited within a sphere. There is nothing wrong 
with this. Complex equality permits that there are many small inequalities and a 
variety of local monopolies within the spheres, held by different groups of men and 
90 women. 
Following Walzer's illustration, citizen X may be chosen over citizen Y for 
86 ibid. 
RP, 245. 
88 Spheres, 18. 
^^ Spheres, 18. 
恥 Spheres, 17. 
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political office; therefore, two citizens are unequal in the political sphere. But 
according to the idea of complex equality, they are equal so long as citizen X's office 
does not give him advantages over citizen Y in other distributive spheres, for example, 
by using his political office to gain superior medical care, better schools for his 
children, better judgment in a criminal or civil trial, and so on. In other words, so long 
as the social good of political office is not a dominant good, and is not a good that can 
be convertible to other goods, citizen X will stand in a relation of complex equality to 
other citizens he governs. People are equal when no one possesses or controls the 
means of domination. From Walzer's point of view there is no need to ensure that all 
inequalities are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged in any sphere.^ ^ But 
complex equality insists on keeping the autonomy of a distributive sphere and 
reduction of domination. An autonomous distributive sphere has its own distinct 
meaning and distribution, within which only certain criteria and arrangement is 
appropriate.92 For instance, money is inappropriate in the sphere of recognition and 
honor. Imagine a lawyer is entitled to the respect he earns from his colleagues and 
praise from his clients. However, it is not a good reason for allowing him an enormous 
income merely because he is a good lawyer.^ ^ One can reply that a lawyer should be 
given a larger income and more incentive to work, not because of his or her talent, but 
because of his or her heavier workload. Walzer does not mean to deny the earning 
power of talented professionals, as he mentions that special skills and combinations of 
skills "will still have their premium."94 He is saying that respect and praise is a social 
good of recognition. When someone gains recognition from other people, and because 
91 Spheres, 18-20. 
92 Spheres, 
93 RP, 249-250. 
94 Spheres, 117. Walzer argues that the achievement of professional status surely entitles a man or a 
woman to some degree of social esteem and even to economic reward. The rest of us are prepared to 
acknowledge skill and talent and to pay for services rendered. But Walzer wants us to acknowledge a 
wide range of skills and talents to pay no more than a market price or, in the case of conscripted services, 
a fair wage. See Spheres, 257. 
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of this, his or her possessing of other social goods is unjust or t y r a n n i c a l ? This 
example can best capture the meaning of Marx's distributive maxim and Walzer's idea 
of complex equality. 
Complex equality requires a protection of boundaries by differentiating social 
goods.96 It involves the critique of the dominance of any one type of social good. Thus 
a defense of complex equality is a matter of protecting separate spheres of social goods 
from the imposition of distributive criteria that are not in accordance with those goods. 
Under the system of complex equality, students would not lose their chances of higher 
education merely because they cannot afford their tuitions. Rich families would not 
enjoy aristocratic privilege before the law. Poor patients would receive medical care 
even if they cannot pay for it. People would not win Nobel Prizes merely because they 
have political power or wealth. Citizens would not lose their voting rights because of 
their race or sex. All in all, Walzer's defense of complex equality is a way to reduce 
dominance of social goods by eliminating the power of a group of people, such as rich 
people, government leaders, religious groups, professionals, educated and talented 
persons, etc., to dominate other people in society. However, Walzer never claims that a 
society must be a just society when there is no dominance at all.^ ^ 
2.4 Blocked Exchanges and Free Exchanges 
Defense of complex equality will limit the freedom of people to exchange social 
goods. But this does not mean that Walzer oppose free exchange of goods. An 
95 Walzer emphasizes that conversion of professional status into esteem and wealth should be ruled out. 
See Spheres, 257 for more detailed discussion. 
96 Spheres, 28. 
97 Walzer does not want to claim that complex equality would necessarily be more stable than simple 
equality. While Walzer allows that there will be many small inequalities in every distributive sphere, he 
is simply silent on cases when there are large inequalities in some distributive spheres. He believes that 
inequalities would not become too large, as autonomy of distributions tends to produce a variety of local 
monopolies held by different groups of men and women. See Spheres, 17. 
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exchange between equals is a free exchange.^^ But he objects that there is a universal 
medium of exchange. Walzer argues that money often fails to represent value because 
something is lost in the process. Masterpieces like Beethoven's symphony and T. S. 
Elliot's poetry have their real values, but their values do not coincide with exchange 
values or price. Exchange values do not reflect their entire values. Walzer points out 
that if we attend to their real values, we will find that they are not the commodities that 
should be bought and sold. Although I can buy a sonata score written by Beethoven in 
a music company, the exchange value does not represent the entire value of a piece of 
Beethoven's sonata. Thus whether a piece of music is good or not is not determined by 
its exchange value. Rather, its value is determined by the distributive principle in the 
sphere of music. We cannot say a sonata is very poor simply because only a few people 
choose to buy a concert ticket for the sonata. 
So what can money buy, and what can't money buy? Walzer replies that we must 
argue about the meaning of the good before we can say anything about its rightful 
distribution. Walzer has summarized a set of rightful distributions for the United 
States. He suggests a list of blocked exchanges in the United States today, based on 
its meanings of social goods.^ ^ Blocked exchanges set limits on what money can buy. 
Whenever we ban the use of money, we do establish a right that this particular good be 
distributed in some other way. 
First, Walzer argues that human beings and personal liberty cannot be bought 
and sold. Second, citizens cannot sell their votes or buy a license for polygamy. Third, 
he points out that in a modem world, citizens should only have one spouse. But I am 
afraid this view is arguable. The idea of “one husband, one wife" is influenced by 
Christian view. Probably Islamic countries including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan do not 
agree with this view. So Walzer is correct to emphasize that this view describes the 
98 Spheres, 120. 
99 Spheres, 100-103.1 think that Walzer's list of blocked exchanges is not confined to the United States. 
Rather, it has universal application. I shall expound this view in § 6.3. 
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circumstance of the United States (or Anglo-American and European societies) today. 
Fourth, criminal justice is not for sale; therefore, judges and juries cannot be 
bribed. Fifth, criminal cases, such as murder, blackmail, stealing, and selling of drugs, 
are illegal. Money cannot change them from illegal into legal. Sixth, citizens have to 
fulfill their duties, such as military service and jury duty. They cannot pay money to 
other men or to the government to be exempt from these duties. The danger of death in 
war or the harshness of criminal punishment is an incentive for some people to pay for 
exemption. However, just as one has a freedom to drive a car does not follow that one 
has a freedom to drive on pavement, one has personal liberty does not follow that one 
should have a right to exempt from conscription and punishment. Therefore, Walzer 
argues that personal liberty is not proof against conscription and imprisonment. 
Seventh, professional and political offices cannot be bought. We need to be sure about 
their qualifications. Jobs can be auctioned off, but only within a limit. Jobs constitute a 
distributive sphere separate from welfare. Eighth, some more social goods are not for 
sale, for example, prize and honour, love and friendship cannot be bought and sold. Of 
course, Walzer admits that we can buy better clothes, cars, and food to make us more 
attractive to other people. However, we cannot use money to buy a meaningful 
friendship or a marriage of true minds. 
Walzer argues that every citizen has certain rights that do not cost money. 
Citizens have freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly. They need not pay for 
the freedom. Also, every citizen has a right to emigrate away from his or her homeland. 
The government has no right to charge the people in order to let him or her go. On the 
other hand, the government has a duty to provide minimal security to its citizens. • 
They do not have to pay for the security and policemen do not ask citizens to give them 
protection money. Similarly, having a fair trial, being protected by the legal system, 
• Concerning immigration control and social welfare, I shall fully discuss in § 4.1. 
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and acquiring basic education are the rights of every citizen. Finally, minimum wage 
laws, or health and safety regulations are provided to the employees. They enjoy a 
basic protection from the community. Of course, the extent of the minimum wage is 
always open to dispute. Also, many modem societies, such as Hong Kong, do not have 
minimum wage law. Despite this, they provide social welfare to ensure minimal 
survival of citizens. Meanwhile, Walzer allows people to pay for themselves in order 
to enjoy better security and private education. 
The blocked exchanges suggest that there are various principles of distribution. 
Some social goods that can be freely exchanged are subject to market changes. The 
distributive principle of romantic love is free choice. Romantic love focuses our 
attention to those people of affection who can love back in return. Social welfare and 
security should be distributed according to the need of the citizens, punishment and 
honors according to desert, and offices according to talents. 
Given the right blocks, Walzer emphasizes that there is no such thing as a 
mal-distribution of consumer goods. Under conditions of complex equality, wages and 
salaries won't be equal. A person with a higher salary might use it to buy and own more 
consumer goods.皿 Concerning business activities, one who builds a better mousetrap, 
or opens a restaurant and sells delicious food, is looking to earn money. One has to bet 
on the market because there is too much luck involved in the business activities, but 
one has a right to what one gets from the market. 
2.5 Natural endowments and desert 
But Rawls argues that we do not deserve our place in the distribution of natural 
肌 Spheres, 191. 
他 Spheres, 108-109. Walzer mentions a novelist who receives less reward during a depression, but 
whom book does well in better times. But we do not say that the novelist become more deserving in 
better times, as desert cannot hang on the state of economy. Business activities involve too much luck 
and are not appropriate to recognize desert. 
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endowments. The luck involved in a business activity may be the result of one's 
natural endowments. Natural endowments, like our birth, our intelligence and social 
status, are morally undeserved in the distribution, as they are matters of luck. Bom 
with certain capacities, raised by loving or stimulating parents, the children gain from 
their good fortune and benefit from their favorable starting place in society. Thus 
existing distribution of wealth and income is the cumulative effect of prior 
distributions of natural and social contingencies. Hence Rawls argues that we do not 
deserve those endowments严 
Rawls丨s arguments are Walzer's chief concern here.刚 Walzer holds that 
recognition and honor should not be gained according to one's natural endowments 
alone, such as displaying one's physical beauty or announcing one's noble birth and 
blood. 1G5 According to Walzer, we should give recognition and honor to people who 
have talents in a specific area. For example, he notes that the organizers of 
contemporary beauty contests would not give honors to those ladies who merely have 
natural endowments, for the beauty contests introduce a variety of "talent" criteria.蘭 
It is objected that candidates' talents do not constitute a crucial criteria in beauty 
contests. Instead one's natural endowments are the most important considerations in 
the distribution of this recognition and honor. Despite this, my view is that one's 
natural endowments affect one's talents. The accident of birth causes people to have 
different aims and interests. A father, who was a great businessman, inspired his son to 
be a great businessman, too. Similarly, a talented pianist was bom in a family who 
could support long-term expenditure on piano tuitions, while a talented basketball 
103 John Rawls (1999), 87, 89. But Rawls does not want to claim that one should eliminate such 
distinctions of having a more favorable starting place in society. Rather, Rawls tries to work out the 
Difference Principle to arrange these contingencies for the good of the least fortunate. He adds that 
those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on 
terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. See Rawls (1999), p. 87. 
104 Spheres, 260n. 
105 Thus Walzer thinks that in modem Western societies, at least in the United States, honor is a social 
good that should be distributed according to desert. But Walzer allows that in some societies there might 
be different conceptions of honor. 
106 Spheres, 260. 
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player was bom with a height higher than average. Surely, one cannot become a great 
businessman, talented pianist or basketball player without one's free will. However, it 
is rather difficult to separate one's talents from one's natural endowment. 
Walzer's attitude towards natural endowment depends on whether it would lead 
to a distribution of a social good that is contrary to the meaning of the good. He objects 
to a school that rejects admissions from children who come from poor families. It is 
unjust, according to Walzer, to deny the children from receiving the benefits of 
education simply because of the accident of their b i r th .浙 Despite this, Walzer never 
holds that one do not deserve the rewards or recognition that come because of one's 
• ]AO ^ • 
luck and natural contingencies. He denies the idea that one's talents and abilities are 
accidental accessories, just as a hat and coat one happens to be wearing. ^^ ^ On 
Walzer's view, they would seem meaningless to individuals if such talents and 
abilities were nothing but the luck of the draw.^ ^^ Although he admits that there is too 
much luck involved in the market, he allows inequalities existing in the sphere of 
market and commodities. According to Walzer, fortune and misfortune are not the 
business of distributive justice. Everyone would agree that people's talents and 
abilities are valuable to a free community. This is because the community would 
benefit from their presence. In a free society, to Nozick and Walzer, people's talents do 
benefit others, and not only themselves. ^ ^  ^  Even Rawls's Difference Principle would 
allow people with greater talents or abilities to get more, provided that they do not lead 
others to get less. Thus Walzer allows that honors could be handed out for utilitarian 
reasons, so as to encourage a politically or socially useful performance. ^ ^^  
彻 Spheres, 
� 8 Spheres, 260n. 
Spheres, 261. 
彻 Spheres, 261. 
111 For example, talented people create more jobs in the market by investments, offer good advice to 
government policies, contribute more taxes to the government, and invent new machineries to benefit 
the whole community. Here Walzer notes that he is partly following the criticisms of Robert Nozick. 
Spheres, 260n. See also Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p.228. 
112 Walzer indicates that utilitarian reasons always play a part in the practice of honoring, but he does 
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But Walzer maintains that it is wrong to distribute all types of social goods 
according to one's birth and natural endowments. On Walzer's view, it is wrong to 
distribute Nobel Prizes and doctoral degrees, for example, to those people who have 
no talents at all but they have wealth and political power, or were bom into famous 
families. 
It is undeniable that the accident of birth causes people to be bom into different 
families. Some people were bom in rich families, while some people were bom in poor 
families. However, the problem of inequality between different families, according to 
Walzer, is not merely that some individuals are more capable while others are less 
capable of making money and undergoing pressure. The problem of inequality, for 
Walzer, is not that some fortunate people enjoy more luxury goods, own more land, 
and take vacations in more exotic places. Inequality becomes a problem only when it 
• 113 
translates into domination of social goods. 
One solution regarding the unequal distribution of consumer goods, as suggested 
by Walzer, is to compensate the less advantageous group in two ways. First, people 
who have greater ability to buy more consumer goods have to pay more taxes to the 
government. With the introduction of progressive taxation, rich citizens have greater 
responsibility to support the costs of communal p r o v i s i o n . ii4 The government, in turn, 
provides medical care to the citizens for the sake of their health and longevity. Thus 
poor people can receive basic welfare and security from the government. Second, 
blocked exchanges guarantee minimal income for the people.^ ^^ On the premise that a 
government carries out these two ways of redistribution, unequal distribution of 
consumer goods has no threat to the survival of the least advantaged group. Thus 
consumer goods can be freely exchanged among the people who desire the goods, as 
not see how they can stand alone. See Spheres, 261. 




Walzer has in effect redressed the inequality of one's starting point, such as natural 
endowments and inherited wealth. Walzer adds that, from the standpoint of complex 
equality, it does not matter that you have a yacht and I do not, or that she has a better 
hi-fi set than he has.^ ^^ 
Walzer thinks that to abolish the market because one's afraid of its tyranny is a 
mistake. Actually, the liveliness of an open market reflects our sense of great variety of 
desirable things. According to Walzer, as long as that is our sense, we have no reason 
to abolish the market. There is nothing degraded in making a shirt and a book available 
for a price. Although a person might be unable to buy both the shirt and the book at the 
same time, there would be nothing degraded about the exchange. Walzer does not 
think that distributive justice has to be concerned with such misfortunes. This is 
because the exchange is in principle a relation of mutual benefit. The money that 
merchants make and the accumulation of things by consumers pose no threat to 
complex equality. So long as money controls commodities and nothing else, he argues 
that there is no need to worry. Complex equality requires not that the market be 
abolished, but that everyone can have access to the market's possibilities regardless of 
his low status or political powerlessness. It defends against the radically laissez-faire 
economy that transforms every social good into a commodity. Some social goods, 
such as the irrigation system of ancient Egyptians, the cathedrals of medieval Europe, 
and the weapons of a modem army, were not commodities that were for sale in the 
m a r k e t . 117 Walzer further notes that the market does not reflect exactly what a person 
deserves. A just price is not the same as a just reward/^^ Walzer argues that a novelist 
who receives a small money reward from his readers does not mean that he has gotten 
less than he deserves. On the contrary, a good sale of his book a year later does not 
mean that he has become more deserving. According to Walzer, talk of desert in the 
us Spheres, 107-108. 
…Spheres, 109-112, 118-122. 
似 Spheres, 120-121. 
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sphere of money makes little sense. This is because it is a chancy business. Market 
does not recognize initiative, innovation, hard work, and so on. All of these are 
sometimes rewarded, but sometimes not. The novelist has bet on the market in which 
there is too much luck involved. But the novelist has a right to what he gets in the 
market when the market provides him the rewards. No one would want to pay his or 
her endless effort, according to Walzer, to strangers in the market, merely to win their 
gratitude. Therefore, Walzer on the one hand, acknowledges the values of market. But 
on the other hand, he emphasizes that the market cannot provide us with a single 
principle guiding all kinds of distributions. 
4 5 
Chapter 3: Criticisms on Walzer's theory of social 
goods 
Ideas about personal responsibility play a part in all these distributive 
decisions, but their part is mediated, not direct. They shape our 
understanding of particular goods; they don't serve as general principles of 
distribution. 
(David Miller & ^Valzer, Pluralism, Justice, and Equality) ^ ^ ^ 
In this chapter, I shall discuss various criticisms on Walzer's theory of social 
goods. I shall divide the chapter into four sections. First, I shall show that social 
meanings alone cannot determine their appropriate criteria of distributions. Apart from 
this, the social meaning of a good may be a wrong idea. Richard Ameson invites us to 
consider that what most people believe in a society might be based on ignorance. 
In § 3.2, I shall discuss Amy Gutmann's view that social meanings are not 
distinct, and disagrees that different social meanings do not constitute different 
spheres. She emphasizes that moral considerations are important factors in shaping a 
distribution. For example, she mentions that individual responsibility and equal 
citizenship are relevant moral considerations in distributing medical resources. 
However, such considerations are not specific to any autonomous sphere. I shall 
explain Walzer's view that moral considerations do not constitute a general principle 
governing all kinds of distributions. This is because Walzer insists that all social goods 
should be distributed according to their own social meanings. Moral considerations, 
however, only play a part in their distributions. They serve as a supplementary role in 
some occasions，which do not in themselves change the autonomy of social meanings 
of different goods. 
In § 3.3,1 shall explain why some commodities might also be regarded as needed 
goods. Now there is an overlapping sphere between commodities and needed goods. It 
彻 Spheres, 
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seems that there is no clear-cut boundary between commodities and needed goods. 
Finally, Jeremy Waldron attacks the distinctive social meanings of communally 
provided goods. In § 3.4, I shall examine Waldron's view that communal goods are 
seldom independent from the spheres of market and commodity. My view is that even 
though the meanings of social goods are often overlapping to each other, people in a 
given society are able to distinguish communal goods from commodities. Also, 
Waldron seems to have assumed that the values and meanings of different social goods 
are commensurable with the use of money. I shall argue that this assumption is wrong. 
The weakness of Walzer's theory of social goods is that Walzer only offers an 
argument that every type of social good should constitute a distinct distributive 
principle. But this argument cannot explain that we should support a ban on slavery, 
murder, and polygamy. To solve this problem, Walzer could respond that citizens have 
a shared understanding of what citizenship means in their community. They have a 
shared understanding of what they should do in their community, such as paying tax 
and banning slavery and assassination. They also have a shared understanding of what 
they should not practice, such as polygamy. 
3.1 Loose link between social meanings and distributive principles 
Walzer's idea that a distribution should be determined by social meaning is 
faced with objections. Walzer tries to link up a distributive principle and the meaning 
of a social good by arguing that a distribution of a social good is just, if and only if it is 
distributed according to its meaning. For example, Walzer argues that market 
exchange is the appropriate standard for commodities. Once we know that something 
is a commodity, Walzer argues, we also know that the market should distribute the 
commodities to those who are willing to forgo other commodities. But it is odd to say 
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that the unequal distribution of money is not the business of distributive justice. On the 
contrary, Brian Barry argues that this matters to most people. ^ ^^  The fact of unequal 
distribution becomes more obvious when the spread between the top and bottom of 
distributional profile in every sphere is enormous. Any theory suggesting that there is 
nothing unjust about a society where rich people use up 40 percent of total resources 
while the poor people cannot enjoy the most basic necessities, according to Barry, is 
itself an unjust theory. ^ ^^  I think Walzer's theory would avoid this situation, as it 
supports a welfare state where there is a redistribution of wealth from the rich 
according to their ability to the poor according to their needs .�22 When the government 
provides goods to the poor, the money it spends actually comes from the tax revenue 
received from other people. The rich contribute the largest part of tax revenue to the 
government. Poor people are protected by basic necessities under the system of 
complex equality, whereas the rich people can own more wealth and resources. 
I agree with David Miller and T. M. Scanlon, s view that knowing the social 
meaning of a good alone is not enough to determine its appropriate distribution. David 
Miller indicates the problem of Walzer's theory of justice by saying that the link 
between social meaning of a good and its appropriate distributive principle is too loose. 
Miller notes that it is obviously appropriate to distribute honor to people who deserve 
it because selling recognition in a market is self-defeating to its social meaning. 
Nevertheless, Miller argues, the case is less obvious for other social goods like 
medical care, education and political p o w e r . ！之斗 This is because it is rather difficult for 
us to say that allowing medical aid to be sold in a market is self-defeating to its social 
120 Brian Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice," in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 1995, p. 70. 
121 ibid., P.79. 
仍 Spheres, 9\, 120. 
But should money commodities be re-distributed? Walzer does not answer this question, because his 
theory of distributive justice does not ask where the resources come from. Given the resources, it only 
deals with how to distribute and share the resources among the people. 
124 ibid； P.5. 
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meaning. We need more arguments to justify the link between its social meaning and 
its appropriate distributive principle. Unfortunately, Walzer does not give us the 
justification. Scanlon offers similar arguments criticizing the link between social 
meaning and its appropriate distributive principle. He distinguishes two kinds of goods 
according to their nature: 1) social goods that are thought of as desirable things in a 
given society; 2) social goods with their meanings that are more analogous to 
11� 
quasi-linguistic meaning. Bread, as Scanlon puts it, is desirable in one society as a 
source of nourishment, while it is desirable in another society as a necessity in 
religious ceremonies. However, the meanings of prizes and honors, for example, 
express a social recognition of certain distinction and achievements. The meanings of 
prizes and honors are in that such meanings imply their distribution. Thus they have 
quasi-linguistic meanings and entail their distributional patterns. But Scanlon thinks 
that Walzer would not agree with such distinction. According to Walzer, the market is 
a proper way to distribute commodities, while a government should provide 
necessities to people. Scanlon thinks that social meanings of these goods cannot 
belong to the first or second kind. This is because the connection between “social 
meanings" and "nature" of these goods is loose. There is no intimate linkage between 
market and commodity, public provision and necessity. To Scanlon, their connections 
should be supported by appeal to some principles, such as “fairness，，，"individuality", 
1 
and "personal integrity." As a result, it seems that social meanings alone cannot 
determine their appropriate criteria of distributions. 
I have shown that, for Miller and Scanlon, knowing the social meaning of a good 
alone is not enough to determine its appropriate distribution. Apart from this, the 
social meaning of a good may be a wrong idea. Richard Ameson invites us to consider 
125 T. M. Scanlon, "Local Justice" London Review of Books (1985), p.l7. 
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that what most people believe in a society might be based on ignorance. ^ ^^  People 
might have wasted their time trying to do better than other people as guided by a false 
standard. It might be better for us to give up the shared meaning that most people in a 
society believe. In Ancient Athens, the government did not provide education of 
• 128 
children. According to Walzer, Athenians did not think that education was a social 
need. Their social meaning of education was different from that of American. 
However, Ameson might claim that what most Athenians believed was based on 
ignorance. In order to treat all persons equally, it may be better that greater resources 
should be spent on education to the poor or to those bom into the less favorable social 
positions, at least during the earlier years of school. 
3.2 Moral considerations and Principle of Utility 
Amy Gutmann denies that social meanings are distinct, and disagrees that 
different social meanings constitute different spheres. She emphasizes that moral 
considerations are important factors in shaping a distribution. For example, she 
mentions that individual responsibility and equal citizenship are relevant moral 
considerations in distributing medical resources. However, such considerations are not 
specific to any autonomous s p h e r e ” � G u t m a n n invites us to consider that the view 
that medical care should be considered as a social need does not follow that medical 
resource must be distributed strictly according to need all the time. She argues that 
personal responsibility is relevant to the distribution of health care, and need is not the 
only morally relevant consideration in distributing medical care. People with reckless 
127 Richard Ameson, "Against 'Complex Equality'," in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 1995，p. 241, 244.C 
128 Spheres, 79. 
129 I am indebted to this view to John Rawls. See John Rawls (1999), p.86. 
130 Amy Gutmann, "Justice across the spheres," in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism, 
Justice, and Equality, 1995, p. 100. 
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behavior that results in medical treatment should not enjoy the same degree of welfare 
as responsible people who still suffer from misfortune. Since it may be too expensive 
to satisfy all the needs at a time, responsible people should enjoy priority. This is the 
moral consideration of personal responsibility. Therefore, satisfaction of need should 
not serve as a sufficient distributive criterion.^ ^^ She wants to show that the meaning of 
a social good alone does not determine its distribution. We can agree that need is a 
necessary condition of having medical care from a government. However, we cannot 
sufficiently conclude that medical care should not be sold in the market when some 
people want to buy a better health care without depriving the services to those in need. 
Walzer replies that doctors may not refuse to treat their patients even if the 
1 
patients may be responsible for their own sickness. When these patients are waiting 
for their treatment in the emergency room in a hospital, Walzer emphasizes that they 
should be treated in the same way as other patients. He writes, "welfare benefits are 
distributed to people in trouble even if they are themselves the cause of the trouble. 
It is another matter when we require the patients to pay a higher cost for insurance and 
to pay more tax for buying cigarettes. But their moral history is irrelevant in the 
emergency room. What the doctors should be concerned with is whether their patients 
are in medical need. 
So far I have described that Walzer's main thesis in The Spheres of Justice is that 
distribution of social goods should be done in accordance with their social meanings, 
and only their social meanings. That is why Walzer stresses the autonomy of the 
spheres. Gutmann aims to undercut Walzer's theory by suggesting that personal 
responsibility, which transcends or crosses the spheres, is another factor to consider. If 
Gutmann is correct, then Walzer's theory would be undermined. 
131 z m , pp.111-115. 
These patients might be heavy smokers, drug addicts, or dangerous workers. 
133 Michael Walzer, "Response", in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism, Justice, and 
Equality, 1995, p. 294. 
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In Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, Walzer concedes that all social goods 
should be distributed according to their own social meanings, but moral considerations 
play a part in the distributions. He points out that “[m]urder, torture, and enslavement 
are wrongful features of any distributive process". These features are wrong for 
reasons that have “little to do with the meaning of social goods.，，i34 Because his theory 
of social goods cannot explain the wrongness of those features, Walzer thinks that we 
need a theory of human rights to set basic parameters within which distributions of 
social goods take place. ^ ^^  Walzer agrees that ideas of personal responsibility should 
play a part in a distribution. However, they do not belong to any particular sphere of a 
social good. He adds that ideas of personal responsibility only play a part in a sense 
that they are "mediating across all social goods” as "trans-sphere principles. It is 
not easy to understand the words of Walzer, so I would like to clarify his view in the 
following discussions. 
My own view is that consideration of consequences underlies Walzer's 
"trans-sphere principles" and they are not something transcendental beyond the 
tradition of a given society. Let me give two examples to elaborate my view. 
Suppose our limited and inseparable resources on education cannot satisfy both 
children. We have to decide which one might enjoy a priority. One child, for example, 
is an exceptional mathematic genius. The other child is so unfortunate that he is a 
severely retarded person. ^ ^^  Applying John Rawls' theory, we can probably conclude 
that the resources should go to the retarded person, even if the training would only 
make him leam how to tie his shoelaces. The retarded person is the least advantaged 
individual at the moment. On the other hand, utilitarianism suggests that the resources 
134 Michael Walzer, "Response", in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism, Justice, and 
Equality, 1995, p. 293. 
135 Ibid., p. 293. 
136 Ibid., p. 294. 
137 A famous example borrowed from John C. Harsanyi, See "Can the Maximin Principle serve as a 
basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls' theory", American Political Science Review (June 1975): 
596. 
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should go to the mathematics genius. Which child should be given more consideration? 
Consider one more example: suppose two patients are waiting for medical treatment 
by antibiotic or they would eventually die. Unfortunately the resources are so scarce 
that only one of them can be saved. It is certain that individual A can recover his health 
after a successful treatment, but since individual B has a terminal cancer, an antibiotic 
can only prolong his life for several months. ^ ^^  Once again, we cannot divide and share 
the resources. In this case, none of them are responsible for their sickness. According 
to Gutmann, should we trace back their moral history, such as their conduct 
performance in college and their way of life in the past twenty years, in order to 
calculate which individual deserves the medical resources? Neither individual A nor 
individual B should be responsible for the misfortune. Meanwhile, both individuals 
have the same need to live. Now the doctor has to consider which patient should be 
saved first. What remains is the consideration of consequences and utility when the 
doctor calculates which patient deserves the medical resources. i对 
But moral consideration of consequences can still bring us some puzzles. John C. 
Harsanyi thinks that Rawls' Difference Principle may reach a highly irrational 
conclusion in the above two examples."*^ To use the limited resources to provide 
138 ibid. 
139 Another example is Gilbert Harman's case in a hospital's emergency room. A doctor has six accident 
victims in his hospital's emergency room. All six are in danger of dying but one is much worse off than 
the others. The doctor can just barely save that person if the doctor devotes all of his resources to him 
and lets the others die. Alternatively, the doctor can save the other five if he is willing to ignore the most 
seriously injured person. Everything else being equal, it would seem that in this case, the doctor would 
be right to save the five and let the other person die. The principle behind this is the principle of utility. 
But suppose the most seriously injured person were the president of the United States. According to 
consequentialist consideration, the doctor might be right to save the president first. See Gilbert Harman, 
The Nature of Morality, Chapter 1, "Ethics and Observation", New York: Oxford University Press 
(1977), P.3. 
140 ibid., p.595. But notice that Rawls gave a response to Harsanyi's criticisms. According to Rawls, his 
Difference Principle should not be applied in "micro scale." It should only be applied in the 
arrangement in the basic structure of a society. Suppose I only have $5000, but a rich man has $10 
billion. Then I suggest that the rich man and I should be put under the veil of ignorance and then we 
choose a principle for distribution. This is a kind of micro scale in which Rawls denies. Rawls is only 
concerned with the basic structure of society because he thinks that the form of society affects its 
members and determines in large part the kind of people they are. By implication, the Difference 
Principle does not apply to the distribution between the retarded child and the genius; hence Rawls 
might not disagree with giving the resources to the mathematical prodigy. However, Harsanyi responds 
that the wrongness of the Difference Principle has nothing to do with the scale. It seems that Rawls has 
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education for the retarded child and to provide the limited antibiotic to the terminal 
cancer victim is something irrational, according to Harsanyi. To provide more 
education to the mathematic genius would increase more utility for the whole society. 
Similarly, recovering a patient's health completely is much better than prolonging an 
individual's life for several months. However, Harsanyi's solution is an unjust 
arrangement according to Rawls' Difference Principle. Both Harsanyi and Rawls, 
Difference Principle give us different perspectives of moral consideration. But neither 
of them can really help us to resolve our puzzles. It is because it is disputed as to which 
perspective of moral consideration is more convincing. 
I think that the content of moral consideration is subject to different times and 
different places. Should we consider the urgency of medical need in the emergency 
room? Should we consider one's loyalty to the country? Should we consider one's 
contributions to the community? Furthermore, to what extent or how much weight do 
the moral considerations play in the distributions? 
On Walzer's view, the idea about moral considerations does not in itself change 
the autonomy of social meanings of different goods. It considers different 
consequences of distributive arguments for different social goods. On my view, this 
idea is especially important during the situations when there are more than two parties, 
who have the same needs, competing for a particular type of scarce resource. Walzer 
never clearly defines the term "need", as different people have different definitions 
and degrees of need. I need five pieces of sushi for a lunch, but you may need a dozen 
pieces of sushi for the meal. In the situation of the emergency room where the two 
patients are in life danger, both patients have the same degree of medical need. But 
whose need should be considered first? Owing to the inseparable allocation and 
scarcity of resources, I think moral consideration may play a part here. As Walzer 
no reason to conclude that the Difference Principle does not apply at the micro scale. 
141 Michael Walzer, "Response", in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism, Justice, and 
Equality, 1995, p. 294. 
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states in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, he has conceded that such moral 
consideration involves consequential considerations of distributive arguments for 
different social goods. 
Based on the above discussion, I would like to summarize the main ideas in this 
section. First, no one should be responsible for her sickness in an emergency room. 
However, when limited and inseparable resources on education cannot satisfy both 
patients, we have to make hard choice by choosing one of them. The trans-sphere 
principles, which are reiterating in each sphere, are moral considerations of 
consequence and utility. Second, I have clarified that on Walzer view, the idea about 
moral considerations does not in itself change the autonomy of distributions of 
different social goods. I have also argued that this idea is especially important during 
the situations when there are more than two parties competing for a particular type of 
scarce resource. Therefore Walzer's idea of moral considerations does not belong to 
any particular distributive sphere. Rather, it is only mediating across different spheres. 
Also, it only has a supplementary role in some occasions. 
If my clarification is true, I think the following view is correct: Walzer does not 
want to claim that the idea of moral considerations should serve as a general principle 
of distribution, because surely Walzer denies that moral considerations of 
consequence and utility should become the only important and relevant factor in all 
sorts of distribution. 142 
142 Gilbert Harman indicates a surprising result that principle of utility might turn out to be. His thought 
experiment is that there are five patients in a hospital who are dying, each in need of a separate organ. 
One needs a kidney, another a lung, a third a heart, and so forth. The doctor of the hospital can save all 
five only / / the doctor takes a single healthy person for routine tests and removes his heart, lungs, 
kidneys, and so forth to distribute to those five patients. In that case, there would be one dead but five 
saved. If the doctor does nothing, the healthy man will survive without incident but the other patients 
will die. Harman observes that our reluctance to sacrifice the innocent bystander reveals the complexity 
of the issue when applying the principle of utility. See Gilbert Harman's The Nature of Morality, p.4. 
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3.3 Basic Needs and Communal Provision 
Brian Barry admits that we have to know the social meanings of the goods in 
order to talk about their criteria of distributions. But he points out that our 
understanding of social meanings is not enough to determine what is a just distribution 
of the goods�43 However, he adds that an existence of some more basic needs to our 
lives does not lead to a conclusion that those goods should be communally p r o v i d e d . i44 
On Walzer's view, the social meaning of medical care in the United States today is that 
the good should be taken out of the market and be communally provided according to 
needs. Barry disagrees with such a view. He argues that food, clothing, and shelter are 
even more basic needs. However, knowing their social meanings does not lead to 
Walzer's conclusion that they should be communally provided. Social recognition of 
need does not entail anything immediately about what justice requires. The reason is 
that every society recognizes food as a basic need, but the United States and many 
other countries do not distribute food to everyone as a communal provision. Walzer 
might respond that the governments of these countries do not understand their social 
meaning of food as a need, and therefore they do not distribute food to the people as a 
communal provision. But Walzer's original argument is that whenever people in a 
society recognize a social good as a need, their government should distribute the good 
to everyone who lacks it. Based on this argument, I think Walzer is not entitled to 
saying that whether some societies have misunderstood their social meanings. 
Despite this, Walzer would agree that an existence of some more basic needs to 
our lives does not lead to a conclusion that a government should generally provide 
those goods to all people. The government does not supply all the basic needs 
precisely because some of them are affordable by most people. Moreover, resources 
ibid., P.71. 
144 Brian Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice", Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 1995, 
pp.72-73. 
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are always scarce, and so the government cannot supply all kinds of basic need to 
people. More importantly, as Walzer argues, the provision of security and welfare 
requires the constraint of those men and women who had previously controlled the 
goods in question and sold them on the market. The reason is that needed goods should 
not be left to "the whim of some powerful group of owners" to the extent that poor 
people cannot enjoy those needed goods�45 Given that clothing and food are socially 
recognized needs, and most people in the society can afford those needs by themselves. 
Now the government does not spend money on general communal provisions of 
clothing and food, but only provide those goods to those citizens who cannot afford the 
goods by themselves. In this case, poor people would not suffer even if other people 
can buy those needed goods on the market. Hence, clothing and shelter are basic needs; 
but when most people in a society could afford the goods, the government would not 
have to provide those goods generally to all the citizens. However, when land is so 
expensive that most people cannot afford to buy a shelter for their minimal standard of 
living, Walzer might wish to support general communal provision of public housing 
for those who need them. 
According to Walzer, communal provision has three meanings. First, it supplies 
the social good with a minimal standard for everyone.i46 Second, it should be equally 
available to all citizens who are in need. Third, instead of supplying the social goods to 
those who can afford them, a government provides the communal goods in order to 
145 Spheres, 89. 
146 The hungry cannot afford to buy food by themselves, and the government provides the social needs 
to those who cannot afford them. However, there is a dispute as to whether a government should provide 
money or food stamps to the hungry. It is objected that the government should not provide money to the 
hungry. The hungry can only use food stamps to exchange for food, but they can reserve part of the 
money to buy other commodities. The opposite view is that the hungry would face discrimination when 
they used food stamps. I think Walzer would be in favor of the previous objection. Concerning the 
sphere of leisure, Walzer argues that holidays and vacations are two different ways of distributing free 
time. It is unjust to use money in exchange for labors' free time {Spheres, 189, 196). The idea behind this 
is that one type of social good should not be used to dominate other distributions by converting it into 
other social goods. Similarly, Walzer would agree that it is unjust to use money in exchange for food. 
The hungry have needs for food, and the government should only provide those social goods that are 
needed by the hungry. 
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free people from their immediate constraints of physical need.m Beyond the level of 
what is communally provided, Walzer allows that needed goods be bought and sold in 
a market. People are allowed to buy and sell the needed goods when the market does 
not distort the distributions of communal goods below the level of communal 
• • 148 
provision. 
It may be objected that need is not even a necessary condition of certain socially 
recognized needs like medical care and housing. According to Walzer, a person can 
have the social goods if she has a need for them. In addition, she can have the goods 
only if she has a need for them. Therefore a person can have the social goods only if he 
or she has a need for them.i49 Need becomes a necessary condition of having the social 
goods. It is objected that the condition is restrictive on those people who do not have 
needs for the goods but they want to own the goods. Also, some people may have a 
need to those goods but they do not want the communal goods provided by their 
government. However, Walzer's view would restrict them to satisfy their needs from 
the market. 
I do not think that there is a restriction on those people. As I have already 
mentioned, communal provision only supplies the needed goods with a minimal 
standard to citizens. Goods with standards above the minimal level are no longer 
needed goods but are commodities to be bought and sold in a market. Government 
supplies food to the hungry. But it only provides some basic relief and nutrition to the 
hungry. They should not expect that the government will supply them with expensive 
Italian cuisine in luxury hotels, nor could they get more food than they need. Markets 
supply social goods to people who might not have any need for them. Some people 
� Spheres, 90, 103, 167. Education and drama may not physical needs if they compare with food, 
clothes, and housing. Walzer agrees that education and drama can be communal goods. Therefore, 
communal goods do not only aim at relieving people from their immediate constraints of physical need. 
148 Spheres, 90. 
149 The needed person can have the goods "only i f , not "if and only i f she has a need for them. This is 
because in those societies, it may not be possible to satisfy everyone's need. Need may not a sufficient 
condition of having the social goods. It is subject to the society's ability to satisfy everyone's need. 
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might have a great need to own luxury goods but the government would not provide 
those goods to the people. Communal provision only ensures a minimally decent care 
to all who need the good.^ ^^ Suppose all citizens in a state with a large territory share a 
recognized need to have an automobile. ^^^ The government decides to provide 
automobiles for its citizens who need them. But there are some citizens in the society 
who have no need for automobiles; they just want to own them. According to Walzer's 
distributive principle, neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition of having the 
communal provision for the citizens has been satisfied. In spite of this, the distributive 
principle has no restriction on a citizen who wants to own a Ferrari and a Porsche for 
purposes other than his or her needs. A billionaire might wish to buy a Mercedes-Benz 
and ten Bentleys in order to impress others with his or her wealth. Meanwhile, a car 
collector is fond of buying Rolls Royce, Jaguar and Saab as collector's items because 
of their beauty and rarity. These people did not violate the distributive principle of 
communal provision because those famous cars are not needed goods. According to 
Walzer, only needed goods are subject to the distributive principle of communal 
provision and they cannot be left to some powerful groups of o w n e r s � 5 2 of course it is 
not easy to define which goods should be regarded as needed goods. Similarly, it is not 
easy to draw a line of minimal standard for communal provision. Despite this, we 
know that luxury goods are not needed goods, and all social goods that can be 
exchanged in a market are called commodities. What we want to know is to consider 
whether some commodities might also be regarded as needed goods. 
If the answer is yes, then at least some needed goods can be bought and sold in a 
market. In Walzer's view, people are allowed to buy and sell the needed goods only 
when the market does not distort the distributions of communal provision. If the 
150 Spheres, 88. 
151 An automobile may be a luxury good in Hong Kong. However, owning an automobile is a necessity 
in some large countries, such as the United States and Canada. 
152 Spheres, 89. 
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answer is no, then needed goods cannot be bought and sold, even when the exchange 
itself does not distort the distributions. But it will be contrary to Walzer's theory in the 
Spheres of Justice. Therefore he would reject the latter answer. It follows that some 
commodities might also be regarded as needed goods. Now there is an overlapping 
sphere between commodities and needed goods. It seems that there is no clear-cut 
boundary between commodities and needed goods. 
3.4 Unclear boundaries between social goods 
Jeremy Waldron attacks the distinctive social meanings of communally 
provided goods with three arguments. First, he thinks that communal goods are seldom 
independent of the spheres of market and commodity. This is because the communal 
provision is made possible by governments' taxing activities in the private sector. 
Money is always involved in the communal provision as the government expenditures 
often take the form of contracts with private firms. A slump in private economy， 
according to Waldron, can severely decrease a government's ability to deliver public 
goods and services. 
Some public services, such as military duties, depend on citizens' services rather 
than signing contracts with private firms. However, a citizen who joins an army has a 
social meaning of his or her contributions. Waldron writes that the time and energy 
which a soldier spends in service constitute a social meaning of military services for 
the coun t ry /53 The public aspect of communal goods, which must be protected against 
the domination of powerful individuals and markets, therefore does not exhaust the 
social meanings of communal goods. i54 
His second argument of the objection is that people receive communal goods 
153 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", p.153. 
154 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", pp. 152-153. 
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only for a short period of time. These people need public assistance because they are 
currently unable to provide the goods for themselves. They are expected that their need 
for public assistance will not last for a long time.'^^ Most people in a society are 
capable of buying goods like food, clothing, and medical care in market places and 
these people do not violate Walzer's distributive theory in any way, such as 
domination of social goods. Waldron thinks that Walzer is correct to ban the use of 
money in exchange for communal goods. However, Waldron thinks that Walzer is 
wrong to argue that communal goods should not be traded-off on the ground; these 
goods have a sphere apart from the market/^^ According to Waldron, communal 
goods should be distributed in accordance with people's particular needs rather than 
by the meaning of the social goods themselves. The meaning of the social goods 
should not dictate the principles with which the social goods are distributed to 
people. 157 This is because many communal goods are the goods that might be 
produced and consumed privately in markets. Some people depend on government 
provision because they have needs for communal goods. However, the people would 
provide the goods for themselves on the basis of market activity when they had no 
need to rely on public assistance. Thus communal goods do not have distinctive social 
meanings as compared with commodities. 
Waldron goes on to object that Walzer's defense of “blocked exchanges" is not 
sound. Walzer argues that rights may not be sold for money. These particular goods 
should be distributed in some other way. Blocked exchanges ban the use of money for 
a list of social goods. At the time we ban the use of money for those goods, Walzer 
argues that we establish a right not to be infringed. ^ ^^  As long as people do not need to 
pay for freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, for example, people are entitled to 
155 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", p. 155. 
156 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", p. 157. 
157 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", p.l55. 
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have rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. Waldron responds that 
whether rights may be sold for money remains a matter of academic and legal 
disputes.159 Examples are right of using some public facilities, right to emigrate from a 
country, right to be exempt from military services, etc. In addition, the reason for 
banning those activities on the list is not that some social goods, such as slavery, 
murder, and polygamy, should not be sold for money. According to Waldron, Walzer 
does not argue that slavery, murder, and polygamy have their own social meanings and 
should be distributed accordingly. Rather, Walzer wants to argue that there should be 
no slaves, no murder, and no polygamy in the s o c i e t y ] 6� 
However, Waldron observes that Walzer's idea of blocked exchanges only 
classifies a given social good either as exchangeable for money or as not. Waldron 
thinks that Walzer should distinguish between an outright ban on something and a rule 
that a social good should not be exchanged for money. ^^^ An outright ban on 
something means that an activity is prohibited, even if the activity does not involve 
money or exchange. According to Waldron, murder is wrong and so murder for money 
is blocked. Hence one cannot sell one's services as an assassin, even for free. This is 
illegal. But such social rule has nothing to do with the distinctive meaning of market 
and commodity. When a society bans murder, its aim is not to prevent the market from 
dominating the sphere of assassination. On the other hand, a rule saying that sex for 
money is wrong is not claiming that sex is a wrong activity. To Waldron, Walzer only 
considers that prostitution is wrong. ^ ^^  But I think Walzer's focus is not trying to 
explain whether prostitution is right or wrong. Instead he wants to claim that we 
cannot buy true love and true friendship from markets. Despite this, Waldron disagrees 
with Walzer's account of love and friendship. Waldron thinks that love and friendship 
159 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", p.158. 
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have no conflict with the market place since many people found their true love through 
a dating service. Moreover, Waldron thinks that Walzer has no reason to exclude that 
some people have sought their own standards of meaningful love and friendship 
through exchange. 163 
I would respond to these objections as follows. I do not agree that communal 
goods are never independent from the sphere of the market. Even if money is always 
involved in the communal provision as the government expenditures, Waldron cannot 
conclude that communal goods are seldom independent from the spheres of market 
and commodity. Students have to pay for their tuition fees for their tertiary education. 
Billionaires contribute part of their wealth to a university. But these facts do not show 
that they can use their money to purchase university degrees from tertiary institutions. 
Nor can these facts conclude that education is seldom independent from the sphere of 
money and commodity. 
By the same logic, Walzer would agree that many people found their true love 
through a dating service. Some people may use money to buy sex. However, this does 
not mean that people might use their money to purchase love and friendship. They 
only have access to dating services from private firms, but dating services are different 
from sex. The meaning of friendship and marriage is more than sex. Walzer would 
agree with most couples that marriage is an expression of love and friendship for 
which money cannot be exchanged. Waldron is correct to note that some people have 
their freedoms to seek their own standards of meaningful love and friendship through 
exchange. They have freedom to spend money on food and entertainment with their 
friends. Alternatively, they might give money to travel agencies so that they could 
spend a long vacation with their loved one. However, these people only gave money to 
some private firms, such as dating service companies, travel agencies, and restaurants. 
163 Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality", pp.158-159. 
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They did not use money in exchange for love and friendship. Our expenditure for a 
dinner with our friends has nothing to do with buying a friendship in a market. 
It seems that the time and energy a soldier spends in service constitute a social 
meaning of military service for the country. Walzer mentions that social goods have 
social meanings, and people find their ways to distributive justice through an 
interpretation of those m e a n i n g s . i64 But, according to Walzer, social meanings are not 
subject to the interpretive decisions of individual men and women.^ ^^ Also, the best 
interpretation is not a product of a complicated piece of survey research. ^ ^^  What is 
interpretation? How can an individual, such as a soldier, contribute to the social 
meaning of a social good? Can the soldier's time and energy devoted to the army 
represent the social meaning of military service? I think answers to these questions 
take me too far away from the focus of this chapter. But I shall attempt to explore these 
puzzles in Chapter 5. 
Although I agree that there is no clear-cut boundary between communal goods 
and commodity, it is wrong to conclude that they have the same kind of social meaning. 
Even if such meanings are overlapping with each other, people in a given society are 
able to distinguish communal goods from commodities. It is true that many communal 
goods are the goods that might be produced and consumed privately in markets. For 
example, food is a communal good when a government provides food to people who 
are in need. Meanwhile, food is created and distributed as a commodity among the 
people in a market. However, a commodity is not the social good that is designed to 
free people from the immediate constraints of physical need. As Walzer observes, a 
commodity is a "source of comfort, warmth and security", which can be a luxury as 
well as a s t ap leEvery society has its own conception of commodity, according to 
似 Spheres, 19. 
iM Spheres, 22. 
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its means of production, its social organization, and the way people conceive, create 
and distribute among t h e m s e l v e s ] 6 8 
Contrary to Walzer's view, Waldron argues that money does not have its own 
sphere of distribution. He thinks that money is not a social good but it is only a 
representation of potential exchange for other goods. Comparing the value and 
meaning of a social good with each other becomes possible with the use of money. As 
a silver coin, the object itself carries a social meaning of adornment. However, 
according to Waldron, a bank note is not an object that carries a social meaning. 
Waldron supposes one might use dollar coins as stones or roll up a banknote to take 
d r u g . 169 丁his is because the banknote or the paper itself does not carry the social 
meaning of potential exchange for other goods. It carries the social meaning of 
potential exchange for other goods only when the government and the note-issuing 
bank guarantee its symbolic marker of exchange. According to Waldron, monetary 
media, such as banknotes, credit cards, passbooks, and dollar coins, does not carry the 
social meaning of potential exchange for other goods. Printed figures on passbooks 
are only a set of numbers and reference codes until the bank recognizes that the figures 
are a symbolic marker of exchange. 
I think Waldron's argument cannot undermine Walzer's sphere of money. Like 
money, one might use tee shirts to clean a floor and windows, while most people 
recognize the tee shirts as a basic need to their society. If a tee shirt is a social good, 
why isn't money a social good, too? Our society gives a social meaning to silver as a 
valuable adornment, but we can imagine that in some poor countries a piece of bread is 
more valuable than ten pounds of silver. In those countries five pounds of marble, for 
instance, is equivalent to ten pounds of mudstone, while the same marble and 
似 Spheres, 6, 103-104 
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mudstone might be valued differently or valueless in other countries. Perhaps modem 
societies would abolish the use of banknotes in the future because electronic banking 
services would replace the function of banknotes. If that is so, we might put those 
banknotes in museums and, hence, they would carry a social meaning as a public asset. 
It is not clear why Waldron thinks that gold, education and medical resources carry 
social meanings but money does not. 
Waldron seems to have assumed that the values and meanings of different social 
goods are commensurable with the use of money, because he thinks that money is a 
medium of exchange. The values and meanings of a computer and a mouse pad are 
commensurable with the use of money because these two social goods are 
commodities. However, it is not easy to conclude that friendship and recognition are 
commensurable with the use of money. Obviously not every social good is a 
commodity, and it seems that friendship and recognition are not commodities at all. 
What money can and cannot buy in a given society depends on the social meanings of 
commodity in that society. Every culture has its own characteristic set of commodities, 
as Walzer says, determined by its mode of production and social organization. ^ ^^  
Therefore, means of production and social organization determine what money means 
to the people. Money depends on its social meaning before it is given to those who 
might be holding any other social goods one might conceivably want. That's why in 
underdeveloped countries credit cards and electronic banking services do not carry the 
social meanings of symbolic markers of exchange. 
Finally, I would like to indicate that Walzer does not suggest a full set of 
blocked exchanges for all societies. He only focuses on the cultural conditions of the 
United States today. Thus we can only raise objections against his list of blocked 
exchanges on the ground of the cultural conditions of the United States. He does not 
171 Spheres, 103. 
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intend to argue that blocked exchanges ban the use of money for a list of social goods 
in all soc i e t i e s . 172 He would agree that there should be no slaves, no murder, and no 
polygamy in the United States. But Walzer only offers an argument that every type of 
social good should constitute a distinct distributive principle. This argument cannot 
explain that we should support a ban on slavery, murder, and polygamy. I think that (1) 
the issue as to whether there should be a ban on slaves is one thing, and (2) the issue as 
to whether the social meaning of money and commodity has a distinctive social 
meaning is another issue. Issue (1) discusses a ban on some activities in a society and it 
is irrelevant to the meanings of social goods. On the other hand, issue (2) discusses a 
proper sphere of money only and its conclusion does not give us an answer as to 
whether slavery should be banned or not. According to Walzer, social meanings of 
social goods determine all distributive principles in a given society. Now (1) and (2) 
are different issues; hence, there is no reason to argue that social meanings of social 
goods can explain a ban on slaves, assassination, and polygamy. Therefore, in 
supporting a ban of slavery, murder and polygamy, Walzer has to undermine his 
theory of social goods with distinctive meanings. 
To solve this problem, Walzer might respond that citizens have a shared 
understanding of what citizenship means in their c o m m u n i t y . 口�They have a shared 
understanding of what they should do in their community, such as paying tax and 
banning slavery and assassination. They also have a shared understanding of what they 
should not practice, such as polygamy. Thus the cultural conditions of the United 
States explain why there should be a ban on slavery, assassination, and polygamy. 
Walzer might argue that the meaning of citizenship possessed by people would 
1721 describe that Walzer does not "intend to" argue that blocked exchanges have universal application. 
This is because many of these block exchanges are the same universally, thus his list of blocked 
exchanges has universal application. However, Walzer does not want to defend universal principles, at 
least in the book of Spheres of Justice. I shall discuss Walzer's list of blocked exchanges and its 
universal application in Chapter 6. 
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determine the social meaning of money and commodity; hence, it explains why there 
should be no money exchange for slavery, assassination, and polygamy. This is 
because citizenship gives meanings to the people in a society about the values and 
commitments this society should have. Citizenship, by its first glance, is similar to a 
club membership. A golf club, for example, requires its members to switch off their 
mobile phones in its restaurants and fitness centers. If the patrons broke the rule, their 
membership would be cancelled. They have a shared understanding of what a 
membership means in their golf club. Nevertheless, Walzer argues that citizenship is 
different from a club membership. What is their difference apart from people trying to 
seek their mutual benefits? Let us go to Chapter 4 for further discussion. 
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Chapter 4: Citizenship and shared understandings of 
social goods 
The denial of membership is always the first of a long train of abuses. There 
is no way to break the train, so we must deny the rightfulness of the denial. 
The theory of distributive justice begins, then, with an account of 
membership rights. It must vindicate at one and the same time the (limited) 
right of closure, without which there could be no communities at all, and 
the political inclusiveness of the existing communities. For it is only as 
members somewhere that men and women can hope to share in all the other 
social goods- security, wealth, honor, office, and power- that communal life 
makes possible. 
(Walzer, Spheres of Justice) 口^  
In the preceding chapters, I have explained that Walzer treats the market as a 
zone of the city, but not the whole of the city, though it is commonly open to all 
comers. 175 Justice requires the defense of difference; various goods need to be 
distributed for different reasons among different groups of people. Walzer explains 
that equality is arrived at not by dividing all advantages up equally, but by enabling 
different people to excel in different social spheres. In this chapter, I first introduce 
Walzer's argument that the theory of distributive justice begins with an account of 
citizenship rights. Then I explore his notions of democratic citizenship and 
decentralized political power. According to Walzer, there is no alternative to 
democracy in the political sphere once every social good maintains its autonomous 
distribution. On my view, we might acknowledge that different communities might 
adopt different political and legal procedures in order to pursue democracy. To me, the 
idea of democracy that is widely held in the United States is applicable in other 
democratic countries as well. I shall explain this view in § 4.3. 
Following that, I shall discuss (a) the relationship between citizenship and the 
socially recognized needs of the people, and (b) whether a government should be 
174 Spheres, 62-63. 
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committed to provide security and welfare to its citizens. I shall explain how Walzer 
argues that communal provision should be distributed according to need, and the 
social good of specialized education should constitute another distributive sphere. 
On my view, the fact that different histories and cultures lead to different sorts, 
different priorities, and different degrees of needs does not by itself show that (1) the 
ancient Greek government, for example, was correct or incorrect to provide public 
baths and gymnasiums for its citizens. This fact also does not show that (2) people had 
a correct shared understanding of the social meaning of welfare. 
But I agree that Walzer's theory of complex equality is constructive in 
narrowing the difference between people's starting points determined by the 
contingencies of their births and familial backgrounds. Nevertheless, I shall argue that 
people's shared sense of a duty to the government, for instance, does not necessarily 
lead to an agreement concerning the extent and form of taxation and other social duties 
such as military services. 
Finally, in § 4.5, I shall summarize Walzer's ideas derived from his theory of 
distributive justice. These ideas are stated as follows: (a) no one can be an all-around 
winner in a democratic and differentiated society; (b) we cannot survive in a stateless 
condition; (c) there exists a plurality of men and women; (d) people are equal; and (e) 
social meanings can be in conflict. I shall raise some problems concerning these ideas. 
4.1 Democratic citizenship and political power 
Walzer argues that the idea of distributive justice presupposes a political 
community within which distribution takes place. It is a bounded world where a group 
of people is committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all 
7 0 
among themselves. ^ ^^  The group avoids sharing political power with strangers who do 
not belong to the political community; political power remains within the community. 
All members have the same citizenship. Walzer asserts that if people gave up their 
citizenship, they would be liable to expulsion, and consequently they would lose their 
communal provision of security and welfare from the government]？？ A citizen's right 
to enjoy communal provisions is different from a foreign person receiving assistance 
from our community. Walzer believes that while members of a community are 
obligated to offer assistance to a foreigner or stranger, they are not obligated to offer 
him membership simply because they need our continuing assistance. ^ ^^  Nor do we 
help the foreigner or stranger for the rest of our lives; assistance is not o n g o i n g . 口9 
Membership constitutes a social meaning. To distinguish membership in one country 
from membership in other countries does not depend upon finding out the historic 
origin of different groups. Rather, we should be concerned with the understanding of 
what citizenship means in every c o m m u n i t y . 18� 
Citizenship is membership of a political community. We have already owned it, 
and so we do not distribute citizenship among ourselves. We distribute the citizenship 
to foreigners. 181 There is no inconsistency with the above view that we are not 
obligated to offer a stranger membership simply because they need our continuing 
assistance. A government has the right to choose its citizens. It is not obligated to offer 
membership to any foreigner who needs it. On my view, Walzer seems to criticize 
utilitarian theory saying that we should not discriminate against someone merely 
182 
because he is far away. Utilitarian theory stands on an impartial point of view. So 
仏 Spheres, 
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party, and (2) if the risks and costs of giving it are relatively low for the other party. See Spheres, 33. 
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long as we accept that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care 
are bad; according to utilitarians, we ought to prevent bad from happening. It does not 
matter whether the suffering person is our citizen or a stranger. Walzer emphasizes 
that only citizens have the right to enjoy continual assistance. I am inclined to agree 
with Walzer. From an impartial point of view, we should help those with sufferings. 
But from an "agent-relative" point of view, we should give more concerns to those 
who are closer with us. 
Our understanding of citizenship determines whether we accept a new 
immigrant from a particular country. Walzer contends that the restraint of immigration 
serves to defend the common life of every member of the community. The common 
life is the value shared by the members, such as liberty and welfare, politics and 
1 QO 
culture. Members have a shared understanding of all values, including what 
citizenship means in their c o m m u n i t y . 184 If such distinctiveness of common life is a 
value, as most people seem to believe, then a governmental authority that seeks to 
regulate immigration becomes necessary. As a result, the door of the country is not 
opened to anyone who wants to come in; rather, it is only opened to a particular group 
of people. 
However, the right to control immigration does not include the right to control 
emigration. Walzer emphasizes that citizens have the right to leave their own country. 
The right to control immigration serves to defend the common life committed to the 
citizens, but the restrain of exit replaces commitment with coercion. ^^^ Here he draws 
183 Spheres, 39. 
184 Spheres, 39. The term "shared understanding" will be fully developed in later sections of this 
chapter. 
185 ibid. Cf. Spheres, 101. The modem state has, to be sure, an investment in every citizen, and it might 
legitimately require that some part of that investment be repaid, in work, public services, or money, 
before permitting emigration. But the citizens can claim, in their turn, that they never sought the health 
care and education that they or their children received, and hence owe nothing to return. But Walzer 
admits that this claim underestimates the benefits of citizenship. 
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an analogy with domestic clubs, where their members can regulate admissions, but 
they cannot bar the withdrawals. However, Walzer makes an important distinction 
between a country and a club. That is, a country has its territorial area, but a club does 
not claim territorial jurisdiction. Members cannot claim territorial jurisdiction and rule 
over the people who share with them the territory. ^ ^^  To do this is to act outside their 
sphere and beyond their r i gh t s ]87 
Walzer uses the case of a rich merchant, George Pullman, to illustrate the 
distinctive feature of citizenship. Pullman used his ownership of land in Illinois to 
govern the people in a way that contravened the shared understandings of the t o w n . 188 
Pullman was an autocrat who had a firm sense of how inhabitants of the town should 
live. Everyone who lived in the town was only a tenant of Pullman. They had no right 
to make decisions because they did not own the land. Instead, Pullman made all the 
decisions regarding the administration and planning of the town. For example, home 
renovation was strictly controlled, and restrictions were placed on the building of 
churches and exchange of commodities. In 1898 the Illinois Supreme Court ordered 
the Pullman Company to distinguish its ownership of the town from the ownership of a 
company. The court ruled that it was unjust to use one's investment in a town to control 
its inhabitants and their choices and actions. Pullman's investment in a town did not 
thereby acquire for him the right to govern its inhabitants. This would have 
contravened the shared understanding of citizenship in the town. According to the 
shared understanding of citizenship, the town had to be governed democratically. 
However, Pullman's behavior, I believe, did not contradict the town's shared 
understanding of citizenship. The Americans in the town could still enjoy their 
political freedom in the state, even if they were the residents or employees under 
186 It implies that even if a group of people leave the country and give up their citizenship, they have no 
right to claim a piece of land in proportion to the number of emigrants. 
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Pullman's supervision. It is odd to argue that factory workers have the right to make 
decisions because citizens have the right to choose their political leaders. It is 
unreasonable to require that the arguments in support of workplace democracy be 
identical with those of political democracy in a society. Similarly, the fact that we are 
living in a democratic society does not require that we support democracy in schools, 
or even families. It is not acceptable to allow students to decide how much homework 
to do on a given day solely because they have political freedoms. 
I should acknowledge that Walzer uses Pullman's case to emphasize the 
importance of communal life. Communal life links people and land. If the community 
were so divided that people did not share a communal life, Walzer argues, the territory 
of the community would be divided too. ！卯 Here citizenship suggests a special 
commitment to one another and a common life with other members. As I stated before, 
members share a common life that defends their values of liberty and welfare, politics 
and culture. After that, people can share with others the meanings of different social 
goods, such as political power and public welfare. Shared understanding of social 
goods becomes possible only if there is a single citizenship. To discuss the rights of a 
citizen becomes the first question of distributive justice. ^ ^^  
In order to talk about the rights of citizenship, Walzer defines the blocked use of 
political power. Citizens can oppose the government's actions，according to their 
shared understanding of the definition of political power. Walzer regards political 
power as a crucial agency of distributive justice. Political sphere is for Walzer a 
"double sphere." On the one hand, it guards the boundaries within which every social 
good is distributed. Political power protects citizens from tyranny and tries to prevent 
illegitimate crossings of various distributive spheres. On the other hand, political 
power is itself to be distributed as a social good on the basis of the shared 
189 Spheres, 44, 62. 
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understanding of the citizens. 
As there are things that money cannot buy, so there are things that government 
officials cannot do, which derive from a shared understanding of political power. 
Walzer makes a list of blocked uses of power in accordance with this shared 
understanding as defined in the United States. Walzer opposes government control 
over all distributions. It is inappropriate to use political power to regulate all kinds of 
sharing, dividing, and exchanging in the society. 19' 
Walzer argues that “limited government", like blocked exchange, is one of the 
crucial means to complex equality. ^ ^^  He indicates that government officials cannot 
control marriages and interfere in personal relations. They cannot control the religious 
life of the citizens, and they cannot sell their political power for self-interest. Officials 
cannot interfere with free exchange when the exchange is done within the sphere of 
money. Teachers should enjoy academic freedom. Government cannot regulate their 
actual teaching. It should guarantee civil liberties, such as free speech, free press, and 
free assembly. 
In § 2.4,1 have shown that every citizen has certain rights that do not cost money. 
Based on Walzer's arguments for blocked uses of power, he further indicates that all 
citizens are equal before the law. Acknowledgement of citizenship means that every 
citizen has the same political and legal rights. Therefore every citizen has the same 
right to vote, and he or she is entitled to a fair trial. In other words, every vote is 
counted in the same manner; all words in a court carry equal w e i g h t . � 9 4 
Democratic citizenship allows citizens to govern themselves by giving every 
citizen the same voting right. This, however, does not mean that every citizen can 
exercise equal political power. Democracy offers a way of allocating power, and it 
Spheres, 4. 
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does not give equal power to every citizen. Rather, democracy is a vehicle for 
persuading one's fellow citizens to agree to the inequality.^ ^^ Some people gain more 
political power because other people vote for them. Officials represent others, make 
decisions, and exercise unequal power as a result of the accumulation of votes from 
constituents. The representatives have to convince officials to approve their proposed 
legislation. In a democratic society, Walzer insists, individuals participating in 
political decisions d o not decide for themselves, b u t for the c o m m u n i t y g e n e r a l l y ] 96 
The fact that people have unequal political power is legitimate. Walzer does not 
argue that a state ought to distribute power among citizens as equally as possible. He is 
concerned with the inappropriate use of political power. It would be inappropriate to 
give some citizens greater political power because of wealth or nepotism. A persuasive 
man can convince other people to follow him, but he cannot use his superior political 
power to stop the citizens from competing for government positions. Democratic 
citizenship guarantees the opportunity to vote and to participate in the government. 
In short, Walzer argues that a town or a state has to be governed democratically. 
This means that citizens have the right to make decisions on town planning, house 
renovation, free exchange, etc. On the other hand, an owner of a company cannot 
claim territorial jurisdiction and rule over the people who share with him the territory. 
Furthermore, all citizens are given the same voting and legal rights, and their rights are 
to be maintained by political power. Political power is distributed only to those who 
can convince other citizens to elect them. But a person having political power makes 
decisions for the community generally. It is inappropriate to use political power as a 
means to gain individual benefits from other social goods or eliminate the equal rights 
of the citizens. Once we have located company ownership, political power, and citizen 
rights in their proper places and have established their autonomy of distributions, 
195 TT, 56. 
196 Spheres, 45. 
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Walzer argues, there is no alternative to democracy in the political s p h e r e .跳 
4.2 Decentralized democratic socialism 
Citizens are not market participants seeking to maximize profit, nor are they 
actively engaging in the equal exercise of political power. Walzer invites us to 
recognize that we are not one-dimensional men. Apart from money and power, we also 
care about love, education, health care, reputation, leisure activities, etc. As a matter of 
fact, we are divided persons who have multiple interests and roles，different identities, 
and different traditions and histories. Walzer refers to himself as an American, a Jew, a 
professor, a philosopher, an author, and a citizen, to emphasize that he is a “divided 
self." As divided selves, we must work for a society that allows for this complexity. ^ ^^  
Walzer understands that all distributive principles must fit together within a single 
cul ture . 200 T h e y must b e comprehensive across different companies o f m e n and 
women. The principles recognize the plurality of men and women in two ways. First, 
every community has its particular map of distributive justice that reflects its 
distinctive, shared understandings of social meanings. As Walzer says, there are an 
infinite number of possible cultures, religions, political arrangements, and 
geographical conditions. They shape an infinite number of possible lives in different 
communities.201 Second, an indeterminate number of distributive spheres in a given 
society operate to defend different criteria of distribution. 
Walzer argues that in any differentiated society, justice will make for harmony 
only if it first makes for separation?^^ Harmony is the appropriate arrangement of 
different social goods so that all distributive principles in the society fit together within 
198 Spheres, 303. 
199 TT, 85, 96. 
200 Spheres, 73. 
抓 Spheres, 3\3. 
^^^ Spheres, 3\9. 
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a single culture. According to Walzer, the appropriate arrangements in Western 
societies in general, and in the United States in particular, are those of decentralized 
democratic socialism. The working principle of democratic socialism is that a society 
opens up the politics and shares the decision making of the government, while 
decentralization is a process that stresses devolution and dispersion of state power into 
the hands of ordinary citizens.��� The devolution and dispersion of state power can be 
paraphrased in three ways. First, crucial decisions that shape the economy are left to 
the public. Second, governmental activity is decentralized so that more people can 
play a part in everyday decision-making. Third, different parties and movements can 
operate due to the increased level of individual commitment? '^^  
Decentralized democratic socialism combines the working principle of 
democratic socialism and the idea of decentralization. According to Walzer, a 
community endorsing decentralized democratic socialism encourages its government 
to provide welfare for the citizens. Meanwhile, market and political power are 
constrained according to the shared understandings of the meanings. On the one hand, 
they do not require the abolition of the market, but rather the confinement of the 
market to its proper space. On the other hand, the state does not take total control of 
economic life. Public honors and recognition are distributed according to merit. 
Individuals are free from all considerations of wealth and class.之。^  
Walzer elaborates his idea of decentralization by defining what is a just society. 
He thinks that a just society is a society where distributive principles are faithful to the 
shared understandings of the citizens. There are two ways to see the relationship 
between a just society and the idea of decentralization. First, the social world may look 
different from the way it does today in future, so every distributive principle of a social 
good and its sphere may change over time; Thus, within each distributive sphere, we 
203 RP, 70. 
204 RP, 51,70-71. 
205 Spheres, 3 IS- Walzer (1984), 323. 
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allow inequalities. Second, politicians have the power to make decisions for the 
community. Ideally, citizens have the power to vote them in or out of office. But 
Walzer stresses that politics is only one sphere among many in a community. People 
who enjoy a larger share in one good may have a smaller share in other social goods?^^ 
4.3 Ruled by citizens or ruled by specialists? 
Nevertheless, Walzer does not think that there exists a universal form of 
democracy. American political arrangements might not suit the needs of Chinese 
citizens. Instead, Chinese citizens should interpret democracy in terms of their own 
history and culture. Walzer does not make any judgment as to whether Chinese 
students should have shouted for democracy in Tienanmen Square. His solidarity with 
the students does not imply acceptance or rejection of their conception of 
democracy. 
Walzer shows a strong opposition to Plato's ”craft analogy." Plato's 
anti-democratic view is that when one is ill, and wants advice on health, one should go 
to see a doctor. In other words, one should consult someone specially trained to do the 
job. The worst alternative the sick man could choose is to assemble a crowd, and ask 
the people to vote on the correct remedy. Administration of a state is a matter of no less 
importance than an individual's health. Making political decisions requires judgment 
and skill. It should, Plato urges, be left to the experts. We are looking for the few who 
know the skill in ruling rather than the ignorant many.^ ^^ Allowing citizens to make 
political decisions is just like navigating at sea by consulting the passengers, and 
ignoring those who are truly skilled in navigation. A trained navigator commands a 
ship based on his study of seasons, sky, stars, and winds. But ignorant sailors assert 
^^^ Spheres, 
207 TT, 60. 
208 This part is paraphrased based on Walzer's description of Plato's analogy. See Spheres, 286. 
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that navigation is a thing that cannot be taught at all, and are ready to murder anyone 
who says it can. Just as the ship so navigated would lose its direction, Plato warns that 
consulting the populace in political decisions would lead to disaster. ^^ ^ 
If ruling is a skill that can only be attained and effectively exercised by the few, 
then democracy seems plainly absurd or irrational. Walzer agrees that navigation at 
sea requires skills and knowledge. However, Walzer contends that a pilot has to serve 
her passengers according to their choice of a destination. Before a pilot makes a 
decision involving possible risk, Walzer suggests that she should consult the 
passengers. The decision might well be left to the passengers.^^^ The pilot is an expert 
in navigation, just like a shoemaker is an expert at repairing shoes. However, Walzer 
argues, the pilot has no right to control the ship without the passengers' agreement, just 
as the shoemaker has no right to repair one's shoes without one's agreement.211 Walzer 
thinks that the case is the same with politics. Knowledge is crucial in politics, just as it 
is crucial in navigation. However, according to Walzer, politicians and pilots need to 
know what the people or the passengers really want. This is because what empowers 
the politicians or pilots to act on their knowledge is the authorization of the people or 
212 
the passengers themselves. A society with democracy, I think, is better than another 
society without democracy. Plainly democracy would bring some negative results, as 
majority opinions may be wrong and stupid. However, it is better than a society where 
the dictator decides every policy and even her successor. But I think Walzer only 
requires citizens have the right to vote for their political leaders. He does not require 
that the political leaders conduct opinion poll every time they make decision. They are 
the experts in politics, just like a pilot is an expert in navigation. It does not make sense 
to reject the importance of expert knowledge in politics. 
209 Plato, Republic VI, in Scott Buchanan (ed.), The Portable Plato, New York: Penguin Books, 1977, 
pp. 510-512. 
210 Spheres, 287. 
Spheres, 287. 
212 Spheres, 287. 
8 0 
According to Walzer, as I have stated in § 3.2, distributive justice requires 
people to exchange, share, and distribute social goods in accordance with their 
meanings. Walzer argues that a distribution has to be determined only in accordance 
with its shared meaning. 
On my view, different societies might have shared certain common ideas about 
democracy or have the same conception of democracy. Just as "monarchy" means 
"ruled by a monarch", "democracy" means "ruled by the demos." In classical Greek, 
demos can be understood as 'the people', and as 'the mob.'^ ^^ "Ruled by the demos" is a 
widely held conception of democracy, which requires respect for human rights. 
Richard Bellemy notes that Britain, France, and Italy share certain common principles, 
such as a respect for human rights. In order to realize their common principles, these 
countries, however, adopt different political and legal procedures that reflect local and 
historical d i f fe rencesagree that we might acknowledge that different communities 
might adopt different political and legal procedures in order to pursue democracy. 
However, this does not imply that different societies can have different idea of 
democracy. The idea of democracy has no difference from the idea of "ruled by the 
demos”. If a monarch ruled a society, this society is not a democratic society. So the 
idea of democracy that is widely held in the United States is applicable in other 
democratic countries as well. 
4.4 Shared understandings of social welfare 
Democratic citizens opt for various forms of security and welfare. In § 4.1, 
Walzer argues that if people relinquished their citizenship, they would lose their 
communal provision of security and welfare from the government. He stresses that 
Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 
73. 
214 Richard Bellemy (1998), p. 175. 
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government officials are committed to providing security and welfare to the citizens. 
To Walzer, citizens come together as members of a community in order to cope with 
difficulties and dangers; they cannot live apart as an isolated body.^ ^^ The community 
fulfills its members' needs, though there is no set of needs that is universal. In ancient 
Athens, as stated by Walzer, government provided public baths and gymnasiums for 
its citizens. However, the government did not provide unemployment insurance, social 
security, or funding for schools.^^^ But in Jewish communities such as those in 
fifteenth-century Spain, parents were obligated to send their children to schools. The 
government paid the school fees for poor children. In contrast to Ancient Athens, 
medieval Jewish communities provided regular distributions of food and clothing to 
• • 217 
poor citizens. Moreover, the general provision of food in Medieval Jewish 
communities primarily served the ritual, rather than the physical needs of the 
people;2i8 they did not recognize the food as a commodity that could be exchanged 
with money. These facts show that different communities lead to different patterns of 
provision. Thus, Walzer indicates that different history and culture leads to different 
priorities. 
Walzer argues that a community should provide all members with those goods 
that are socially recognized as needs. People recognize that certain goods are 
necessary to their common life.220 There is an agreement to redistribute the resources 
of the members in accordance with their shared understanding of needs. Communal 
provision is the recognition of their membership. On the other hand, every member is 
215 Spheres, 64-65, 80. 
2�6 Spheres, 64-67, 70. 
^^^ Spheres, 73. 
218 Spheres, 76. 
219 In many societies, however, the ruling class interest often leads to dominance and tyranny. I have 
indicated in §2.2 that because of dominance, tyranny becomes possible. 
220 Let's take vacation as an example. As soon as vacation has become a central feature of common life 
and culture in a society, some form of communal provision is required. For instance, the government 
should preserve wildlife for the people, otherwise certain vacations become impossible. Similarly, 
Walzer proposes that tax money should be spent on parks, beaches, campsites, and so on, to make sure 
that there are places for all those people who want to take a vacation in countryside. See Spheres, 192. 
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committed to bearing the necessary burden of the provision, such as paying taxes and 
joining the army. This duty is shared in the sense that some sort of tax or military 
services is needed, or communal provision could not last.^ ^^ As Walzer mentions, 
public health as a general provision is possible only when some members of the 
community give their money to support the provision. Therefore, taxation for services 
such as defense, internal security, public health, and other forms of provision is 
222 
necessary. That is why Walzer connects democratic citizenship with communal 
provision. 
Walzer indicates that communal provision is both general and particular. ^ ^^  
General communal provision means that a government provides a given communal 
good equally to all or most members of the community. But particular communal 
provision supplies the social goods only to those citizens who are in need. Using 
Walzer's examples, reservoirs and irrigation works，police officers, public education, 
national defense, and the justice system, all serve the general needs of the citizens. On 
the contrary, the distribution of food to the hungry serves their particular needs.^ "^^  
The scarcity of resources limits the actual distribution of social goods. Citizens, 
who argue about the social meaning of communal provision, constitute a conception of 
the sphere of security and welfare?- Walzer offers three principles for the sphere of 
security and welfare. First, a political community has to provide its members with the 
social goods that are collectively recognized as needs. Not all social goods are 
collectively recognized as needs. For example, clothing and fresh water are socially 
221 Spheres, 68. Such shared sense of the duty to serve militarily and donate tax monies does not imply 
agreement as to the nature and extent of said duties. 
^^^ Spheres, 68,81,93-94. 
Spheres, 65-66. 
224 Walzer notes that public health services are most often general, while the care of the sick is most 
often particular in form. This means that public health services and the care of the sick can be both 
general and particular. I think both public health services and the care of the sick can be regarded as a 
social good of medical care. Every citizen becomes ill at some point in time, so medical care is 
necessary in general. Medical care is sometimes particular because A may need a kidney, whereas B 
may need a new heart, and C does not need any new organ at all. See Spheres, 66. 
225 Spheres, 66, 75, 79. 
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recognized needs, but the American government does not generally provide these 
goods as a social welfare to its people.^ ^^ Second, the goods that are recognized as 
social needs are distributed in proportion to need, because people do not have the same 
degree of need for a particular kind of social good. Finally, communal provision 
recognizes and upholds the underlying equality of membership. Needy citizens are 
entitled to social goods, regardless of their race, social class, gender, educational 
background, or age. Walzer does not tell us whether the principles apply to traditional 
India, where the fruits of the harvest are distributed according to caste, so that 
everyone can subsist in accordance with her social function. Despite this, he contends 
that the three principles apply to the citizens of the United States.^ ^^ 
Walzer never disagrees that practical difficulties can upset the three principles. 
The fact is that the wealthy have advantages in American courts, and resources are 
insufficient to meet every person's need for legal aid. Walzer, however, does not think 
that there is a problem. Americans believe that every individual should have recourse 
to legal justice without regard to her wealth. They also believe that punishment is a 
negative good in the sense that it ought to be distributed to those who have been found 
guilty.228 
People's attitudes towards security and welfare have changed in the past and 
will continue to change. But the change is always a matter of political argument, 
organization, and struggle that coincides with the history of the society. Thus Walzer 
stresses that we cannot determine which needs ought to be recognized, nor can we 
226 You can also recall §3.3 of my thesis. 
227 Spheres, 84. These principles have considerable force in the United States because of several cultural 
factors: (1) The community may or may not be affluent, and the understanding of individual need is 
expansive. (2) The community of citizens is loosely organized, and the welfare system tightens the 
community, (3) The ideology of self-reliance and entrepreneurial opportunity is widely accepted. 
People who are unfortunate in the business world have greater needs for public assistance. (4) Labor 
movements are relatively weak. Employees do not have sufficient power to protect their labor rights and 
minimal standards of living. Based on these four reasons, Walzer argues that the United States has a 
considerable reason to support the three principles. It seems that the principles could apply to other 
countries as well, provided those countries have a culture similar to that in the United States. 
228 Spheres, 85. 
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determine the appropriate levels of provision for a society, without understanding its 
definition of security and welfare.^^^ Hence Walzer suggests that his three principles 
for the sphere of security and welfare can be summarized into a revised version of 
Marx's maxim, that is, “from each according to his resources; to each according to his 
socially recognized needs." ^ ^^  
4.41 Medical Care 
Among modem citizens, longevity is a socially recognized need. This was not 
the case in Europe during the Middle Ages. Medical technology was primitive. At its 
best, the care was benign; at its worst, dangerous and destructive. People did not 
expect that their doctors could cure their bodies when they were ill. Thus, in Europe 
during the Middle Ages, Walzer notes, cure of souls was common. 
Advances in medical knowledge lead to increased confidence in medical 
providers. Physical health and longevity began to be taken more seriously. The desire 
and need for medical care consequently increased. People begin to share an idea that 
medical care should be distributed in proportion to illness, not to wealth?^ ^  
Walzer states that the pattern of medical provision in the United States is 
intended to provide a minimally decent level of care to all who need it, though the 
country does not provide a national health service to all citizens.^^^According to 
Walzer's three principles of distributing social needs, the American government 
should provide medical care to all who need it and should also subsidize research and 
training. Walzer continues to argue that the government has to restrain rich people 
229 Walzer mentions that one can conceive of a society in which haircuts took on such central cultural 
significance that communal provision would be morally required, but it is something more than an 
interesting fact that no such society has ever existed. See Spheres 
230 Spheres, 91. To Walzer, one's need is different from a social need. Children's needs for education, 
for example, were not socially recognized needs in Ancient Athens, according to Walzer. 
231 Spheres, 86-87; IS, 30. 
232 Spheres, 88. 
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from employing private doctors when medical care has become a socially recognized 
need. As long as the system of free enterprise exists in medical care, Walzer argues, 
wealth will be dominant in the sphere of security and welfare. Individuals will be cared 
for in proportion to their ability to pay, not their need for care?^^ Walzer states that 
needed goods are not commodities and should not be distributed according to the 
interests of rich people.234 
Medical insurance may help people to secure their future bodily health. Despite 
this, poverty remains a significant barrier to adequate and consistent medical treatment. 
The wealthy are likely to receive better medical services than the poor because many 
rich people have their own private doctors. According to Walzer, it does not matter 
that medical services are distributed only to those who can pay for these, //medical 
care were not a necessary and essential g o o d ? As soon as medical care becomes a 
socially recognized need, and as soon as the community invests in its provision, only 
the rich (or those people who pay for medical services) can enjoy medical services 
would matter a great deal. Thus, the medical authority would act wrongly if he gives a 
better service to the wealthy people, simply because they can pay more money. 
Services can only be so exchanged when their provision is above the level in 
accordance with shared understanding, or when the exchange does not distort the 
distribution below that level. It has to ensure that autonomy of the sphere would not be 
o /T 
dominated by market. If a dialysis in hospital is a medical need to the patients with 
renal failure; but it is only available to those who can afford to pay for its services, the 
distribution would become unjust. On the contrary, suppose the machine is not yet 
recognized as a medical need to patients. Then, according to Walzer, he would not 
233 Spheres, 89. 
Spheres, 89. 
235 Walzer actually allows socially recognized needs to be bought and sold in a market. Therefore I 
cannot say that according to Walzer, it does not matter that medical services are distributed only to those 
who can pay for these, only if medical care were not a necessary and essential good. 
236 Spheres, 88-90. 
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regard this distribution as unjust, even though the machine is only available to those 
who can afford to pay for its services. I do not fully agree with Walzer's view. It seems 
that the connection between the social meaning of a medical good and its appropriate 
distributive principle is not clear. I shall expound this view in Chapter 5 in detail. 
4.42 Education 
Walzer wants to distinguish the social good of education from the sphere of 
security and welfare. Although Walzer agrees that every community should provide 
education for its children, he wants to defend the idea that education belongs to 
another sphere. Education is a social good that can be distributed among the people. 
But the distributive principles for teaching positions, admission of students, school 
authority, academic results, and knowledge are something quite different from that of 
economy and political order. For instance, as Walzer mentions, teaching posts 
should be distributed to qualified scholars. 
In many societies, schools have been dominated primarily by birth and blood, 
wealth or gender. However, Walzer argues that this is irrelevant to the internal 
character of education. To Walzer, the social meaning of education is that those 
capable of learning should be taught, without regard to their birth, blood, wealth and 
gender.238 Walzer invites us to think of educational equality as a welfare provision. As 
our future citizens, children have a need to leam; we need to teach. But Walzer 
reminds us that the principle of need is not the only criterion for the distribution of 
education. Apart from their needs, we have to consider the children's interests and 
intellectual capacities as well. Not all children have the same interest in learning, nor 
^^^ Spheres, 197-198. 
238 Spheres, 201. 
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do they have the same intellectual c apab i l i t i e s 
Walzer distinguishes basic schooling from specialized schools. Basic education 
is a coercive and compulsory business. At the level of basic schooling, Walzer urges 
that children should attend schools. Private schools are expensive, and not every 
family can afford its children this opportunity. Walzer thinks that it is wrong to deny 
children such benefits simply because of their inherited economic status. When 
education is a communal provision, the supposed benefits can be distributed more 
widely. 
Walzer offers a remarkable conclusion regarding education as a social good. In 
his view, the educational good in principle is not up for purchase. The purchase is 
tolerable when it does not bring enormous social advantages. 
The same need to receive basic schooling does not require a uniform educational 
career. We might maintain open enrolment for those who want to continue their higher 
education. However, Walzer insists, there is no need to support their study in order to 
exhaust their interest in their subjectsBecause members of the community have to 
support the provision financially, a person who forgoes continued study is not morally 
required to support students. A government has only a limited amount of money to 
spend and a limited number of places available for specialized training. 
Walzer's response is that interest alone cannot serve as a distributive principle of 
239 Spheres, 203. 
^^^ Spheres,2n-2\9. 
241 Someone may think that receiving higher education is one example ofNagel 's "agent-relative value", 
as it is in contrast to "agent-neutral value". As Nagel puts it, "[tjhere's a reason for me to be given 
morphine, which is independent of the fact that the pain is mine- namely, that it's awful." Why is the 
pain awful? Nagel gives a concise explanation here: "If you and a stranger have both been injured, you 
have one dose of painkiller, and his pain is much more severe than yours, you should give him the 
painkiller- not for any complicated reasons, but simply because of the relative severity of the two pains, 
which provides a neutral reason to prefer the relief of the more severe." It is what Nagel called 
agent-neutral reason, which is distinctive to a person who wants to climb to the top of Mount 
Kilimanjaro or to learn the Beethoven sonatas. These values are relative to agent, as they are derived 
from the agent's own interests, desires, and attachments. See Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 
New York : Oxford University Press (1986), pp.162, 167. 
242 Spheres, 203, 208-210, 214. 
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higher education.243 He does not think that higher educational opportunities should be 
given to those who have no talents, even though they are interested in higher 
educational training. Rather, higher education should be distributed to those who are 
talented. It is wrong to exclude the talented students from their studies simply because 
they cannot afford the tuition. 
A limited number of educational opportunities would result in keen competition 
and would create a large number of frustrated candidates. Walzer denies that this is a 
problem, unless the desired end is not knowledge, but personal status, power, and 
wealth. Obviously, Walzer says, talented students in the field would monopolize the 
specialized training, but the monopoly is legitimate when the schools admit talented 
students and reject others. Walzer only emphasizes that the students should not 
convert their academic achievements into economic and political advantages. He 
never requires that all children should go to the same type of school.244 
There are educational reasons to separate children with special difficulties in 
certain subjects. The separation has nothing to do with producing a hierarchy, difficult 
social classes, or racial groups within the schools. The purpose of such separation is to 
encourage the children to find their authentic friends in the group and to let them adjust 
to the pace of their learning. The children are equal within a complex set of distributive 
arrangements; that is, they receive a common education at a basic level, even if there is 
some variation in the curriculum?'^ ^ 
In this section, Walzer tries to argue that communal provision should be 
distributed according to need, and the social good of specialized education should 
constitute another distributive sphere. The root of his arguments is based on people's 
shared understanding of social meanings of welfare and security in a given society. 
However, the fact that different histories and cultures lead to different sorts, different 




priorities, and different degrees of need does not itself show that (1) the ancient Greek 
government, for example, was correct or incorrect to provide public baths and 
gymnasiums for its citizens. This fact also does not show that (2) people had a correct 
shared understanding of the social meaning of welfare. 
Walzer does not insist that one type of social good can only consist of one 
distributive principle. Educational goods are divided into basic schooling and 
specialized education. These two levels of education constitute two very different 
distributive principles. However, to claim that purchase for education is tolerable 
when it does not bring enormous social advantages undermines the autonomy in the 
sphere of education. Rich families can still bring their children to high-quality private 
schools for better education, even though their children are not talented. Walzer 
responds that he is not looking for an entirely distinctive distributive sphere, because 
what happens in one distributive sphere affects what happens in the others. He can at 
most look for "relative autonomy，，.246 Walzer might further reply that rich families 
will not dominate educational opportunities, even if we allow their children to 
purchase their education strictly with money rather than talent. Students from poor 
families can apply for scholarships according to their intellectual capacities. In this 
way they can extend their studies in good schools and universities without regard to 
affordability. 
When holding a certificate from a private university or tertiary institution does 
not bring enormous social advantages, according to Walzer, the university or 
institution can admit untalented students who can pay for the education. The possible 
social advantages of an educational certificate might change over time. At the time the 
students graduate from the school, their certificates will not give them considerable 
social advantages. But let's say, some years later, there is a sudden increase in the 
施 Spheres, 10. 
9 0 
market's demand for the skills that the certificates recognize; the students would then 
receive enormous social advantages. Seemingly, it is odd to trace back their 
curriculum vitae and claim that the students were unjust to purchase the educational 
goods. But I think this is consistent with Walzer's view, because social advantages 
should include future possible advantages. 
Walzer's theory is constructive in narrowing the difference between people's 
starting points determined by the contingencies of their births and familial 
backgrounds. Even the least advantaged citizens enjoy minimal protection by the 
government with communal provision. No one would enjoy more voting and legal 
rights, simply because of her status. Despite this, people's shared sense of a duty to the 
government does not necessarily lead to an agreement concerning the extent and form 
of taxation and other social duties such as military services. The possible disagreement 
on such issues would affect the pool of government resources, which then affects the 
communal provision. 
4.5 Art of separation 
So far we note that Walzer places emphasis on separation in his theory of 
distributive justice.247 The word "separation" might be understood as a separation 
between individuals. However, this would misconstrue the point. Walzer's “art of 
separation" aims at separating different social goods into the spheres of market, office, 
recognition, political power, medical care, education, and so on. When the separations 
hold, there are inequalities within each sphere. 
In this section, I would like to summarize Walzer's ideas derived from his theory 
247 In Walzer's terminology, separation carries the same meaning as "differentiation." Walzer argues 
that distributive justice is an art of differentiation. See Spheres, xv. The title of this section "art of 
separation" is borrowed from Walzer's paper published in Political Theory. See Walzer, "Liberalism 
and the Art of Separation." Political Theory 12 (1984): 315-330. 
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of distributive justice. These ideas are stated as follows: (a) no one can be an 
all-around winner in a democratic and differentiated society; (b) we cannot survive in 
a stateless condition; (c) there exists a plurality of men and women; (d) people are 
equal; and (e) social meanings can be in conflict. 
Walzer says that in a modem, complex, and differentiated society, every person 
enjoys both freedom and equality when success in one sphere is not equivalent to, nor 
translatable into, success in another sphere. It is a decent state whose citizens and 
government officials are committed to complex equality. They maintain that every 
sphere is operating in accordance with its own distributive principles. Complex 
equality protects the autonomous distribution of a distributive sphere from the 
tyrannical intrusions of other spheres. There are things that the government cannot do, 
just as money cannot buy votes, offices, jury decisions, and university places. To 
protect academic freedom from the tyrannical intrusions of the powerful and the 
wealthy, for example, is to secure the free activity of the people in the sphere of 
knowledge. People have the right to study, to speak, and to listen as they please. When 
the separation holds, people with political power or money do not dominate the 
academic activities and admission policy in a university. Therefore, separation works 
to isolate social settings so that a church is in the hands of believers, a university is in 
the hands of scholars, and a firm is in the hands of workers and managers. Individuals 
rotate leadership in different institutional settings so that they can enjoy their different 
social roles. As a result, (a) no one can be picked out as an all-around winner. 
The separation of spheres allows citizens to enjoy their own accomplishments 
without the threat of any one group dominating the others. The separation, however, is 
not rooted in a separation between individuals. Because every social good is created 
and conceived in social processes, separation is rooted in social complexity. The 
spheres that encircle government, universities，and markets separate institutions, 
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practices, and relationships. The spheres do not encircle you and me. The art of 
separation reminds us that individuals belong to a particular society and that values are 
socially c o n s t r u c t e d . 248 it follows that we cannot remove ourselves as mutually 
disinterested rational agents when we are concerned with distributive justice. We are 
contingent animals who belong to particular groups; we have our own histories and 
shared understandings. We cannot participate in the distribution of social goods 
without a community. We cannot survive in isolation because, Walzer tells us, (b) 
statelessness is a condition of infinite danger because it would become an isolated 
world without security or public health care.249 
The fact that we have shared and socially recognized needs does not change the 
complexity of a community where different social goods may have different 
distributive principles. This leads to Walzer's enthusiasm for (c) the plurality of men 
and women in two senses, as I have described them in § 4.2. First, every community 
has its particular map of distributive justice that is in accordance with its culturally 
relative meaning. As long as the social meanings supportive of that system are 
genuinely shared, then the system is just, however much it may offend our beliefs 
about justice. Second, an indeterminate number of distributive spheres in a given 
society operate to defend different criteria of distribution. 
Walzer further argues that (d) people are one another's equal because (dl) all of 
them are culture-producing creatures. They conceive, create, and live in meaningful 
worlds with their shared understanding of social goods. (d2) We cannot, Walzer 
argues, rank and order these worlds regarding their understanding of social goods, 
because justice is relative to social meanings. Different political arrangements cannot 
be ranked in a single series, unless we could assign to each some quantity of moral 
248 Walzer (1984), 325. 
249 Spheres, 32. 
250 Walzer writes that when there is a greater number of members who believe that it is the social 
meaning of the good, the social meaning is genuinely shared by the people. See IS, 44. 
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value, say seven, nineteen, or thirty two. Different features of the societies, such as 
traditions, religions, political arrangements, geographical conditions, and so on, 
produce an infinite number of shared ways of life. Distinct shared understandings of 
places, honors, jobs, and other social goods constitute very different maps of 
distributive justice. Therefore we have to do justice to different companies of men and 
women by respecting their particular creations of social meanings^^^ 
Walzer's defense of pluralism is seemingly a commitment to ethical relativism. 
Ethical relativism means that two or more groups of people may disagree over a moral 
issue, and yet both can be correct. One would expect that distributive principles of 
social goods would vary from society to society. Different moral views may lead to 
different distributive arrangements, and hence Walzer thinks that we have to expect 
and welcome such a great variety of different arrangements. He thinks that we should 
show equal respect for every particular cultural creation. But I think Walzer is not a 
relativist, as I shall show that he has admitted some universal elements in his 
distributive theory. More importantly, he has revised his theory by incorporating some 
minimalist ideas, which is a form of universalism. Details will be shown in § 6.3 and § 
6.4. 
But Walzer admits that (e) social meanings can be in conflict, and some people 
may disagree about the shared understandings of the members.^ '^^  Walzer's solution is 
that the society should provide channels for members to argue for alternative 
cc 
distributions under adjudicative mechanisms. The products of a shared experience, 
as characterized by Walzer, are the result of "historical negotiation, intrigue, and 
251 Spheres, 313-314, 321; OT, 3. 
252 Gilbert Harman has offered a vigorous defense of ethical relativism in Gilbert Harman's "Moral 
Relativism Defended," Philosophical Review, Vol. 84 (1975), pp. 3-22; his "Relativistic Ethics: 
Morality as Politics," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), pp. 109-21 ； and his "What Is Moral 
Relativism?" in Values and Morals, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel, 1978). 





There are certain puzzles in the ideas (a), (d2) and (e). I think idea (a), the idea 
that no one can be an all-round winner in a democratic and differentiated society, is 
dubious. Walzer cannot prove that in a society with complex equality, no one can 
become an all-round winner in all spheres. Is there any problem with some talented 
people monopolizing different types of social goods, or at least, monopolizing several 
types of social goods, at the same time in the same society? Also, the plausibility of 
idea (d2), that we cannot rank and order these worlds regarding their understanding of 
social goods, is debatable. Nowadays people almost agree that Nazism is inferior to 
democracy. Suppose the people in one country (country P) are virtuous, whereas the 
people in another country (country Q) are evil, engaged in forms of vice. Isn't country 
P more respectful than country Q? Third, concerning the idea (e), which claims that 
social meanings can be in conflict, is there any way to determine the correct social 
meaning, when social meanings are in conflict? 
In Walzer's view, a society should be faithful to people's different 
understandings of social goods. The society can provide channels for people to debate 
about alternative distributions under adjudicative mechanism. But complex equality 
requires shared meanings in order to defend distributive principles of a society. Ronald 
Dworkin, however, denies that people in a society can reach an agreement on the 
appropriate way to distribute a social good. He thinks that people do not have a shared 
understanding of social goods. They cannot agree on certain principles that follow 
from people's shared understandings. In fact, Dworkin argues, members of a given 
society do not have shared understandings of social goods at all.^ ^^  In the United States, 
Dworkin indicates that the community does not assign the social good of medical care 
to a particular sphere of need. The fact is that medical service is not equally available 
256 Walzer (1981), 395. 
257 Ronald Dworkin, "To Each His Own," New York Review of Books (April 1983), pp. 4-6. 
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to all citizens, and people can buy better services at their own cost. Besides, political 
arguments, Dworkin argues, do not begin in some shared understanding of distributive 
principles.258 Instead there is always an endless debate between competing arguments. 
Dworkin offers an indirect argument here. He says that, according to Walzer, 
distributive justice is a matter of following shared understandings of social meanings. 
Dworkin thinks that people have no shared understanding at all. Given on Walzer's 
view, it follows that people cannot debate about distributive justice.^^^ 
The shared understanding of a social meaning is not identical to the common 
opinion of the majority of the citizens, and the appropriate arrangement of the social 
goods may be different from the overwhelming will of the citizens. Walzer argues that 
people might misunderstand the logic of their own institutions, or they might fail to 
apply the principles they hold. For example, Walzer's "decentralized democratic 
socialism" is held up against the contemporary public opinion of Americans. All these 
controversies are rooted in how we should interpret the social meanings of a particular 
society. Appropriate arrangements are not simply descriptions of majority opinions. 
According to Walzer, we find our way to distributive justice through an 
"interpretation" of social meanings of social goods.^ ^^ Therefore, to say that social 
goods should be distributed in ways that do not violate the shared understandings of 
what those goods mean is in one sense very abstract. This is because Walzer has said 
O /CO 
very little about what a correct or good interpretation is. We should turn to this issue 
in the next two Chapters. 
258 ibid., p.4. 
259 ibid, p.5. 
260 Spheres, 99; IS, 44. 
26�Spheres, 19. 
2621 share this idea with Bernard Williams. See "Social Justice", in Peter A. French (ed.), Journal of 
Social Philosophy 20 (1989): 68-69. 
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Chapter 5: Interpretation and social criticism 
The critical intellectual climbs towards an absolutist position the way a 
child climbs a tree, without any sense that he will ever have to come down; 
it is a pure adventure. 
(Walzer, The Company of Critic s)'^^^ 
The term "interpretation" is only mentioned twice in Spheres of Justice and 
Walzer does not provide any explanation to the use of this term.264 Nevertheless, the 
idea of interpretation is crucial to Walzer's theory of distributive justice: It is a key to 
search for the principles internal to each distributive sphere. 
I would like to illustrate this idea by showing a potential tension between 
majority opinions and shared understandings of citizens. As a member of society, 
Walzer stresses the importance of democracy as a way of allocating power and 
legitimating its use so as to create a society that opens up the politics and shares the 
decision-making of the government. Government officials can legitimately attain and 
use political power only with the consent of the governed. As a decent respect for 
the opinions of mankind, complex equality defends democracy as a way of allocating 
power and legitimating its use.^ ^^ But Walzer adds that the majority opinions may be 
wrong.267 So what is the shared understanding among the citizens? It seems that there 
is potentially a tension between democratic citizenship and shared understandings of 
the members. To understand the tension, we have to explore the reasons behind by 
further reviewing his theory, and we have to explore the significance of interpretation 
in the matters of distributive justice by studying his works since Spheres of Justice. 
263 Company, 237-238. 
264 Walzer only says that another way of doing philosophy is to "interpret to one's fellow citizens the 
world of meanings that we share." Besides, he describes that social goods have social meanings, and we 
find our way to distributive justice through "an interpretation of those meanings." However, he does not 
offer any way to know or determine whether a social meaning is correctly interpreted or not. See 
Spheres, xiv & 19. 
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In § 5.1, I shall introduce Walzer's thesis of interpretation. I shall expound 
Walzer's view that the best interpretation that is coherent with the values of a 
community is not necessarily identical with the opinion poll or survey search of the 
society. I shall argue that Walzer's classification of different paths in moral philosophy 
is either unclear or mistaken. Also Walzer cannot show that interpretation is the best 
way to do moral philosophy. I shall explain my view that our attitude toward morality 
does not necessarily resemble the interpretation of laws and precedents carried out by 
lawyers and judges. A social criticism can create a new outlook on morality that is 
radically different from the original one. 
In § 5.2, I shall introduce how Walzer used his interpretation thesis for social 
criticism. I do not agree with Walzer's view that a social critic is always bound to her 
standpoint when the critic tries to look into other cultures. Walzer eventually argues 
that interpretation involves a search for "core values" within a given society. However, 
I shall argue that Walzer's "coherence principle" is not a plausible way to find out the 
core values. Second, I shall argue that Walzer's interpretation on American society 
seems wrong. Even if he were correct, the core values that he interprets were too 
abstract to be useful as a guide for finding distributions and principles of various 
goods. 
In § 5.3,1 explain Dworkin's view that Walzer has tacitly relied on some hidden 
principles in his interpretation thesis. I shall go through the debate and then argue that 
Walzer is correct to emphasize that the same good would have different meanings in 
different circumstances, even in the same society. But I doubt that disagreements 
concerning how to distribute a social good can be solved by a public debate in the 
society as suggested by Walzer. Dworkin also argues that shared understanding is not 
possible in a complicated and pluralistic modem society. It seems that we can solve the 
Dworkin-Walzer debate by arguing that people agree about the reference, but not the 
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social meaning of a good. I shall expound the arguments in detail, but I shall indicate 
that this solution is rather trivial. 
5.1 Internal criticism and Interpretation thesis 
Disappointment is one of the most common motives for criticism. Each society 
has its own ideas about how institutions ought to function or how people ought to 
behave. Social criticisms focus on institutions and social activities to see whether they 
can uphold just practices in a given society. According to Walzer, social criticism 
concerns its people, rather than those of other societies. He explains that if a critic is a 
stranger, really disinterested, it is hard to see why he would involve himself in people's 
^ CO 
affairs. To concern the people, social criticism gives voice to the common 
complaints of the people and invokes the local values that underlie those complaints. 
On the other hand, Walzer defines that "external criticisms" disconnect 
themselves from local values and everyday practices. Those criticisms escape from a 
particular tradition or particular moral law, and pretend themselves as the eyes in 
heaven from an impartial point of view away from the society. Therefore, Walzer 
suggests that social criticism should be an internal activity. That is, a good critic 
should not be a stranger who escapes from a particular tradition and particular moral 
law and pretends himself as the eyes in heaven from an impartial point of view away 
from the society. I will explain later that Walzer encourages a person to step back from 
his or her own personal point of view in order to get a better picture of the society. But 
a stranger is different. He or she escapes from the society with an impartial point of 
view. He or she has no real knowledge of the society. A good critic, according to 
268 Company, 20. 
269/5； 28, 61-89. 
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Walzer, involves himself or herself in the local affairs of those people?^^ Internal 
criticism, therefore, tries to show how a community's own practices or distributive 
arrangements violate its own its shared understandings, or deep meanings. 
It seems that Walzer opposes the Kantian view by criticizing its disconnection 
from local values and everyday practices. However, Walzer has misunderstood this 
view. The Kantian view he criticizes does not necessarily escape from a particular 
tradition. It may rely on impartial moral principles but returns to a particular society 
when applying such principles to the circumstances in it. Because of its "return", 
Kantian view has to involve itself in the particular tradition, moral law and local affairs 
in a given society. Kantian impartial moral principles include: "Do not treat human 
beings merely as a means" and ”act on that maxim whereby one can, at the same time, 
will that it should become a universal law.” When these principles apply to particular 
circumstances in a specific society, such as criticizing slavery and murder, they uphold 
just practices in that society. 
On Walzer's view, there are three tasks of social criticism. First, the critic 
exposes the false appearances of his own society. Second, he gives expression to his 
people's deepest sense of how they ought to live. Finally, a critic should acknowledge 
that there are other forms of equally legitimate hopes and aspirations other than his 
own interpretation. In Spheres of Justice, Walzer argues that our attitude toward 
distributive justice is shaped by our interpretation of the shared understandings. He 
wants to show that social criticism can only be thought of as an interpretive activity 
that reflects the shared understandings of a particular community. Distributive 
principles rely on shared understandings of social meanings. However, shared 
understandings are not simply majority opinions and social practices of citizens. Thus 
Walzer has to seek for other method in order to find out the shared understandings. 
270 Company, 3-22; IS, 62. 
271 Company, 232. 
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Interpretation is not the only method. However, Walzer observes that citizens have 
different social meanings in their minds for the same good, so he argues that we have 
to interpret which social meaning is the "correct" meaning. We may call this view 
Walzer's "interpretation thesis." 
There is a relationship between complex equality and Walzer's interpretation 
thesis. Complex equality is a social condition where no group of claimants dominates 
the distributive processes of different social good, while interpretation thesis attempts 
to provide a critical standard against aggressive boundary crossings, based on the 
practices and shared understandings of a particular society. Therefore, both complex 
equality and interpretation thesis defend the particularity and autonomy of different 
distributive processes. What Walzer does in Spheres of Justice is to present, as a 
connected critic, his interpretation of our shared understandings in relation to the 
various spheres of justice?� 
Walzer suggests three common paths in moral philosophy: (1) discovery, (2) 
invention, and (3) interpretation. Although he does not attempt to exhaust the list, 
Walzer thinks that these paths are the most important and enduring ways that social 
critics adopt in order to do their social criticisms. He contends that these three paths in 
moral philosophy can be compared to the three branches of government: executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches. On his view, discovery resembles the work of the 
executive branch. That is, it finds, proclaims, and then enforces the law. Invention is 
like constitutional legislation, because it is creating a new moral world. Finally, 
interpretation is a like a judgment by a legal judge. 
The path of discovering requires a philosopher to detach himself from his social 
position, as Thomas Nagel argues, with a view to discovering the objective moral 
truths. Detaching oneself from one's social position means that a critic abandons and 
272 TT, 39. 
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steps back from his own point of view in order to look at the world from an objective 
point of view. That is, the critic sees himself as being no different from the others, and 
recognizes the moral principles that necessarily govern us. Then the critic discovers 
that there is the existence of natural law and natural rights constituted by divine 
commands.274 For example, Nagel discovers an objective principle that we should not 
be indifferent to the suffering of other people. As Nagel puts it, “if you and a stranger 
have both been injured and you have one dose of painkiller, and his pain is much more 
severe than yours, you should give him the painkiller-not for any complicated reasons, 
but simply because of the relative severity of the two pains, which provides a neutral 
275 
reason to prefer the relief of the more severe." Bentham claims to have discovered 
the foundation of morality in which nature has placed mankind under the governance 
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. On Bentham's view, it is for pain and 
pleasure alone to point out what people ought to do. 
But this classification is not satisfactory. Arguably, Nagel could respond that his 
mode of enquiry is invention because he is creating an outlook to find out what people 
ought to do. If this objection is true, it is possible that Nagel's moral philosophy is 
relevant to the case of legislature or the judicial, rather than the executive. 
According to Walzer, the path of invention, unlike the path of discovery, does 
not require a philosopher to assume any existing moral world or objective moral truths. 
Rather, people have to undertake the construction of an entirely new moral world. 
Since there is no pre-existing design or divine commands to guide us, we need to 
construct a procedure or moral system in order to solve our moral and distributive 
issues. Walzer thinks that Rawls,s theory of justice is the best-known example 
adopting the path of invention. Rawls's theory of justice imagines a situation where 
274/5,3-5. 
275 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press (1986), p. 162. 
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every representative is fair and equal. It deprives the particular knowledge of the 
representatives as if they were a group of travellers from different countries and 
cultures, speaking different languages, and meeting in a neutral space. Rawls,s 
invention imagines that the people behind the veil of ignorance are ignorant of their 
social standings, talents, and life plans so that the situation can capture everyone's 
interest and opinions. At the end, according to Rawls, people will produce a moral 
world in which they are willing to live. 
Again, it can be objected that Rawls's two principles are not forms of invention. 
Rawls might be inspired by some insights through discovery instead. This process 
requires him to detach oneself from one's social position and step back from one's own 
point of view, in order to look at the world from an objective point of view. To Walzer, 
both discovery and invention attempt to look elsewhere with a view to finding some 
external and universal standard applicable to different times and places. According 
to Walzer, moral philosophy should not be seeking divine commands or objective 
morality applicable to all societies. Nor should we try to invent a new moral system. 
Walzer argues that morality is neither divine nor natural, except insofar as we believe 
that the voice of the people is the voice of God, or that human nature requires us to live 
in society. 
But obviously Walzer is mistaken. We can imagine that a priest in a small 
village on an outlying island tries to invent a moral theory applicable only to the 
villagers who are living in that small village. Such moral theory requires that every 
person who has reached the age of 70 should leave his or her family and stay in a 
mountain where there is no food or drink for survival. The village cannot support them 
because of its food shortage and poverty. We can imagine another moral theory that 
allows people to eat their family members after their deaths. These moral theories may 
饥 IS,2\. 
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be impartial; however, they are not applicable to different times and places. These two 
stories show that discovery and invention of a moral theory are not seeking divine 
command or objective morality applicable to all societies. 
Nevertheless, Walzer does not seem to deny moral objectivity. I think 
objectivity is relevant to morality. From an objective standpoint, as Nagel argues, we 
see a world that contains multiple individual perspectives. We step outside of 
ourselves when we can make moral judgments on what is morally right or wrong from 
an impersonal standpoint. Morality is possible when we can give reasons for actions 
independently of how things appear to us. Walzer only maintains that a social critic 
does not require a complete detachment as an outsider and pretends to see his or her 
own society through the eyes of a stranger. Interpreters who criticize the society are 
not detached observers, as they interpret the society with the experience of their own. 
Nor are they the enemies of the society, even when they are fiercely opposed to this or 
that prevailing practice or institutional arrangement. This is because they are 
interpreting and arguing within a world of social meanings in which they share. Also, 
they do not assume a single true meaning exists in the world. It is a mistake, according 
to Walzer, to suppose that we must escape from our situation in order to make a correct 
interpretation.280 He believes critical distance is necessary for the criticisms. Walzer 
admits that the more closely we identify with the community, the more difficult it is 
281 
for us to recognize its wrong. 
It seems to me that no one will oppose the view that critical distance is necessary 
for the criticisms. Even Nagel would agree that critical distance is necessary when we 
talk about distributive justice. Nagel would agree that we need not detach from our 
society completely as a stranger, but step back to some degree that is necessary for 
moral impartiality. Therefore, Walzer is unlikely to disagree with Nagel in the view 
279 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press (1986), pp. 139, 168. 
280 Company, 231. 
281 IS, 36. 
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that we should step back to some degree when we talke about distributive justice. 
Walzer seems to misunderstand the detachment Nagel talks about. Nagel would never 
reject experience as irrelevant to social or distributive justice. The application of any 
abstract principle, such as the Difference Principle, would require experience and 
familiarity of the society on which one applies the abstract principle.^ ^^ Walzer sounds 
as though Nagel's ideal social critic would be entirely detached from society, stripped 
of emotion, information, and experience. This person would be a hermit, not a critic. 
Nor is this person Nagel's ideal social critic. 
Walzer criticizes Nagel and Rawls because he wants to defend his interpretation 
thesis. But I think Walzer's attempt is not successful. According to the interpretation 
thesis, distributive disputes that arise within a particular society and culture have to be 
settled from within. That means when people argue about some political issues, they 
are arguing within a tradition of moral discourse. When asking what sorts of talents 
they ought to recognize, whether equal opportunity is a "right", their moral philosophy 
283 
has to pursue these questions by finding out the right things for them to do. To make 
interpretations, Walzer argues, we need to refer to the shared understandings of its 
people, but not give up their connections and commitments with their society. On 
Walzer's view, we do not have to discover the moral world because "we have always 
lived t he re . "284 Nor do we have to invent the moral world because "it has already been 
invented." ^^ ^ Walzer seems to argue that our history and culture are given to us. We 
have already lived in a particular society with its institutions, practices, tradition, and 
values. 
Walzer indicates that the process of interpretation resembles lawyers and judges 
who struggle to find out a correct meaning from conflicting laws and precedents in a 
282 A question asking whether the Difference Principle, say, is a just principle is another issue. 
283 IS, 23. 
284 IS, 20. 
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society. Since they are bound to the laws and precedents, lawyers and judges have 
no need to look elsewhere. My view is that our attitude toward morality does not 
necessarily resemble interpretation of laws and precedents carried out by lawyers and 
judges. To interpret whether the "June 4 Incidence" in Mainland China was immoral, 
we may have to rely on some moral principles that are not confined to one specific 
society. Such principles include: (1) whether the Chinese government or the 
movement leaders treated other students and workers merely as a means to some ends; 
(2) whether the consequence of the massacre was better than that of allowing the 
movement to spread over the country; (3) whether the Chinese government infringed 
the basic human rights of the Chinese students; and (4) whether the Chinese 
government was wrong because it ordered its troop to fire at its own citizens who were 
demonstrating or protesting peacefully. Based on Walzer's interpretation thesis, we 
may regard these principles as something “outside the society". 
But the application of any abstract principle, as I have shown, would require 
experience and familiarity of the society on which one applies the abstract principle. It 
seems that the distinction between "inside the society" and "outside the society" has no 
significance. 
Nevertheless, Walzer would object to this view. For Walzer, we only need to 
interpret the right thing that is appropriate for us to do because every society has its 
287 
own way to solve the problems concerning distributive justice. We can only solve 
these questions, according to Walzer, by interpreting the meaning of our way of life in 
288 
accordance with our own social tradition. People in different societies would have 
described a just society in different ways. Different societies would have different 
principles for the same type of social goods. As Walzer mentions, some things that we 
286/5； 20-21. 
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consider "immoral" are not so regarded everywhere. On the contrary, what is very 
important for one group may mean little to another?^^ We cannot simply conclude 
that our moral thinking is right and opinions other than our moral thinking are wrong. 
To Walzer, a given society is just if distributive principles of this society are faithful to 
the shared understandings of its members.]^ A good criticism takes every particular 
feature of a society into account. Every society has its standards on how one should 
behave, which etiquette we should follow, and which values we should adopt. Such 
standards are expressed in forms of legal and religious texts, ritual practice, moral tales, 
epic poems, and codes of behavior inherited from earlier wisdom. Some of these are 
given explicit formulation in practices and institutions, but most are implicit in 
underlying ideas. These are the raw materials, which Walzer thinks we need to 
291 
interpret. They are authoritative to the people as people's categories, relationships, 
commitments, and aspirations are all shaped by, and expressed in terms of these 
practices, institutions, and underlying ideas. People will exchange, share, and 
distribute the goods in accordance with their meanings. To Walzer, we would not 
know how to do so if we did not understand what those social goods really were and 
293 
what they were for. 
But I doubt that we do not need to re-discover or re-invent our institutions, 
practices, traditions, and values. It is because our institutions, practices, traditions, and 
values are not necessarily morally correct.294 Even if they are authoritative to us, we 
cannot then conclude that they are morally correct. Perhaps they are morally wrong, 
and eventually we need to invent a new moral system for us. Moreover, we are not 
necessarily aware of, and can recognize, the tradition and values of a society, such as 
289 7T, 16. 
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291 Walzer, "'Sphere of Justice': An Exchange", New York Review of Books (July 1983), p.43. 
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the values of humility and filial fidelity, though "we have always lived there." Our 
institutions and practices may even contravene the tradition and values of our 
society.295 We may have to discover our tradition and values in order to find out 
whether we should adopt and follow our tradition and values. Further, morality 
without re-discovery and re-invention may not be in accordance with the true meaning 
of shared understandings. This is because we just rely on what is given to us. But our 
given history and culture, as Walzer admits, may be some majority opinions and social 
practices that are contrary to the shared understandings of citizens. 
Besides, to say that (1) "people's categories, relationships, commitments, and 
aspirations are all shaped by, and expressed in terms of our practices, institutions, and 
underlying ideas" is a much stronger claim than saying that (2) "people's categories, 
relationships, commitments, and aspirations are in part shaped by, and expressed in 
terms of our practices, institutions, and underlying ideas." It is implausible to accept 
the view (1), when we realize that foreign practices, institutions, and underlying ideas 
often or sometimes shape our society. On the other hand, our traditional practices and 
institutions have less influence on shaping our way of life and even our moral views, 
such as abortions, animal rights, philosophy of education, human cloning, etc. So I 
would hold (2) rather than (1), because (2) does not reject the possibility that foreign 
practices, institutions, and underlying would bring a lot of valuable insights to improve 
our way of life and contribute a lot in dealing with our moral issues. 
But Walzer mentions that even moralities derived from new discoveries and 
inventions always turn out to resemble the morality they already have.^ ^^ This is 
because an infinite number of new discoverers and inventors succeed each other. 
Companies of people who adopt the discovery or invention are likely to argue about 
295 Cutting the cost of medical subsidies for old people, for example, seems to have contravened the 
tradition value of taking care of the elderly in Chinese society. 
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the meaning of what they have accepted and succeed. ^ ^^  Religious morality, for 
example, commonly takes the form of a written text, or a sacred book.�^ For Walzer, 
such a written text or a sacred book requires interpretation in order to get the meanings 
and messages from it. In fact social meanings are not just there, agreed on once and for 
all. Rather, they are subject to change with time. There are disputes and different 
interpretations of social meanings. 299 According to Walzer, these facts make us unable 
to know whether we have actually got the genuine, true and timeless interpretation of 
social meanings. 
On my view, this claim of Walzer's seems false. Walzer is correct to point out 
that an infinite number of new discoverers and inventors succeed each other and 
people argue about the meaning of what they have accepted and succeed. But it does 
not follow that new moralities resemble the moralities people already have. Successors 
of traditions can create a new outlook on morality that is radically different from the 
original one. Besides, given the fact that there are disputes on different interpretations, 
it does not entail that we cannot then get a genuine, true and timeless interpretation of 
social meanings. In principle we can get the best interpretation, but Walzer is correct to 
point out that we do not know whether such interpretation is really the best one. 
Perhaps some years later when the social conditions change, it is no longer the best 
interpretation. 
But who would object to this view? Even Kantians and utilitarians agree that a 
moral principle would change over time. In a given circumstance (Ci), we should 
apply a principle (Pi) in that society. When circumstance changes from Ci to C2, then 
we should revise or abandon the principle into a new one (P2). Thus no one can get a 
timeless principle. It should be modified with time and circumstances. But they would 
think that they have got a genuine and true principle for their society. 
297/5； 26. 
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Walzer admits that he does not attempt to exhaust the common paths in moral 
philosophy. This means that even if Walzer can successfully reject the paths of 
discovery and invention, he still would not deduce that the path of interpretation is the 
last and the best alternative. But Walzer allows that these three paths can have 
overlapping areas. He permits that a distributive theory or principle can involve both 
discovery and interpretation, or involve both invention and interpretation.^^^ While 
Walzer permits that the path of interpretation can overlap with the paths of discovery 
and invention, ambiguity and difficulties remain. I doubt that interpretation is really 
different in kind from discovery, or even invention. An interpreter has to show how a 
community's own practices or distributive arrangements violate its own deep 
meanings or its shared understandings. They are not just there, but they have to be 
discovered by the interpreter. While the interpreter has found out the appropriate 
distributive principles for the community in accordance with its shared understandings 
of social meanings, he or she has invented a set of new distributive principles for the 
community. 
Despite his particularism towards morality, he does not seem to agree that one 
thing that is oppressive here is not oppressive in another society. Although every 
society has its standards on how one should behave, it does not follow that all 
standards from those societies are all correct. When our society disagrees with another 
society on the oppressiveness of X, Walzer does not accept that both societies are 
correct. This is because Walzer can argue that one society has misinterpreted the right 
thing that is appropriate for its people to do. Also, Walzer can hold that, for some X, X 
is wrong for society A, but right for society B. In this regard, we have to know how 
Walzer uses his interpretation thesis for social criticism. 
300 He indicates that utilitarianism is both a discovery and invention. 75,21. Besides, he thinks that every 
discovery and invention requires interpretation. He does not want to deny the paths of discovery and 
invention. See IS, 26. 
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5.2 Social criticism 
Majority opinions might misunderstand the logic of a particular institution, and 
they can be wrong about the facts of their case. There is a possibility that the critic is 
right and the majority of citizens are wrong. Walzer indicates that good interpreters 
attempt to show that their particular interpretation of the shared social meanings 
actually conflicts with current social practices and beliefs of fellow citizens. They may 
affirm or oppose this or that prevailing practice or institutional arrangement, and they 
do not only "recall and repeat" the tradition.^ ^^ Rather, they "give shape to its past by 
interpreting and revising" it, in the name of values recognized and shared in that same 
socicty.搬 
Walzer also invites us to consider that its social structure, political arrangements, 
and distributive standards are given. Therefore, even if people may revise or reject 
such given tradition, according to Walzer, there is room only for local adjustments.^ ^^ 
Arguably, whether Walzer's claim is plausible or not depends on what is meant by 
"local adjustments." If this means that the adjustments are small or not general, he still 
seems either wrong or without grounds. The abolition of the Chinese monarchy in 
1901 and the May 4 Movement of 1919 caused a large impact on Chinese society 
because Chinese tradition had undergone large adjustments and revisions. Some old 
rules were rejected while people introduced new rules into the country. To accept 
Walzer's view means that whatever the changes were, because a given tradition had 
undergone large adjustments (instead of small adjustments), the changes were 
immoral. That is why I think that Walzer's view is either wrong or without grounds. 
Walzer would respond that a critic is always bound to his or her standpoint when 
301 IS, 82. 
302 IS, 83. 
303 7T, 3, 12, 16-18. 
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the critic tries to look into other cultures.��* Whenever we look into other cultures, he 
argues that we cannot see the entire world. That is, by studying one group of people, it 
is impossible for us to see all the other groups of people. As a result, whenever a critic 
wants to revise or reject his or her given tradition, he or she is always bound to his or 
her "local" standpoint. He or she requires stepping back to some degree, for the sake of 
critical distance. Despite this, the critic does not detach entirely from his or her 
experience, information, and tradition. 
However, I do not agree with this response. Whether the critic can only make 
local adjustment is one thing; whether he or she can only see part of the entire world is 
another. Why can't critics with good and correct theories, such as Kantian maxims, 
claim that they can see the entire world? Kantians may claim that Kantian maxims (i.e. 
Do not treat human beings merely as a means) are so general that they can be applied 
in all societies. Therefore, the problem is not that the critic can never see the entire 
world, but that whether his theories can make good and correct social criticisms. 
Walzer argues that the best critics may best interpret the social meanings of a 
particular society, but they have no reason to claim that they are the last critics of the 
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society. Walzer notes that there will be no end to the process of interpretations 
because the arguments given by the critics are subject to ongoing public debates and 
reflections, and they may be further revised or rejected in the future. For Walzer, 
competing critics can help correct moral mistakes. People who accept their views give 
rise to endless arguments about the meaning of what has been accepted. Thus Walzer 
holds that no moral argument is entitled to be the last word. This view does not mean 
that there is no right answer on moral issue. Walzer only reminds us that we do not 
know whether our "best interpretation" is really the right answer. Perhaps we got the 
304 Company, 231. 
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right answer now, but it might be wrong in the future.^^^ Or perhaps we think that we 
have found out the right answer but in fact we have not. 
To Walzer, interpretation is a common activity. He argues that we are dependent 
upon socially created meanings, and we are all interpreters of the morality we share.^ ^^ 
As a member in a community, we have a common possession of tradition and a body 
of moral knowledge. We can argue about the most appropriate ways to distribute our 
social goods, though we might have disagreements about those meanings. Walzer 
states that a society with competing critics is better than a society where a single critic 
stands in a privileged position, setting up a universal standard for the people. ^ ^^  
Therefore distributive justice should be interpreted openly in public deliberation 
where all citizens are encouraged to participate. Since every citizen is an interpreter, 
any citizen can argue that our current institutions and practices are failing to do justice 
to our deeper aspirations as a particular community or institution.^ ^ ^ 
But whether a society with competing critics is better depends on how good 
those critics are. If one genius person, for example, Moses, could not arrive at a correct 
interpretation, why would two or three or even more people be able to arrive at it? It is 
undeniable that one's interpretation can be wrong, and interpreters may misinterpret 
the social meanings of a society. Walzer also agrees that it is possible for individuals 
within a society to get things wrong, and it is also possible for groups of individuals to 
get things wrong, too.^ ^^ When every one of us is an interpreter, which one of the 
interpretations put forward by us is the best interpretation? 
How can social criticism correctly interpret the practices and understandings of 
a particular society, but at the same time leave room enough for critical distance so that 
it is not blindly loyal to the current practices? Walzer opposes the view that the best 
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interpretation can be found out through a process of survey or an opinion 
312 
poll. Instead he offers a definitive answer to distinguish between good and bad 
interpretations. He writes that the best interpretation would be "coherent" with our 
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values. We may call this view "coherentism". Social criticism, as Walzer sees it, 
involves a search for the core values within a given moral and political community, 
and an inquiry into the best interpretation available. Walzer argues that every one of us 
would know roughly what we were looking for and would be able to exclude those 
inadequate or bad interpretations of our values. 
It seems to me that Walzer's coherentism does not guarantee the best 
interpretation. First of all, there may be many interpretations, indeed an infinite 
number of them, that are coherent with our values. Secondly, those values might be 
something destructive to the society. They could be corruption, egoism, money 
worship, blindly loyal to authority, etc. Some values, such as altruism, might be 
contrary to the core values of the society. Despite this, the society might need those 
"external" values to revolutionize it. 
Walzer would respond that people will sometimes confirm, and sometimes 
challenge, received opinions by going back to the values and principles that constitute 
their moral world. 314 This means that the best interpretation of the shared 
understandings of social meanings of the best social critics might be opposed to a 
majority opinion of the citizens. Thus there is potentially of a tension between the best 
interpretation of shared understandings of social meanings, and majority opinions of 
men and women about the distributive principles of social goods. Walzer would argue 
that the core values of a society in which a social critic interprets are potentially 
different from the current social practices and common opinions in that society. 
3I2ZS,39; TT, 27. 
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But when the social practices and majority opinions cannot provide resources 
and reasons for the interpretation thesis, how can a social critic find out the core values 
in a given society? To be coherent with American values, for example, Walzer 
suggests that the interpretation should be coherent with "equal protection, equal 
opportunity, political liberty, [and] individualism." 3)5 Walzer's view seems 
unreasonable. These values might be totally rejected or need to be revised in the future, 
just as slavery was uprooted in nineteenth century America, around the time of the 
Civil War. The abolition of slavery in the American society was based on the 
principles that were contrary to the values in the society. This revolution had nothing 
to do with the interpretation of values that cohere with the American society. Rather, 
new values were applied to the society and gave a new outlook on the people and their 
social practices. 
Moreover, "equal protection, equal opportunity, political liberty, [and] 
individualism" only reflect certain values of the American society. It seems that other 
values, such as racial discrimination, are left behind. Only good values are highlighted. 
Perhaps it is not proper to distinguish what are good values and what are bad values. 
We have to presuppose a standard to judge what are good and what are bad. Imagine a 
society where all citizens think that the most important thing in their lives is money. 
When they think that deceiving other people will make them rich, they will deceive 
other people. If we think that they are wrong, we have to rely on some moral principles, 
such as treating other people as a means to achieve some selfish ends is wrong, apart 
from the values of the society. But this principle is contrary to the shared 
understandings of the people in that society. Thus if we apply this principle to the 
society, according to Walzer, it would be unjust. 
However, Walzer's interpretation seems wrong. American people do not receive 
-川 ZS;28, 42. 
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an equal degree of protection from the government. Even if they can receive a minimal 
protection from the government, some people enjoy more protection than other people 
by paying more money. Second, the American people do not receive equal opportunity, 
too. Racial discrimination still persists in some states and some cities. People with 
better education usually have more opportunities than people with less education. 
Finally, even if Walzer's interpretations were correct, the American core values 
that Walzer identifies were too abstract to be used as a guideline in distributions of 
different social goods. First, I should clarify that Walzer's interpretation of American 
core values is not irrelevant to Walzer's theory of distributive justice. The value of 
"equal protection" is relevant to his distributive principle of medical care and security. 
Walzer has argued that medical care and security should be distributed to those in need. 
A minimal level of medical provision and general security of social order reflect the 
value of equal protection. Walzer has also argued that basic education should be 
distributed to citizens regardless of their social status. Meanwhile, every student has 
equal opportunity to struggle for tertiary education as long as he or she has enough 
talent. The value of political liberty ensures that people have rights to choose their 
political leaders. Individualism gives every citizen freedom of speech, press, religion, 
and assembly. Besides, human beings cannot be bought and sold. The sale of slaves is 
ruled out. According to Walzer, none of these require money payment.^ ^^ Finally, 
people can freely own and exchange commodities according to their wish. 
Nevertheless, the values of "equal protection, equal opportunity, political liberty, 
and individualism" cannot entail Walzer's view that higher education should be 
distributed according to talent. Can students who do not perform well in university 
讯 Spheres, 100-101. 
317 Rawls argues that the principle of equal opportunity would justify a government to ensure equal 
opportunity of education. Rawls's Difference Principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to 
provide "genuine equality of opportunity", society must give more attention to those with fewer native 
assets and to those bom into the less favorable social positions. The idea is to redress the bias of 
contingencies in the direction of equality. In pursuit of this principle, Rawls holds that greater resources 
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admission tests or public examinations but perform well in other areas such as model 
making and hiking be admitted to universities? Besides, based on Walzer's "American 
core values", we do not know whether university students should be responsible for 
their tuition fees. How much should they pay for their education? Should higher 
education be completely free of charge or should students be partly responsible for 
their education? Should they pay uniform tuition fees, or pay according to their 
professions? We cannot even know how much degree of security a govermnent should 
provide in order to ensure the value of "equal protection." All these puzzles have 
shown that such core values are too abstract to be used as guidelines in concrete 
distributive justice. 
To sum up, Walzer's interpretation thesis actually forms an integral component 
in Walzer's theory of justice. However, he cannot defend his thesis successfully. First, 
Walzer misunderstood that the application of any abstract principle would require 
experience and familiarity of the society on which one applies the abstract principle. 
Second, Walzer cannot show that his interpretation thesis is better than other 
approaches of morality, such as "discovery" and "invention." Actually Walzer is even 
unable to distinguish his interpretation thesis from the paths of discovery and 
invention. Besides, Walzer is wrong to assume that a social critic is always bound to 
his or her standpoint when looking into other cultures. It is implausible to conclude 
that a given society with many interpreters at a time is better than a society with a 
single and genius interpreter, as the genius interpreter might be the only person who is 
really able to give the best and correct interpretation of that society. Finally, Walzer's 
coherentism, while necessary, is not sufficient for guaranteeing the "correct" values or 
true shared understanding in a society. Even if we can find out the core values of a 
society, they are too abstract to be used as a criterion in distributions of social goods. 
should be spent on education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least during the earlier years 
of school. See A Theory of Justice, p.86. 
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5.3 Dworkin-Walzer Debate 
Walzer's interpretation thesis led to a debate between Dworkin and Walzer. 
Dworkin argues that Walzer's interpretation thesis tacitly relies on some hidden 
premises that Walzer never mentioned in his works. That is why Walzer may conclude 
that medical care belongs to the sphere of need, and that political issues belong to the 
sphere of merit and democracy. According to Dworkin, Walzer limits the number of 
spheres and each sphere has some "fixed, preordained, and ideal principles" defined by 
him. These principles are fixed and preordained because they are "established in 
advance" and they "remain the same for all societies". ^ ^^  Walzer believes that 
university places or professional offices are assigned for talents, and he believes that 
medical care should be provided to those in need alone. Therefore, he constructs some 
ideal spheres and then he calls them the sphere of office and the sphere of need. As a 
result, when a community recognizes a social good as something that people need (e.g., 
medical care), the community is committed to every feature of the sphere defined by 
Walzer in advance. Thus Walzer concludes that the community should provide the 
social good to the needy citizens. 
Dworkin declines to accept these preordained spheres. Dworkin argues that the 
government may intervene in the market in order that poor people can receive some 
medical care. However, it does not follow, Walzer understands this, that justice 
demands a full national health service. In fact, there are many interpretations on the 
social meaning of medical care in the same society. Walzer's interpretation is only one 
interpretation among other competing interpretations. However, Walzer does not 
provide us with any reason to support his claim. Therefore, Dworkin concludes that 
Walzer has tacitly appealed to some general principles, in which Dworkin thinks that 
ibid., P.5. 
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Walzer contradicts what he said before.^^^ 
Walzer thinks that Dworkin has provided an excellent model in his account of 
how "hard cases" ought to be decided in a legal system like our own. ^ ^^  In Walzer's 
view, moral argument resembles the work of a lawyer or judge who struggles to find 
meaning from conflicting laws and precedents.^ ^^ But Walzer denies that we should 
move out from our tradition, relying on general principles in order to resolve the 
disagreements between competing arguments. He agrees with Dworkin that a judge 
reaches a right decision not by appealing to principles external to the legal system, but 
by exploring the internal principles of the system itself.^ ^^ I would like to illustrate 
Dworkin's account of how hard cases ought to be decided in a legal system. 
According to Dworkin, there must always be a right answer in a hard case, and 
there must in principle always be one and only one right answer to any hard case, 
except in some rare cases. A judge has to try to his or her ability to find the right 
answer. Since Hercules, Dworkin's imaginary judge, has unlimited intellectual power 
of memory and time, he could find a uniquely correct answer in every hard case. This 
is because he could aspire to all relevant information about the history, moral 
principles and past practice of a given society. Consequently, his judgment would 
provide the best "fit" with the existing moral culture as a whole, and would uncover or 
discover a principle that underlies the past judicial decisions.^ ^^ The best interpretation 
Walzer considers his theory of justice to be "radically particularist". Rather than seeking universal or 
transcendental principles of justice, he aims at understanding local meanings of justice shared by fellow 
citizens (see Spheres, xiv). But it is noted that Walzer tries to defend a certain sort of universalism in his 
later works. Details will be discussed later in § 6.3. 
320 Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange," New York Review of 
Books (July 1983): pp. 43-44. 
321 IS, 20. Dworkin would agree that law and morality are necessarily connected, but only in hard cases. 
See Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law: an introduction, London and New York: Routledge (2000), p.56. 
To Walzer, legal cases resemble moral arguments because they are both "interpretive in character" 
(recall § 5.1 in my thesis). 
Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange", op. cit., p. 43. 
323 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, in Joel Feinberg and Jules Coleman (eds.), Philosophy of Law, 
Sixth Edition, Wadsworth, 2000, p.154-155. 
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is not only the one that is the best fit to the society; its soundness is also important.^ "^^  
This means that the judge would make a judicial judgment that is also a correct moral 
and political decision as well. 
Dworkin's analogy implies that there is only one right interpretation of 
contestable cases. If different interpretations are inconsistent with each other, then 
Hercules must choose a "correct" interpretation in his view, which comes closest to 
what abstract justice or principles would require. 
According to Dworkin, legal justice is like an ongoing literary narrative. Every 
author in his or her situation would have to interpret what has been written in the book 
in previous chapters. But Walzer responds that the author does not appeal to some 
universal theory of justice away from his or her own tradition.^ ^^ 
Walzer insists that the boundary around each social good may change over time. 
Arguments that support the boundaries are "historical, sociological and contingent 
Instead of spending money on medical care, any particular society might use that 
money to spend it on defense, drama, or education. Moreover, some types of social 
goods have complex rather than unitary distributive principles.��？ Medical care, for 
instance, can have complex distributive principles. Pillows in a hospital room, coin 
telephones outside an emergency room, food and nutrition for patients and medical 
staff, and dialysis machines can have different distributive principles. Therefore, a 
pillow and the coin telephones becomes part of medical resources only if they are 
housed in a hospital. The same good would have different meanings in different 
circumstances even in the same society. A pillow becomes part of "medical care" only 
324 According to Dworkin, the role of Hercules is to aspire to a completely coherent theory of law that 
will yield a judgment that will provide the best fit with existing legal materials, and will reveal the law 
in its best possible light, in terms of moral and political soundness, as exemplified by the liberal values 
of justice, fairness, equality, due process and individual rights. These two aspects of interpretation 
Dworkin describes as the dimensions of "best fit" and of "best light" (see Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of 
Law: An Introduction, contemporary theories of law, p.57). 
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in case it is housed in a hospital. But we cannot assume that pillows in the hospital 
should be distributed according to need. Pillows in a hospital are a kind of medical 
resources. But medical resource is not necessarily a needed good. Even if it is a needed 
good, the government does not necessarily supply it to people according to their needs. 
According to Walzer's definition, needed goods are not commodities.^^^ But he does 
not mean that needed goods should be completely barred from the market. In other 
words, needed goods do not always belong to government's welfare. 
The concept of welfare is that people cannot afford a good, so the government 
assists them to provide minimally decent care to all who need it in proportion to their 
needs.329 People need a lot of things: Food, drinks, clothes, shelter, and other daily 
necessities. But they do not mean that the government should provide all these goods 
generally to all citizens. Since resources are always scarce, the actual distribution will 
depend on the available resources.^ ^^ Walzer notes that clearly we cannot meet, and 
we do not have to meet, every need to the same degree. The ancient Athenians, for 
example, provided public baths and gymnasiums for the citizens but never provided 
any unemployment insurance or social security. ^ ^^  Walzer explains that Athenians 
made a choice about how to spend public funds. This choice is made in accordance 
with their understanding of what the common life required. Thus even if a pillow is 
also part of medical care in the hospital, it is not necessarily that it should be a socially 
recognized need that should be generally provided by the government. Moreover, 
Walzer distinguishes communal provision into two main types: General communal 
provision and particular communal provision. The building of reservoir, according to 
Walzer, is a form of general provision. But the distribution of food to widows and 
Spheres, 90. 
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orphans is particular.^^^ Thus, it could be that the same type of social goods can have 
different distributive principles in the same society. Some of them may be generally 
provided and equally available to all citizens, while some of them may be provided to 
the citizens in proportion to their need. Some of them may be freely exchanged in the 
market. 
Thus it is wrong, according to Walzer, to assume that all medical goods should 
be distributed according to need alone under the "preordained" sphere of medical care. 
Walzer emphasizes that social recognition of need does not entail anything 
immediately about what justice requires. Walzer stresses that there is no a priori way 
to determine what needs ought to be recognized, and which levels of provision should 
be provided. This is because our attitudes toward medical care have a history, and 
these attitudes may change over time.^ ^^ 
There are always some disagreements concerning how to distribute a social 
good, and there are a variety of critics competing with each other. As I have mentioned 
earlier, Walzer contends that the society should provide channels for them to express 
their disagreements, and to debate alternative distributions under "adjudicative 
mechanisms丨丨.334 That is to say, there should be a democratic public capable of 
choosing among its critics when conflicts arise, so that people can argue about 
priorities by offering different interpretations of their common life.^ ^^ 
It seems to me that Walzer's view has two main problems. The first problem is 
that we cannot solve the disagreements between different interpretations through a 
public debate. As I have mentioned, Walzer admits that people do not know whether 
they have got the genuine, true and timeless interpretation of social meanings. 
Therefore, they will doubt that other people have got the genuine, true and timeless 
Spheres, 65-66. 
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interpretation of social meanings, too. Public debate only reveals that there are 
disputes and different interpretations of social meanings in that society. It cannot solve 
people's doubts. As I have argued, looking for "coherent" interpretations and "core 
values" cannot solve our distributive issues. Also I have argued that Walzer's view is 
implausible. Critics who defend some distributive principles with good arguments, 
such as Kantian theory and utilitarian principles, would think that they have got 
genuine and true principles. That means the rightness or plausibility of a distributive 
principle depends on critics' arguments. It does not depend on a democratic public 
capable of choosing among its critics when conflicts arise. 
The second problem is that Walzer does not say whether a democratic public 
should exist in every society. Does Walzer mean that a society is unjust if it does not 
provide a democratic public for people to express their disagreements concerning how 
to distribute a social good? The answer depends on what a democratic public means. 
Walzer could argue that different societies have different meanings toward a 
democratic public. But it seems implausible because Walzer does not think that we can 
rely on public opinions such as opinion polls and telephone interviews on distributive 
justice. The democratic public may mean that scholars, government officials and 
professionals organize regular forums, seminars and conferences on social issues, and 
publish consultation documents on government policies in order to exchange ideas. If I 
am correct, many societies would become unjust because they do not have such a 
democratic public. However, why should we have this democratic public when we are 
dealing with political, social and even moral issues? Indian caste society did not have 
this democratic public, but Walzer does not base on this fact to conclude that Indian 
caste was unjust. 
Walzer further contrasts two kinds of disagreements about a distribution. The 
first kind of disagreement is that when people disagree about the social meanings of 
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their social goods in a cultural tradition. They interpret a given social meaning in 
somewhat different ways. To Walzer, disagreement is possible only when people 
share, at least to some extent, the meaning of a social good. Otherwise, they just talk 
past each other, and they are not even disagreeing.^^^ Such a disagreement allows 
people to take different positions on how far medical care, for example, should be 
distributed in accordance with need. Therefore people who disagree about how to 
distribute medical care, for example, nevertheless agree about what they are referring 
to. 
The second kind of disagreement, as Walzer puts forward, is that people from 
different cultural traditions may have very different understandings of the same social 
good; hence, it may be necessary to work out different distributive criteria for different 
cultural traditions. These traditions do not necessarily share a common understanding 
of the social meaning of medical care, and they may not be of the view that medical 
care is a social need. For Walzer it is odd to say that the principles of justice 
"appropriate to Americans must be appropriate as well to ancient Babylonians. 
Dworkin thinks that Walzer's reply is not persuasive. This is because Walzer's 
interpretation of medical care is wrong. In America, as Dworkin mentions, rich people 
are always able to buy better medical care than poor people. How can Walzer defend 
his argument that medical care should be provided to all members of a community in 
accordance with their needs alone?^^^ Dworkin thinks that Walzer does not explain the 
reasons for thinking one interpretation is superior to another interpretation, when 
there is a controversy over which interpretation is better. According to Dworkin, there 
are two ways in which Walzer might argue. First, Walzer might want to argue that one 
interpretation is better than another interpretation because the latter is not coherent to 
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the principles required by justice.^^^ But Walzer never defends any abstract principles 
required by justice. Second, Walzer might want to argue that one interpretation is 
better than another interpretation because the superior one is satisfied with the 
preordained requirement of a distributive sphere. But Walzer has responded that he is 
not appealing to any preordained spheres. 
Dworkin agrees that we have to take into account particular features of a 
community in order to advance a distributive theory for a social good. We have to 
understand what a social good means to us in order to distribute the good to men and 
women. He also agrees that there is no reason to expect what justice requires of us can 
also apply to the ancient Babylonians, and vice versa. Despite this, Dworkin contends 
that justice is not an anthropological judgment that studies a given conventional 
practice of a soc ie ty .We need principles of justice, Dworkin argues, to decide 
which features of a community are relevant to a just distribution. They are the 
principles we accept, not because they are captured in our conventional practice. 
Georgia Wamke gives us an inspiring analysis of the Dworkin-Walzer 
deba t e . 341 She says that Dworkin treats social meanings as conventions between 
individuals about the social goods in which they share. In this way social meanings can 
only reflect individual opinions, while different people have different opinions. 
Walzer cannot deny the existence of different opinions of national health provision for 
the United States. However, Wamke indicates that when Americans disagrees about 
how best to provide medical care, the disagreeing people share the same reference, but 
not (necessarily) the social meaning of a good. People disagree to what extent a 
country should provide medical care. They can do so precisely because they know that 
339 “ ’Spheres of Justice': An Exchange", p. 45. 
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they are talking about the same thing.342 Suppose that the medical resources in a 
country are so limited that there are two men who have different opinions about the 
way to distribute the medical resources. Despite this, these two men agree that medical 
care is a social need of their society. This is the shared meaning to some minimal 
extent, or else they cannot even disagree. People agree about the reference, but not the 
social meaning of a good. They agree, for example, what education is, but disagree as 
to the meaning of it, and in particular how much education one needs and as to who 
needs it. Therefore, Dworkin appears to he wrong to say that because people have 
different opinions of a distribution, they have nothing to share about,^� As Walzer 
puts it, "[m]orality...is something we have to argue about. The argument implies 
common possession, but common possession does not imply a g r e e m e n t . "344 
But this view is rather trivial. The common possession that Walzer argues would 
be a very minimal sense, so minimal that we can say George W. Bush has something to 
share with Bin Laden, or with Sadden Hussein.^ "^ ^ Obviously this is trivial; therefore, if 
the only thing people share about X is the reference of X, then one can't accuse 
Dworkin of being wrong here. This is because they have nothing to share, apart from 
the referent, the absolutely minimal thing that they share. 
Thus in the Dworkn-Walzer debate, Walzer can only argue that different groups 
of people (including majority and minority) share the reference of a social good, 
though they have disagreements on its appropriate way of distribution. In this way, 
Walzer can only defend a weak sense of shared understandings. He cannot defend a 
strong sense of shared understandings in which people agree about how to distribute 
their social goods. As a result, even if we assume that the best way to do an 
342 Walzer mentions that people may argue about the best account of shared meanings. However, they 
would know roughly what they were looking for; thereby, they could exclude a large number of bad 
accounts (see IS, 28). 
"To each his own", p.6. 
3451 am indebted to this view to Professor Li Hon Lam, who helps me to think more clearly on this point. 
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interpretation of social meanings is an internal activity, we are still unable to find out 
the most appropriate distributive principles of a society by interpreting people's shared 
meanings of social goods. Obviously, Walzer wants to defend the strong sense of 
shared understandings. Interpreters try to interpret the shared understandings of social 
meanings in order to find out a right distributive principle for the society. They do not 
just want to know that people agree about the reference of a social good. 
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Chapter 6: Problems with Walzer's interpretation 
thesis 
Assume now that the Indian villagers really do accept the doctrines that 
support the caste system. A visitor to the village might still try to convince 
them- it is an entirely respectable activity- that those doctrines are false. 
(Walzer, Spheres of Justice) ^^^ 
In Chapter 5, Walzer tries to argue that outsiders and strangers are not in a 
position to make criticisms opposing to this or that practice or institutional 
arrangement.347 However, social criticisms from foreign societies don't usually offend 
us. We get offended when we believe that critics from foreign societies incorrectly 
interpret our social meanings. I think there is no reason to assume that a society should 
have a privileged standpoint to judge their own distributive issues, compared with 
those of a foreign country. Citizens of a society in some sense are in a more privileged 
standpoint, presumably because they know their society very well. But this sort of 
privileged standpoint has to be balanced off the standpoint of a foreigner who are more 
detached, and hence perhaps more objective. To take one example, many Hong Kong 
people, including the government in late 1980s and early 1990s believed that many 
higher skilled labors would leave Hong Kong before its handover. Hence the 
government spent a lot of money to expand tertiary education and abandoned 
four-year undergraduates study. These policies were made with a view to increasing 
the labor force in a short period. Those Hong Kong people, including the government, 
were not objective. In fact the labor force in Hong Kong are in surplus now. 
Walzer might argue that we cannot simply call foreign people "outsiders", 
because they may know very well about our society. On the other hand, we cannot 
simply define members of our society "insiders", because some of them are ignorant of 
Spheres, 
347 7T, 3, 12, 16-18. 
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our society. It is obvious that Walzer wants to reject social criticisms from outsiders 
rather than social criticisms from foreigners. Hence Walzer does not reject social 
criticisms from a foreign society. 
It might be objected that the distinction between insider and outsider in this way 
is tautological and trivial. Our common sense tells us that a critic who knows a society 
well is better than another critic who knows nothing about the society. However, 
Walzer's view is not tautological and trivial, because he defines an outsider of a society 
as someone who is detached from it. Marx presumably knew Britain well, and he even 
lived there. But he was counted as an outsider. 
Nevertheless, I don't think Walzer would agree with this. If Marx knew Britain 
well, Walzer would agree that Marx could be an insider to criticize Britain. In 
Interpretation and Social Criticism, Walzer states that an "outsider" can become a 
good social critic or an "insider" only if she manages to gets herself inside, and "enters 
imaginatively [my emphasis] into local practices and arrangements., '348 if one were a 
local citizen or resident, there would be no need for one to imaginatively involve 
oneself into local culture. Walzer acknowledges that a critic may pick up new ideas 
from other countries as long as she can connect them to the local cu l ture . In Spheres 
of Justice, Walzer allows that a visitor who comes to an Indian caste village, Walzer 
mentions, might still convince the villagers that the idea of a caste system is unjust by 
introducing new principles to the villagers”�Therefore, although Walzer does not 
think that Marx is a good critic, Walzer agrees that a foreigner from a given society 
may still criticize the local culture of this society. Regarding Walzer's view on the 
distinction between insider and outsider, I think such distinction is not tautological and 
trivial. This is because it is not easy to define whether the foreign visitor an "insider" or 
348 IS, 39. 
349ZS，39. 
^^^ Spheres, 2>\A. 
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"outsider". 
In this chapter, I would like to show how Walzer allows social criticism from 
foreign countries. On my view, Walzer cannot defend his interpretation thesis, and 
finally, I shall explain why Walzer is forced to hold that his distributive theory has to 
admit some universal elements. In §6.1, Walzer observes that people might not accept 
a critic's interpretation as to which distributive principles should be applied to a 
society. But Walzer allows that a critic can convince the people to accept his or her 
view until they finally accept the new distributive principles that change their social 
life. Citizens' consensus on a distributive principle determines whether it is just or not. 
But Walzer does not specify whether all citizens should agree with a distributive 
principle in order to make it just. Perhaps Walzer should exclude some age groups, 
such as kindergarten students, and exclude those who do not know the society well. 
However, it is not easy to know whether a citizen really joins acknowledges his or her 
distributive principles. Also, to rely on citizens' consensus would undermine Walzer's 
claim that distributive justice does not depend on majority opinions. I would argue that 
the fact that there being some people protesting is neither a necessary, nor sufficient, 
condition for the distributive justice. 
In §6.2，I will introduce and discuss some criticisms against Walzer's 
interpretation thesis, which were given by Georgia Wamke, Joshua Cohen, and Joseph 
Raz. I agree with Georgia Wamke,s view that Walzer's interpretation thesis cannot 
justify its own particular interpretation against others. She argues that if we accept 
Walzer's interpretation thesis, we cannot criticize other societies. Wamke also 
correctly points out that aside from Walzer's interpretation, there are other 
perspectives that are also coherent to American society as well. Since we would have 
so many interpretive possibilities, thereby we would be unable to find out the best 
interpretation. Besides, I agree with Raz's view, which holds that moral arguments are 
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not interpretations of social practices. Raz argues that social practices and institutions 
do not by themselves provide reasons for a moral claim. He argues that even if we 
assume that people rarely advocate moral arguments that do not have roots in the 
social practices of a society. On my view, social practices and institutions seem to 
constitute a large part in an interpretation. But actually Walzer allows a visitor to 
convince people to accept moral arguments that do not have roots in the social 
practices. Therefore, I think that Walzer can improve his thesis by saying that an 
interpretation needs not appeal to social practices. Besides, I think that Walzer does 
not clarify his "underlying ideas" or core values in detail. As a result, it is rather 
difficult to criticize our social practices with core values. 
In §6.3，I would like to argue that Walzer's particularism and his theory of 
complex equality were not intended to be universal; but, unknown to Walzer, must be 
universal. 
Walzer re-states his idea of distributive justice in his later writings. In Thick and 
Thin, Walzer holds that distributive principles should be made according to the social 
meanings of social goods. Nevertheless, the principles should be constrained by 
minimalism. They are to be constrained by truisms, such as "no one should murder 
innocent people", "no one should betray a country", "cruelty is wrong", etc, which are 
applied or reiterated across human societies.^ ^^ Walzer attempts to respond to his 
critics by strengthening his arguments about justice. He posits a solution to explain (a) 
the world's numerous and diverse expressions of ethics as well as (b) how to make 
moral judgments across cultural boundaries. He hopes to encourage social and moral 
communication between diverse cultures of different communities. I shall introduce 
how he re-states his idea of distributive justice in his later works and raise some 
questions concerning his universalism but at the same time I wish to acknowledge his 
TT, 26. 
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motivation for this project. I shall also discuss one important issue: In Think and Thin, 
Walzer holds that minimalism, or the thin morality, is universal. Is this relevant or 
related to Walzer's universalism in Spheres of Justice? Or are the two kinds of 
universalism completely related? My view is that these two universalisms are different, 
but are inter-related. 
The rest of this chapter is my attempt to improve some of his arguments in order 
to see whether his theory can be made more convincing or attractive. 
6.1 The possibility of social criticisms made by another society 
I should first state that Walzer is not prepared to conclude that we can never 
criticize other cultures by invoking our own values. A visitor who comes to an 
Indian caste village, Walzer mentions, might still convince the villagers that the idea 
of a caste system is unjust by introducing new principles to the villagers. ^ ^^  Instead of 
protecting the caste system, the principles might state that men and women are borne 
equal. By the way, the process is not an attempt to force or coerce the Indian villagers 
to redesign their village against their shared understandings. It is a process that the 
visitor tries to convince the villagers to change their society. If he or she succeeded, 
new distributive principles would change the current beliefs of the villagers.354 That 
means the villagers would really accept the new principles. Acceptance of new 
principles means that there is a general agreement that new principles ought to be 
applied to a society. A general agreement is crucial to constitutions of social meanings. 
To Walzer, constitutions of distributive principles should “reflect a general 
agreement...since no vote is ever taken, there must be a consensus .On Walzer's 
说 Spheres, 3M. 
^^^ Spheres, 3\4. 
Spheres, 313-314. 
355 Michael Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning." In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.), 
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view，only God's goods do not require the agreement of mankind, or of a majority of 
men and women, or of any group of men and women meeting under ideal 
conditions.356 Yet Walzer has never specified the minimal number of men and women 
in order to show that they have a shared understanding on a social good. The number 
of persons needed in order to satisfy the "consensus" and reflect a "general agreement" 
remains unknown. The number of persons required for there being "a majority of men 
'jcn 
and women" is also undetermined. Despite this, a general agreement as to what 
distributive principles should apply does not require every citizen to take a vote. 
Citizens' choice on one interpretation instead of other interpretations, as Walzer 
puts it, might be the result of "historical negotiation, intrigue, and struggle".^ ^^ I think 
that we need not assume that negotiation, intrigue, and struggle must be wrong. 
Confucius tried to interpret the shared meanings of Chinese society and argued that the 
ethical core of Chinese society should be arranged in accordance with the religious 
rules of the Chow Dynasty. The majority of citizens once rejected Confucianism. 
Partly because of historical negotiation, intrigue, and struggle, eventually 
Confucianism has been endorsed by the people and has been shaping the distributive 
principles of Chinese society for thousands of years. 
Walzer admits that people might not accept a critic's interpretation as to which 
distributive principles should be applied to a society.^ ^^ But he agrees that a greater 
number of people supporting the interpretation would make it more genuine to the 
people. 360 He does not argue for a social meaning that exists universally and 
ahistorically. According to Walzer, an object is holy not because of its nature that leads 
us to say that it is a holy object. The holiness of an object is not a universally 
The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1993, p. 167. 
356 Spheres, 7. 
357 Spheres, 7. 
358 Walzer (1981), 395. 
360/5，44. 
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recognizable fact. The object is holy only because people in a given society 
acknowledge its holiness^i The holiness of altar, as Walzer puts forward, is a social 
meaning that is constituted in accordance with certain principles. Constitutions of 
social meanings involve socially meaningful occasions (holy days), spaces (churches), 
officials (priests and bishops), performances (religious services), texts (scriptures and 
prayers), and beliefs (theologies).^^^ Walzer says that he should not use the altar, for 
example, as a desk not because God would strike him dead. It would be wrong to do 
that because of the social meaning given to the altar in his society. To Walzer, the 
principles that follow from the social meaning of the table as a holy altar are 
authoritative to those men and women who join in the process of constitutions of 
distributive principles or acknowledge these principles.^ ^^ It follows that other people 
who do not join in the process of constitutions of distributive principles or 
acknowledge these principles, as Walzer mentions, are not bound by the principles，* 
It is possible that some groups of people in a society do not play any part in the 
process of constitutions of distributive principles. They have no chance to agree or 
disagree about the distributive principles of their social goods，，They can be the 
minority in society, such as handicapped persons, elderly and people with prolonged 
sickness. They can be the majority in society, such as people of the lowest castes who 
do not share any political power. 
But Walzer does not distinguish clearly between groups of people in a society 
who know the society well but they have no chance play any part in the process of 
constitutions of distributive principles, and groups of people in the society, such as 
361 Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p. 167. 
362 Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p.l68. 
Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p.l68. 
364 Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p. 167. 
365 Will Kymlicka notes that the excluded minority may be unable to get recognition from the cultural 
mainstreams. Communitarians wish to defend that practices of our cultural tradition are the basis for the 
common good. However, according to Kymlicka, these practices were historically defined by a small 
segment of the population. See Kymlicka (1999), p. 179. 
134 
students in kindergartens, who are incompetent to play any part in the process. So 
given the fact that the latter groups of people do not play any part in the process, it does 
not follow that they should not be bound by the distributive principles. We can further 
argue which kind of people can be claimed to be a person who knows his or her society 
well. A man over 60 does not necessarily know more about his society than a woman 
around 40, given that they have been living in the same society since they were borned 
there. 
Walzer asserts that if those people have played no part in the process of 
constitutions of distributive principles or have not acknowledged these principles, the 
distributive principles would become unjust.^ ^^ According to Walzer, we search for 
distributive principles through an interpretation of social meanings. ^ ^^  But social 
meanings come from people's shared understanding. Walzer observes that people 
conceive and create goods, which they then distribute among themselves. In fact, 
people already stand in relation to a set of goods and they have a history of 
transactions. Thus creation and conception of social meanings involve a 
participation of a group of people. Without their participation, there would be no 
shared understandings, and people would not have the first notion of how to go about 
the business of giving, allocating, and exchanging goods.遍 This result would be 
contrary to Walzer's central thesis. I would like to illustrate this view with an example: 
If people of the lowest castes in the Indian caste society have played no part in the 
process of constitutions of distributive principles or have not acknowledged these 
principles, the distributive principles would also become unjust. Walzer adds that any 
resistance to the agreement nullifies the justice of distributive principles, and it does 
not matter if the resistance is passive, hidden or private. When the majority of the 
366 Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p.l73. 
Spheres, 19. 
368 Spheres, 6-7. 
369 Spheres, 8. 
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people in India have agreed that the Indian caste society is just, but the minority group 
of people cannot express their resentment except that they can only do so in the 
company of other people of the lowest caste privately, the caste system would become 
unjust. So long as we discover such resistance, according to Walzer, the distributive 
principles of the society in question would become unjust, too.^ ^^ 
But how can we know that there are really some people who agree or decline to 
accept the distributive principles? Walzer's theory shows that Indian caste society 
might be an unjust society, because the lower-class people might not really join in the 
process of constitutions of distributive principles or acknowledge these principles. 
They might be physically coerced without any choice or they might find it difficult to 
escape from the hierarchical distributive principles. For example, they have to become 
slaves in order to make a living for themselves. In this case，it is not easy to know 
whether they really join in the process of the constitutions or acknowledge their 
distributive principles. 
Also, to rely on citizens' consensus would undermine Walzer's claim that 
distributive justice does not depend on majority opinions. Walzer seeks for an 
agreement among the citizens. That means interpreters have to collect their opinions 
and views about the distributive principles. Thus there would be no difference between 
doing interpretation and conducting opinion poll. 
More importantly, the fact that there being some people protesting is neither a 
necessary, nor sufficient, condition for the distributive justice. On my view, even if no 
one objects, the distribution might still be very unjust: Consider a society in which 
ideological elements are so powerful that everyone is deluded into believing that it is a 
just society. But in fact it is a very unjust society. On the other hand, even if there are 
many objections, it does not follow that the distribution should be very unjust. Given 
370 Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p. 173. 
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that many people object to football gambling, it does not follow that it is unjust for a 
government to allow football gambling and collect taxes from it. 
However, this objection would contradict Walzer's theory of distributive justice, 
which states that a just society is a society where its distributive principles are held in 
accordance with people's shared understandings. Should we assert that people's shared 
understandings of social meanings are in fact very unjust, we would undermine his 
fundamental thesis. For we have to rely on some other principles as a moral standard in 
order to say that people's shared understandings are in fact unjust. But these principles 
may be some general principles that are contrary to the shared understandings of the 
people. According to Walzer, people's shared understandings of social goods reflect a 
general consensus or agreement of people towards the social goods. Imagine a given 
social good, say, education, is only distributed to nobles and rich families. Suppose 
people have a general consensus to the distributive principle. In this case, they have a 
shared understanding toward the social meaning of education. 
It seems that Walzer's distributive theory can avoid being undermined by 
abandoning the view that the justice of a distribution should rely on whether people 
have accepted the distribution or not. People might be deluded by some false 
ideological elements. However, a good interpreter can overcome this and is able to 
give a right answer on distributions for that society. This “right answer" can be 
different from what people actually believe or agree with. 
But this response seems implausible. Following from preceding chapters, we 
cannot solve the problem of finding out the best interpretation. Apart from appealing 
to majority opinions or some genius interpreters, we have no other plausible way to 
find out the best interpretation. Now the majority opinions might be wrong. Then, who 
are the genius interpreters? Walzer does not give us the answer. He only tries to set 
conditions on the justice (or injustice) of a distribution by reference to the quietness, or 
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protest, of the population. 
According to Walzer, foreigners or visitors are taking part in the constitutions of 
distributive principles, as a visitor's effort to convince the citizens to accept her 
interpretation as respectful. On his view, a foreigner or a visitor's interpretation would 
become the shared understandings of social meanings in a country when local citizens 
finally accept new distributive principles suggested by the foreign people. On the 
contrary, the interpretation would not become the shared understandings of the 
citizens when they refuse to accept the new principles. As Walzer notes that "what 
empowers the politicians or pilots to act on their knowledge is the authorization of the 
people or the passengers themselves." People's choice has a role in the final 
judgment on the distributive principles. But I have argued that the fact that there being 
some people protesting is neither a necessary, nor sufficient, condition for the 
distributive justice. If I am correct, the view that people's choice has a role in the final 
judgment on the distributive principles is implausible. 
It seems that Walzer wishes to defend these two statements. First, (1) the 
rightness or wrongness of a distribution of a social good, according to Walzer, has to 
be determined in accord with its shared meaning. Second, (2) it is wrong to use a 
distributive principle in another country, which is not in accord with the shared 
meaning of the social good in our own country. Walzer wishes to argue that the 
shared meaning of the social good in question is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition of a just distribution. Nevertheless, I think that there is a problem in 
deducing the statement (2) from the statement (1). Even if the rightness of one 
distribution of a social good should be determined in accordance with its shared 
meaning, Walzer cannot exclude the possibility that some distributive principles from 
371 Sp heres, 287. 
372 Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", p. 169. 
373 Spheres, 313. Or he only wants to defend a water-down version of (2), because he is not against 
someone's applying her distributive principle in another country, provided that this country finally 
accepts her principle. 
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foreign countries would apply to our own country, even though they are now contrary 
to our shared meanings. We may be persuaded to accept those principles in the future. 
6.2 Refutation of Walzer's interpretation thesis 
I shall further divide this section into five sub-sections: They are listed as follows: 
i) Georgia Wamke's criticism; 
ii) Joshua Cohen's criticism; 
iii) Raw materials taking part in Walzer's interpretation 
iv) Joseph Raz's criticism; and 
v) Social practices and underlying ideas. 
6.21 Georgia Wamke's criticism 
Georgia Wamke doubts that Walzer's interpretation thesis can justify its own 
particular interpretation against others.374 First of all, we are never looking at the 
world from a God's eye view, standing outside from our historical situation with the 
best interpretive context. Thus we do not know whether our particular interpretation is 
a correct one. Moreover, according to Wamke, if we criticize a society such as a 
traditional caste society for its treatment of the lower castes but also claim that our 
criticism flows only from our own social and political understandings, the criticism 
would lose most of its force. This is because if we acknowledge that our notions of 
justice and equality are based simply on shared understandings of our social meanings, 
it is not clear why we would object to the different shared understandings of a different 
culture and tradition. More importantly, if we can only try to convince the people from 
374 Georgia Wamke, "Walzer and Social Interpretation", op. cit, pp.26, 32-33. 
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another society to move from one account of equality to another, it is not clear why 
they should change their shared understandings. The morality of the caste society in 
India has to do with the meaning of equality shared among the Indians. On the other 
hand, the equality shared by us is contrary to the shared understandings of equality in 
India. There is no reason, according to Walzer's distributive theory, for criticizing the 
Indian caste society by using our perspective or shared understandings of social 
meanings.375 
Besides, Wamke criticizes that what appears as contradictory to the shared 
understandings of Americans from Walzer's interpretation might appear as coherent to 
their shared understandings from other competing interpretations. Walzer's 
interpretations of social meanings, Wamke argues, simply reflect one perspective of a 
coherent description of practices and institutions in the society. Aside from Walzer's 
interpretation, there are other perspectives that are also coherent to American society 
as well. Since we would have so many interpretive possibilities, thereby we would be 
unable to find out the best interpretation.^^^ Thus Walzer's interpretation thesis cannot 
serve as a critical standard of existing practices. 
I agree with Georgia Wamke view that Walzer's interpretation thesis cannot 
justify its own particular interpretation against others. To criticize other societies, 
instead of appealing to our own values, it seems that we should step away from that 
society in order to get a more objective outlook. Kantian theory, for instance, is so 
general that it is objective enough to criticize those practices, institutions, and beliefs 
in other societies, which treat other human beings merely as a means. The raw 
materials of Walzer's interpretation thesis, on the contrary, only include one's own 
social practices, institutions, and underlying ideas. Interpreters are not required to step 
away from these practices, institutions, and underlying ideas in order to get a more 
Georgia Wamke, ‘‘Walzer and Social Interpretation", op. cit, pp. 32-33. 
'''ibid., pp. 30-31,36-37. 
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objective outlook. Thus, Walzer's interpretation thesis has no ground to criticize other 
societies. I also agree that given there are so many interpretive possibilities that are 
coherent to a society's core values, we would be unable to find out the best 
interpretation. I have already argued this point in Chapter 5. 
Wamke also criticizes that Walzer's interpretation thesis would entail infinite 
regress in our way to identify the best interpretation. Walzer agrees that interpretation 
is not of a legislative design by a single agent from the same perspective, but of 
conflicts among individuals and groups with diverse values and ambitions. This factor 
increases the complexity of identifying the best interpretation when there are 
competing interpreters claiming that they have found the correct way to distribute a 
social good in question. This is because we have to know which value and ambition is 
more respectful than others, before we can base on this value and ambition to decide 
whether an interpreter has made the best interpretation. Unfortunately, in order to 
know which value and ambition is more respectful than others, we would become 
interpreters again. Perhaps some interpreters doing the same job like us would 
challenge our interpretation, and give their own interpretations in other way round. 
Finally a new critic comes out and tries to solve the conflicts between their 
interpretations and ours. There is a possibility of infinite regress in our way to identify 
the best interpretation. 
Walzer might argue that there is no prior way to identify the best interpretation, 
because every society has its own particular shared understandings on social meanings. 
Besides, Walzer agrees that the process of interpretation is always an ongoing debate 
among interpreters. All interpretations, according to Walzer, are subject to further 
criticisms and challenges. This view does not follow that in principle there is no right 
answer on distributive justice. The point is that the interpretation that we consider 
correct now, may be incorrect in the future. Thus other interpreters doing the same job 
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like us would challenge our interpretation, and give their own interpretations in other 
way round. 
6.22 Joshua Cohen's criticism 
Although Walzer emphasizes that a just distribution that follows from shared 
understandings is often different from what people actually believe or practice, Joshua 
Cohen argues that shared understandings have to be identified through the existing 
practices of a given society in question. The shared understandings of common needs 
of Athenians, for example, are identified through their practices of subsidizations of 
baths, gymnasiums, and drama festivals. The shared understandings of the good of 
office in ancient China are identified by the practice of examination system for the 
imperial Chinese bureaucracy. Thus Cohen argues that the existing practices serve as 
the only evidence to account for the shared understandings of social meanings.]?? 
Walzer thinks that a given social goods should be distributed according to need, if it is 
recognized as a social need. However, for instance, if the practice of a society does not 
distribute medical good to people according to need, on Walzer's view, we do not 
know whether the society should recognize medical good as a need. Then according to 
Walzer's theory, we do not know whether medical good should be distributed 
according to need. 
Joshua Cohen even criticizes Walzer's interpretation that it is an arbitrary or 
tendentious interpretation.�？^ In the United States, health care can also be privately 
purchased. People do not in fact enjoy the same degree and the same standard of 
medical services. The distribution of health care in the United States, for example, can 
be a just distribution in a number of ways, depending on how we interpret its meaning. 
377 Joshua Cohen, "Michael Walzer: Spheres of Justice ^ The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), p.463. 
378 The evaluative phrases "arbitrary and tendentious" are borrowed from Joshua Cohen in his book 
review on Walzer's Spheres of Justice. See Cohen (1986), 465. 
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There are at least three kinds of interpretations of shared understandings in dispute: (1) 
Doctors should serve the citizens in need, regardless of their wealth. (2) Doctors 
should only serve those patients who can afford the cost of medical care. (3) Doctors 
should serve the citizens in need, but the doctors might give priorities to those patients 
who could pay more money for medical care. 
Interpretations (1), (2) and (3) describe the current practice of medical care in 
the United States today, but Walzer only acknowledges the interpretation (1) and 
argues that medical care has already constituted a social meaning as part of the sphere 
379 
of need. As a result, certain aspects of the social practice become more important 
than others. The whole picture of the social practice is that medical care is both a need 
and a commodity. As a social good, people treat medical care as a social need, but at 
the same time people allow it to be bought and sold in a market. To account for this 
social practice, there is another way of interpretation of medical care, which holds that 
medical care is not a need alone but it is also a commodity. Such an interpretation can 
be regarded as a mixed interpretation. Cohen indicates that Walzer has not spelled out 
why medical care as a social need is more important than medical care as a commodity. 
It seems more reasonable to conclude that the best interpretation of medical care is a 
mixed interpretation, and stress that the social meaning of medical care is that it is both 
a need and a commodity to the people. This is because health care in the United States 
is distributed largely privately, and very unequally. Since Cohen thinks that the current 
pattern of medical provision in the United States provides the only data or evidence for 
an interpretation, Cohen thinks that the "mixed interpretation" gives us a more 
complete picture in reflecting the current health care practices in the United States.^ ^^ 
Yet Walzer does not think that existing practices serve as the only evidence to 
account for the shared understandings of social meanings. He thinks that practices, 
379 Spheres, 17, 24. 
380 Cohen thinks that existing practices serve as the only evidence for the interpretation of a social good. 
See Cohen (1986), p. 463. 
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institutions, and underlying ideas altogether constitute a history, which allows us to 
interpret these as best we can in order to get the right distributive principles for us.^ ^^  
On Walzer's view, current practices are not the only source of interpretation. He may 
further reply that not all aspects of the current practices are faithful to people's shared 
understanding, and so only some aspects of the current practices can support Walzer's 
interpretations of social meanings. Walzer can criticize those practices in a given 
society when he finds that they are contrary to his own way of interpretation. Suppose 
Walzer thinks that the society should provide a given good to those in need but in fact 
it is now being distributed in accordance with affordability. Walzer can criticize its 
wrongness. But Cohen thinks that Walzer cannot offer any reason to disregard the 
current practices. As Cohen states before, we cannot identify shared understandings 
without appealing to the current practices in a given society. Therefore Walzer cannot 
make critical interpretations that are radically different from the current practices. 
Thus Cohen argues that Walzer's interpretation thesis is "intrinsically 
conservative,，.382 
Although Cohen argues that Walzer's interpretive theory is “intrinsically 
conservative", Cohen notes that in fact Walzer's theory is not loyal to the current 
practice. This is because Cohen observes that private doctors largely operate 
distributive practices of American medical services. Moreover, the distribution of 
medical services is very uneven. 
Concerning Cohen's view that Walzer's interpretation thesis is intrinsically 
conservative, I think that his view seems wrong. To say that a theory is intrinsically 
conservative means that it is only loyal to the current practices in a society and does 
not makes critical interpretations. But Cohen suddenly shifts his position and claims 
that Walzer's theory deviates or diverges from the current practices. So in fact Cohen 
训 See Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange", op. cit., p. 43. 
382 ibid” pp. 464-466. 
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has either admitted that Walzer's interpretation thesis is not conservative, or his theory 
has deviated or diverged from the current practices. 
6.23 Raw materials taking part in Walzer's interpretation 
David Miller tries to explain Walzer's way to interpret from competing social 
meanings. Miller thinks that there are two types of raw materials taking part in 
Walzer's interpretation. One type is the institutions and practices of a society, and the 
other type is people's beliefs and opinions about those institutions and practices.^ ^^ 
Taking education as an example, the education system in contemporary 
American is the institution and practice of the Unites States. Whilst what people think 
and say about education, how teachers understand their role, and what parents demand 
for their children constitute the people's beliefs and opinions about American 
education system. Practices and institutions may be a result of dominance. This would 
cause people's complaints and criticisms when the practices and institutions are held 
up against people's beliefs and opinions. In the practice of medical care in the United 
States, the quality of medical care available to citizens depends on their affordability. 
However, Walzer argues that the shared understanding of medical care requires that it 
be distributed according to need alone until the minimal level of provision is satisfied. 
On the other hand, practice and institutions are more stable than people's beliefs and 
opinions. Even if practice and institutions follow people's beliefs and opinions, they 
only follow the core of such beliefs and opinions from the past to present, which are 
more stable. Nine Americans out of ten do not think that socialism is appropriate for 
the country. Nevertheless, Miller explains that if we look at their past and present 
beliefs and opinions and try to find out the core of such beliefs and opinions, we can 
383 David Miller, "Introduction", Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (1996), p.7. 
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reach Walzer's conclusion that decentralized democratic socialism is the appropriate 
arrangement for the United States. 
Miller emphasizes that Walzer never conducts any simple opinion poll when 
looking at people's beliefs and opinions. To Miller, Walzer relies on two requirements 
in distinguishing between better and worse interpretations of our social meanings. 
First, we still have to ask people's beliefs and opinions concerning a distributive issue. 
However, the questions are asked in different ways, and Walzer has to eliminate the 
less good answers to the same questions. In fact, the first requirement is hidden in 
Walzer's thesis. Walzer says that the majority of citizens might fail to apply 
consistently the principles in which people professed to hold. Therefore a distributive 
principle might be against the majority of the citizens. ^^ ^ Another requirement is to 
see whether people's beliefs are coherent. Miller thinks that people's beliefs are based 
on some distributive principles of social goods determined by their social meanings. 
We have to see whether a distributive principle supporting a belief can be applied to 
beliefs about some neighboring distributive issues. For example, Americans believe 
that political power should be given to those who gain the greatest number of votes. 
The principle behind is that every citizen has his or her right to vote for his or her 
political leaders. To be coherent, the principle would include a commitment to 
workplace democracy, and hence workers in a factory have rights to take part in 
making decisions. But there is a problem here. Appealing to coherence may give us an 
absurd result. For example, even if we agree that every citizen has his or her right to 
vote, should we allow that students have the right to vote for their teachers? Should 
children have the right to choose how much homework they want to do? Although the 
right to vote is usually confined to politics and the workplace. However, this example 
shows that appealing to coherence in the interpretation of social meanings cannot 
384 David Miller (1996), p.8. See also Spheres, 99. 
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sufficiently guarantee us to search for correct distributive principles. 
I do not think Walzer would be satisfied with Miller's analysis. No evidence in 
Walzer's theory shows that people's belief about a distributive issue is backed by a 
distributive principle of the social good. Rather, it is people's shared understanding of 
a social good that determines a distributive principle. Meanwhile, Walzer never 
supports any form of general principles in The Spheres of Justice. Nor has he explicitly 
admitted that people's beliefs and opinions are one of the raw materials in the process 
of interpretation, even though Walzer did not reject these.^ ^^ Despite this, Miller's 
distinction between (1) practices and institutions on the one hand, and (2) people's 
beliefs and opinions about those practices and institutions is remarkable, as he 
attempts to clarify Walzer's claim that we can mark off "deep and inclusive" accounts 
Q/T 
of social life from "shadow and partisan accounts". 
6.24 Joseph Raz's criticism 
Joseph Raz criticizes the view that moral arguments are interpretations of the 
morality that is. On Raz's view, criticisms of current practices assume that one 
morality is right and another morality that it displaced was wrong. However, Walzer's 
interpretation thesis only interprets the current morality in a given society. It does not 
give new meanings to the current morality. Therefore the interpretation thesis cannot 
establish a view that one morality is right and another morality that it displaced was 
wrong. It follows that the interpretation thesis is incompetent to criticize that the 
current morality is wrong. Raz argues that unless Walzer appeals to universal 
Walzer only mentions that there is no basic text in the moral world like the constitution and no 
authoritative decisions, but there is a history. There are "institutions and practices", and "underlying 
ideas". He thinks that we must interpret these as best as we can in order to get the most appropriate ways 
to distribute our social goods with one another. Walzer never explicitly admits that "underlying ideas" 
are identical to people's beliefs and opinions. Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: 
An Exchange", op. cit., p. 43. 
386 Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange, op. cit., p.43. 
147 
principles, there would be no possibility of moral change in that society.^ ^^ 
This view cannot reject Walzer's interpretation thesis. Walzer does not 
necessarily agree that current morality is right and the old morality that it displaced 
was wrong. A current morality guides that market should control the distribution of 
educational resources is one thing, but whether it is morally correct to distribute the 
educational resources according to market forces in that society is another issue. 
According to Walzer, the correctness of a morality does not depend on some universal 
principles. The main reason for moral changes is due to changes in social meanings. 
The changes in social meanings require new interpretations, because interpretation 
thesis interprets the shared meanings in a given society. When social meanings change 
over time, according to Walzer, we have to make new interpretation. The result of a 
new interpretation justifies the correctness or wrongness of a moral change. Thus the 
interpretation thesis in this sense would not obstruct moral change in the society. 
Raz points out that as long as moral views and arguments are expressed n 
language, they are essentially language bound, and there is no doubt that the 
understanding of moral views and arguments involves interpretation of arguments and 
propositions. The same can be said of physics, when such a weak sense of 
» O Q 
interpretation applies to the subject. However, Walzer's interpretation thesis is not 
proposing a weak sense of interpretation. Rather, he wants to argue for a strong sense 
of interpretation. In other words, Walzer says that there are three main ways to do 
moral philosophy: They are discovery, invention, and interpretation. He observes that 
some philosophers do not adopt interpretation in their moral theories. Thus Walzer 
wants to argue that morality is interpretative in a way in which physics is not. Walzer. 
Meanwhile, he argues for a weak sense of shared understandings of social goods. This 
387 Joseph Raz, "Morality as Interpretation," Ethics 101 (1991), p.398. 
388 Joseph Raz (1991), p.392. It is a weak sense of interpretation because conceivably every kind of 
knowledge is expressed in language, and is essentially language bound. Thus interpretation of this sense 
involved not only in morality, but also in every kind of human knowledge. As a result, to say that 
morality is interpretive in character becomes a trivial claim. 
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means that there can be competing interpretations of social goods though they share 
the same reference. To find out the best interpretations among them, according to Raz, 
we cannot rely on interpretation anymore, when each of them claims that it is the best 
one. 
Raz contends that moral arguments are not interpretations. Interpretation of 
social practices regards justice as a contingent matter. For it depends on social 
practices in a given society at the time. On his view, justice is not a contingent matter. 
Ordinary arguments against deceit, for example, do not involve interpretation of social 
practices. People argue that it is wrong to take unfair advantage of others, and to treat a 
person merely as a mean. Or they argue that deceit undermines trust and raise 
suspicions, which hinders communication between persons.^ ^^ Social practices are 
relevant for establishing facts about deceit, its effects, and the most effective ways of 
combating it. Raz argues that people rarely advocate moral arguments that do not have 
roots in the social practices of a society. Despite this, it does not follow that social 
practices are themselves the reasons for a moral c l a im . • Social practices do not 
themselves provide any moral reason to combat deceit. To Raz, social criticisms are 
possible only when morality can be developed away from the social practices. 
Otherwise, there would be no difference between morality and social practices. In 
other words, social practices would only be correct, and would not be wrong.^ This 
consequence is implausible, because social practices in a particular society can be 
mistaken. Hence morality is not identical to the current practices of the society. 
Raz argues that ultimately interpretation thesis assumes a moral point of view. 
He expounds this view by using two examples. One example is that there is a man who 
allows a young child to drive a car. The other example is that there was a man who 
leaves his old and sick parents fifty miles away from home in nineteenth century 
389 Joseph Raz, "Morality as Interpretation," Ethics 101 (1991), pp.402-403. 
• Joseph Raz, "Morality as Interpretation," Ethics 101 (1991), p.404. 
Joseph Raz, "Morality as Interpretation," Ethics 101 (1991), pp.397-398. 
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before the invention of autoniobiles.^^^Ordinary morality asserts that these two acts are 
both morally wrong. However, when the child has grown up into an adult, and when 
transportation has been improved, the situation changes. The same acts are no longer 
regarded as immoral. The moral point of view behind is that children should not drive 
a car because they do not have enough ability to leam the skills and danger of driving. 
Also, ordinary morality argues that one has a duty, say, to take care of one's parents 
when they feel sick. If any moral change assumes some unchanged moral point of 
view, we could agree that morality remains unchanged despite the change of situation. 
Obviously, Walzer would not defend any unchanged principle in his thesis, though he 
admits that people who find out their appropriate arrangements would believe that 
those arrangements are the right thing for them to do.^ ^^  But should Walzer wants to 
deny unchanged principles, he has to explain why certain propositions of morality are 
right from today, but they are not right before. The explanation of what makes certain 
propositions of morality now, was not applicable to the past. However, to say that one 
thing is right from today, Raz argues, we have to explain why it was not right before.394 
I do not think that ultimately the interpretation thesis should assume a moral 
point of view. Walzer might respond that every interpretation is "theory-laden". That 
is, every interpreter has assumed his or her own values in every interpretation of social 
meanings. These values may come from his or her past experience and knowledge. 
However, these values are not necessarily relevant to morality. A man (P) who sits in a 
room at night and sees a dark shadow besides the windows may think that there is a 
thief outside his house. Another man (Q) has the same experience but he thinks that 
there is a ghost outside his house. Both P and Q are theory-laden when they interpret 
the dark shadow outside the windows. However, the values behind their 
392 Joseph Raz, "Morality as Interpretation," Ethics 101 (1991), p.398. 
393 IS, 23. 
394 ibid., P.399 
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interpretations have nothing to do with morality. ^ ^^  This example can apply to 
distributive justice. People disagree with how to distribute a medical care, because 
they have different interpretations. But since they have different past experience and 
knowledge, they have disagreement on the correct distributive principle. Past 
experience, such as the painful experience in the emergency unit, may contribute to an 
interpreter's view that medical care should be distributed in proportion of need by the 
government. 
Raz seems to have assumed that moral reasons must rely on some unchanged 
moral principles or moral point of view. But every moral principle or moral point of 
view may be modified, revised, or rejected with time. A moral principle or moral point 
of view that applies now does not mean that it will be unchanged forever. Surely, 
Walzer denies unchanged principles too. His reason is that social meanings are 
historical in character, and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions, change 
over time.396 His theory of social goods is concerned with how people conceive, create, 
and distribute goods among themselves. This theory has explained why certain 
propositions of morality are right from today, but they are not right before. It has also 
explained why one distribution was not right before, but it becomes an appropriate 
distribution today. 
According to Walzer's interpretation thesis, moral argument is an interpretation 
of the social practices of a society under discussion. Raz argues that the interpretation 
thesis would lead to the possibility that Hitler's Nazis practices were just. For 
interpreters can argue that Nazis practices were done in accordance with the shared 
understandings of German during the World War II. To Raz, the verdict of 
interpretation is true for the interpreter, or for any one who shares his or her 
3951 owe to this view to Professor Li Hon Lam. 
396 Spheres, 9. 
397 Joseph Raz, "Morality as Interpretation," Ethics 101 (1991), p.402. 
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perspective.398 The moral claim of German's Final Solution is true for the Nazi 
German interpreters or for any one who shares his or her perspective. One way to 
avoid this possibility, Raz argues, is to defend some methods of interpretation that rule 
out certain results. However, Raz argues that there is no reason to accept such morally 
biased methods of interpretation. Otherwise we have to accept that certain moral 
claims are presupposed by Walzer's theory. Raz thinks that presumably Walzer does 
not want to adopt any moral assumption in his interpretation thesis. Thus Raz's view 
would refute Walzer's interpretation thesis. 
It could be objected that even if Walzer adopted certain moral assumptions, Raz 
would not refute Walzer's interpretation thesis. Mosses led his people to exile from 
Egypt, because he believed that God had revealed a revelation to him. He believed that 
it was a revelation from God rather than the whisper from the devils through his way of 
interpretation. He might adopt a moral assumption that man should not doubt God's 
words. To consider how to distribute educational resources to students in Hong Kong, 
for example, the government is likely to consider some moral assumptions, such as 
young children have equal right to go to school, and providing education to people 
regardless of their social class is beneficial to a society. These moral assumptions may 
be the core values of the society. Based on these assumptions, we can in principle find 
out a correct interpretation that is coherent to these assumptions. But as I have argued, 
Walzer might respond that every interpretation is "theory-laden". That is, every 
interpreter has assumed his or her own values in every interpretation of social 
meanings. These values may come from his or her past experience and knowledge. 
However, these values are not necessarily relevant to morality. On my view, the 
problem of Walzer's interpretation thesis is not that Walzer has adopted some moral 
assumptions. Rather, as I have argued in last chapter, it is puzzling as to how to find 
398 ibid., p.403. 
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out the core values in a society. However, there are too many interpretations that are 
coherent with the core values. Further, it is misleading to rely on those core values in 
solving distributive issues. 
Raz has already shown that morality is not identical with the morality that 
currently prevails in a particular society. Given the non-identity, first of all, we do not 
know how an interpreter can reach the best interpretation among the conflicting 
interpretations, as interpreters only share a weak sense of shared understanding. 
Second, if social practices that currently prevail in the society were mistaken, we 
would not know how the interpreter could find a correct interpretation from the 
prevailing wrong ideas. Therefore Raz concludes that interpretation of social 
meanings alone is not sufficient enough to make moral arguments. 
6.25 Social practices and underlying ideas 
On my view, Raz is correct to point out that social practices do not provide 
reasons for a moral claim. Nevertheless, Walzer also mentions that social practices 
alone are not enough for interpretations. As I have introduced in § 5.1 and § 6.1, he 
thinks that practices, institutions, and underlying ideas altogether constitute a history, 
which allow us to interpret these as best we can in order to get the right distributive 
principles for us. ^ ^^  But there are two possible problems that would undermine 
Walzer's interpretation thesis. First, social practices and institutions seem to 
constitute a large part in an interpretation. Seemingly, people rarely advocate moral 
arguments that do not have roots in the social practices of a society. Suppose an 
interpreter thinks that education in Society P should be distributed according to need 
and talent. However, the current practice of education in Society P is that only wealthy 
399 See Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange", op. cit., p. 43. 
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and powerful classes have the right to receive education, while the government does 
not provide any education opportunity to the poor. Based on Walzer's interpretation 
thesis, it seems that we cannot advocate moral arguments based on this interpretation. 
Thus Walzer has to admit that social practices and institutions constitute a large part in 
an interpretation. 
I think Walzer can avoid this challenge only if he revises his interpretation thesis. 
Actually, Walzer allows foreign visitors to convince or persuade people to accept 
moral arguments that do not have roots in their social practices. That means the view 
that people rarely advocate moral arguments that do not have roots in their social 
practices seems wrong. On Walzer's view, current practices, institutions, and 
underlying ideas serve as the raw materials in an interpretation. To avoid this 
challenge, I think Walzer may revise his interpretation thesis by saying that current 
practices are not necessary in accordance with the deep meanings or the core values of 
the society. In other words, Walzer can simply reject current practices and institutions 
as one of the raw materials. To say that current practices are not the raw materials of 
interpretation, Walzer can avoid using current practices in society to criticize the 
society itself. Thus he can avoid circularity in his interpretation thesis. 
As a result, underlying ideas become the only raw materials in an interpretation. 
But Walzer does not clarify his "underlying ideas" in detail. This is the second 
problems that would undermine his interpretation thesis. There is no evidence that 
underlying ideas are identical to beliefs and opinions of citizens. Despite this, as I have 
shown in Chapter 5, Walzer has discussed the role of “core values" in an interpretation 
He argues that an interpreter has to find out the core values of a given society in order 
to know the shared understandings of social meanings in the society. Thus it is 
plausible to say that "underlying ideas" are actually the cores values of a given society. 
I have argued in Chapter 5 that core values were too abstract to be useful as a 
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guide for finding distributional principles of various goods. Nevertheless, underlying 
ideas do not necessarily reflect on the current practices and institutions. For example, 
underlying ideas in Society Q encourage people to help others. But the current 
practices and institutions, such as business activities, may emphasize self-interests and 
maximizing utility. Thus I think Walzer has to admit that core values, on the one hand, 
are too abstract to be useful as a guide for finding distributional principles of various 
goods. But on the other hand, Walzer can say that core values are useful as a 
constraint against some distributional principles that are contrary to or incoherent 
with them. 
So can underlying ideas of German people rule out the idea of Nazi German 
during the Second World War? On my view, Walzer could reply this question in two 
ways: First, German people did not really accept the idea of Nazi German, but they 
were forced to follow the rules given by the Nazi government. But this reply is 
problematic. This is because, as I have argued, it is difficult for us to know whether 
people really accepted a distributive principle. More importantly, the justice of a 
distributive principle, as previously discussed, should not depend solely on people's 
opinions. People's opinions are contingent. This is because people's opinions might be 
deluded by false ideologies and false underlying ideas. These opinions are usually 
unexamined by the people, which may change suddenly without reason at all. Thus 
what is just should not solely rely on people's opinions. 
On my view, the second way in which Walzer could reply the question is that he 
has to admit that there are really some universal elements in his distributive theory, 
which entitles Walzer to rule out cruel ideas, such as German Nazism, that are 
contradictory to such universal elements. In Spheres of Justice, Walzer denies there 
being universal principles. But to me, Walzer's particularism and his theory of 
complex equality were not intended to be universal; hut, unknown to Walzer, must be 
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universal. I am going to expound this view in the next section. If I am correct, Walzer's 
particularism has admitted universal elements, which undermines Walzer's original 
view that an interpreter needs not look for universal principles. 
All in all, Walzer's interpretation thesis still cannot give a convincing answer on 
solving conflicts and disagreements concerning distributive issues. After many 
discussions, some puzzles on several key concepts remain unsolved. These puzzles are 
first and foremost concerned with Walzer's unclear concepts of "core values" or 
"underlying ideas", because they are crucial for working out a correct distribution of a 
social good. Secondly, Walzer sometimes give us an impression that a correct 
distributive principle does not depend on majority opinions, and shared 
understandings of a social good is different from what most citizens believe. 
Interpreters who know the core values in society find out the shared understandings. 
However, in this chapter, Walzer emphasizes that a just distribution means that 
citizens really accept the principle without disagreement. As I have shown, this view is 
implausible. If I am correct, the interpretation thesis would need to be revised, or 
completely rejected. 
The most we can say with assurance is that Walzer's interpretation thesis forces 
us to think about the social meanings upon which each society's system of distributive 
principles of social goods is based. Even if we assume that our distributive system is a 
"good" one, it does not follow that a foreign distributive system is therefore a "bad" 
one. At least, we should not be troubled just because the foreign way is different from 
our own, but defense of pluralism and respecting particular creations do not imply that 
we cannot criticize other cultures. 
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6.3 Universal application of Walzer's particularism 
In Spheres of Justice, Walzer once analyses that the appropriate arrangements in 
"our own society" are those of a decentralized democratic socialism. His judgment 
attracts me to think about the range of application of his theory of distributive justice. 
Besides, Walzer emphasizes that every citizen is an interpreter of our own society. 
According to Walzer, any citizen can argue that our current institutions and practices 
fail to do justice to our deeper aspirations as a particular community or institution.如。 
What does it mean by "our own society"? Is it only confined to contemporary 
American society?— Should every democratic society in our world or every 
contemporary society in the world adopt the suggested arrangements of decentralized 
democratic socialism? 
Walzer holds that a given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a way 
faithful to the shared understandings of the members.402 I would like to argue that 
Walzer intends his statement to be universally true. It is fair to say that Walzer does not 
require every modem industrial society or democratic country to adopt decentralized 
democratic sociaUsm.403 Despite this, shared understanding of social meanings is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of distributive justice. On Walzer's view, once we 
have well interpreted the shared understanding, we can sufficiently find out the 
appropriate distributive principles of the social goods. On the contrary, a society 
cannot be a just society until its distributive principles are faithful to the shared 
understandings of the members. In other words, wherever we are coming from, as long 
Richard Bellemy thinks that Walzer's idea does not confine to the United States. According to 
Bellemy, Walzer believes that the democratic socialism is implicit in the public culture of modern 
industrial societies and develops out of the complex equality they favor. See Richard Bellemy, "Walzer 
on pluralism, equality and democracy", p. 177. 
搬 Sphef^es, 313. 
403 Walzer only indicates that the appropriate arrangements in the United States are those of a 
decentralized democratic socialism. He does not argue that other societies should follow and accept 
these arrangements. See Spheres, 318. 
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as we follow Walzer's theory, we can find out appropriate distributive principles for 
our social goods. This view is the same for all in every society and there is no 
exception and negotiation. 
Walzer suggests a list of blocked exchanges in the United States. However, it 
seems that the list apply to most societies in the modem wor ld . 404 Thus block 
exchanges set limits on the dominance of wealth in most societies.405 Obviously, some 
of these limits are universal: (1) Political power cannot be bought and sold; (2) 
criminal justice is not for sale; (3) freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly do not 
require money payments; (4) political offices cannot be bought; (5) prizes and honors 
are not available for purchase. The fact that some societies do not have criminal justice 
and freedom of speech does not refute the view that criminal justice and freedom of 
speech are not for sale. So long as a society has criminal justice and freedom of speech, 
it would not require its citizens to pay for these. 
Besides, Walzer emphasizes that distributive justice begins with an account of 
citizenship rights.楊 For it is only as members somewhere that men and women can 
hope to share in all the other social goods, such as security, wealth, honor, office, and 
power, which makes communal life possible. According to Walzer, citizenship rights 
allow people to share in all other types of social goods in order to constitute their own 
communal life."^ ^^  Importance of citizenship is expressed in two ways: (1) Citizenship 
provides mutual benefits for citizens and the governments. Citizens have rights to 
receive public provision on recognized needs, such as medical care and education. The 
government, in turn, collects tax money from people in order to maintain the pool of 
communal provision. (2) Citizenship gives meanings to individual lives of the citizens. 
Holiday and vacations are social goods that are distributed to and enjoyed by the 
稱 Slavery and polygamy might be acceptable in some civilized societies in ancient world, such as 
Ancient Greece and China. 
奶5 Spheres, 100-103. 
狐 Spheres, 63. 
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citizens of a society. Holidays and vacations do not only give benefits to the citizens, 
but they also contribute a part of common life in the society. Walzer does not 
confine this view to modern American society, because he uses various examples from 
different countries to defend his point of view. 
Nevertheless, given his express attitude against universalism, it seems more 
plausible for us to say that his particularism was not intended to be universal, but 
unknown to Walzer, must be universal. The concepts of particularism and 
universalism are not contradictory to each other. They are referring to different levels 
of prepositions. Particularism supports the view that different societies have different 
distributive principles for different social goods. Thus medical care in the United 
States should be distributed according to need, while tertiary education should be 
distributed according to talent. But medical care and tertiary education can have other 
ways of distribution in other societies. Regarding universalism, it acknowledges the 
view that “all moral truths are relativists". But the view itself is a universal judgment. 
Walzer revises or paraphrases Karl Marx's renowned slogans or maxims in order 
to expound his own views. Although Walzer does not think that Marx's philosophy is 
helpful with regard to the distribution of political power, honor and fame, sailboats, 
rare books, and beautiful objects of every sort; Walzer is inspired by Marx's maxim: 
"from each according to ability, to each according to needs" in the distribution of 
needed goods to c i t i z e n s . ^ Walzer partly borrows this maxim and suggests that his 
principles for the sphere of security and welfare can be summarized into a revised 
version of Marx's maxim, that is，“from each according to his resources; to each 
according to his socially recognized n e e d s . ” 糊 Another famous maxim of Marx also 
influences the distribution of recognition in Walzer's theory of justice. Marx observes 
• Spheres, 194. 
• Sphere, 25. 
410 Spheres, 91. To Walzer, one's need is different from a social need. Children's needs for education, 
for example, were not socially recognized needs in Ancient Athens, according to Walzer. Recall § 4.4 of 
my thesis. 
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that "if you are not able, by the manifestation of youself as a loving person, to make 
yourself a beloved person- then your love is impotent and a misfortune. "4Walzer 
paraphrases Marx's argument by saying that "if a person is not able, by the 
manifestation of himself as a worthy person, to make himself a valued person, then his 
worth is impotent and a misfortune."Apart from these, Pascal's view toward 
distributive justice is also helpful in Walzer's theory of complex equality against 
domination and tyranny. Pascal argues that "the nature of tyranny is to desire power 
over the whole world and outside its own sphere. These maxims are just like 
universal principles guiding all kinds of distributions of communal goods and 
recognition in all human societies. Surely, different society has its own way to 
distribute these goods in accordance with its particular social meaning. However, a 
just distribution should comply with these paraphrased guiding principles. 
On my view, these guiding principles are ultimately rooted in Walzer's central 
thesis: Complex equality. The theory of complex equality, which holds that "no social 
good X should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y 
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x" sets a 
constraint against dominations of goods and illegitimate crossing of distributive 
spheres. Walzer is forced to hold that his theory of complex equality is universal in all 
societies. Otherwise, it would be groundless to condemn those distributions that are 
contrary to their social meaning. 
The reason for complex equality, as Walzer argues, is that it is wrong for the rich 
to oppress and subordinate the poor with dominant good and command their 
deferential b e h a v i o r , i4 The wrongness of domination is that the rich do not respect the 
poor. On Walzer's view, we have to do justice to different companies of men and 
411 Spheres, 18. 
似 Spheres >25 込. 
413 Spheres, 18. 
414 Recall § 1.2 and §1.5 of my thesis (see also Spheres, xiii). 
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women by respecting their particular creations of social meanings. In this regard, 
whether or not Walzer agrees with Kant's moral philosophy, his particularism has 
something in common with Kantian view, which holds that it is wrong to treat other 
human beings merely as a means to achieve a goal or an end. 
Defenders of particularism do not want to claim that either our morality or those 
of other societies are unworthy of being taken seriously. Instead, when philosophers 
like Walzer urge us to see that the moralities of some other societies are as good as 
ours, they would hold that requirements of morality in different societies vary but are 
not for that reason to be taken less seriously.'^  have explained Walzer's view that 
morality in a given society is authoritative to its people, because their categories, 
relationships, commitments, and aspirations are all shaped by, and expressed in terms 
of the morality in that societyWalzer wants to claim that there is no conflict 
between particularism and a morality that is authoritative to the people. On my view, 
Walzer has to hold this view as a universal claim. Otherwise, he has to allow that in 
some cases or social situations, a just society can have a morality that has no force to 
its people. 
Given his express attitude against universalism, in this section, I find that 
Walzer's theory is self-defeating, because Walzer also presupposes universal truth in 
his particularism. It seems more plausible to say that his particularism was not 
intended to be universal, but, unknown to Walzer, must be universal. The universal 
truth is presupposed in some most basic level of his theory, such as complex equality. 
But Walzer can maintain that concerning how to distribute particular goods is 
particularistic. My conjecture then is that Walzer has to improve his theory in order to 
make it more convincing and attractive. 
415 Scanlon (1998), p.333. Walzer holds that we cannot "rank and order" different societies with regard 
to their understandings of social goods. See Spheres, 314. 
416 IS, 21. See also § 5.1 of my thesis. 
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6.4 Thick and thin 
Walzer's re-states his idea of distributive justice in his later writings. In Thick 
and Thin, Walzer holds that distributive principles should be made according to the 
social meanings of social goods. Nevertheless, the principles should be constrained by 
minimalism. They are to be constrained by truisms, such as "no one should murder 
innocent people", "no one should betray a country", "cruelty is wrong", etc, which are 
applied or reiterated across human societies.4i7 Walzer attempts to respond to his 
critics by strengthening his arguments about justice. He posits a solution to explain (a) 
the world's numerous and diverse expressions of ethics as well as (b) how to make 
moral judgments across cultural boundaries. He hopes to encourage social and moral 
communication between diverse cultures of different communities. I shall introduce 
how he re-states his idea of distributive justice in his later works and raise some 
questions concerning his universalism but at the same time I wish to acknowledge his 
motivation for this project. I shall also discuss one important issue: In Think and Thin, 
Walzer holds that minimalism, or the thin morality，is universal. Is this relevant or 
related to Walzer's universalism in Spheres of Justice? Or are the two kinds of 
universalism completely related? My view is that these two universalisms are different, 
but are inter-related. 
Walzer recalls a picture from television news before he offers arguments to 
support his view that there is a negative doctrine that is reiterated across human 
societies. A film clip from television news showed a group of demonstrators in Prague 
who is calling for "justice" and "democracy", though their conception of a just society 
is different from that of the United States. However, as an American or a foreign 
observer, Walzer saw the picture from the television but he still recognized and 
417 TT, 26. 
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acknowledged the values in which the demonstrators were defending."^^^ Based on this 
experience, Walzer puts forward that everyone who saw the picture would 
immediately recognize and acknowledge what the demonstrators are calling for. 
Walzer begins his argument with a discussion of what he calls "thin" morality, 
which is contrasted with "thick" morality. On the one hand, he explains, there is a 
"thin" set of values, universal in validity across different cultures and national 
boundaries, but minimal in content about the moral rules different cultures have in 
common. On the other hand, there are culturally specific "thick" moralities of our own 
history and culture, separate and particular families of doctrines that can only apply 
within a given c o m m u n i t y . A c c o r d i n g to Walzer, a just distribution of social goods 
is a thick morality that can only be made within a single culture. 
Walzer offers two examples to contrast the difference between the "thin" and 
"thick" moralities. First, Walzer argues that most of us have some sense of what the 
concepts such as "grinding the face of the poor" and "oppression of the poor" are and 
why they are wrong. Although the language used by the demonstrators is unknown to 
us and the social meanings they share are different from ours, a common 
understanding of those concepts is possible on a more abstract level.*��Similarly, 
when Czechs wave their flags in defense of "truth" and “justice”, Walzer argues, every 
human being should support the values in which the demonstrators are defending, 
because truth and justice are the values that are recognized and acknowledged by 
human beings. But it is another question whether everyone should support Czech's 
conception of truth and justice. On Walzer's view, people from other countries may 
disagree with Czech's conception of truth a n d ju s t i ce . 42' 
Another example is that people have no difficulty in agreeing the words “justice, 
418 TT, 1-2, He also claims that we can recognize and empathize with the Chinese protesters' cries for 
freedom from dictatorship in Tienanmen Square in 1989. See TT, 59. 
419 TT, xi. 
420 3 . 
421 TT, 3-5. 
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justice, shah thou pursue,, from the book of Deuteronomy. Walzer argues that people 
would have similar ideas of justice in negative aspect, such as its rejection of brutality. 
However, when someone tries to explain how the book of Deuteronomy understands 
justice, the people would not find it easy to agree.422 People would have different ideas 
of justice, and they might know nothing about what justice means to other societies. 
Despite this, Walzer argues that people would recognize that justice guides their 
political and legal pursuits in their own way.423 
Walzer adds that members of all the different societies can acknowledge each 
other's different ways. Although people seem to disagree with one another all the time, 
Walzer argues that they can leam from and respond to each other because there are 
three characteristics attributed to human beings.424 First, (1) human beings have moral 
expectations about their behavior not only of our fellows but of strangers too.425 They 
expect that some negative injunctions are not only held in their own society but also 
applicable to other societies as well. Second, (2) human beings are able to make a list 
of similar features between different societies and try to figure out what the features 
have in common.426 Third, (3) human beings have vital interests in each having a need 
for security and protection by norms forbidding torture, murder and tyranny. Such 
need seems a necessary condition, in general, for the pursuit of whatever else we might 
personally find desirable in life. For that reason, human beings in all societies can 
understand the wrongs of unnecessary injuries and pains, and hence human beings 
from all societies would agree that no innocent person should have to endure injuries 
and pains.427 
422 TT, 5.C 
423 tT, 5. 
424 TT, 8. 
425 t T , 1 7 . 
426 tT, 10. 
427 10. H.L.A. Hart had discussed these contingent features in his The Concept of Law. In the book, 
Hart emphasizes that contingent features of human life do not provide any reason for being moral, but 
they are the necessary condition of morality. These features include human vulnerability, approximate 
equality, limited altruism, limited resources, and limited understanding. The fact that men are both 
164 
Based on these characteristics, Walzer argues that human beings have shared a 
thin morality, which designates some reiterated features of culturally specific thick 
moralities of different societies. These reiterated features are a small number of ideas 
in which human beings understand fundamental moral issues across cultural 
428 
borders. Some negative injunctions, such as rules against murder, deception, 
betrayal, torture, oppression, gross cruelty and tyranny are reiteratively held in all 
societies. Hence thin morality provides a critical perspective to see whether one 
particular society violates the negative injunctions. Besides, thin morality provides 
positive injunctions protecting human rights to life and liberty. Although the language 
of human rights is Western in origin, Walzer thinks that it is translatable. 
Reiteration in effect means universally applicability. A thin morality P is 
reiterated in a society Q, if and only if P applies in Q. But someone could raise an 
objection that thin morality is not really reiterating across every human society, 
because many societies in our world violated the negative injunction. To respond to 
this, maybe not everyone in every culture in the past thousand years would agree with 
some common moral beliefs. However, Walzer seems to concede that the content of 
these beliefs corresponds to the more-or-less permanent moral features of human life. 
Therefore, thin morality, according to Walzer, is not a morality that everyone in every 
culture in the past two thousand years would agree with. Rather, the thin morality is 
widely shared in human world. The beliefs that one has to pay for goods taken out 
from shops, that rape is wrong, and that robbery is not a permissible way to increase 
occasionally prone to, and normally vulnerable to, bodily attack provides a need to prohibit the use of 
violence. On the other hand, no individual, without cooperation, can control other individuals for more 
than a short period. Even the strongest individual must sleep. At times when he or she is sleeping, he or 
she loses his or her superiority temporarily. Third, the fact that men are neither angels nor devils makes 
moral rules possible. For angels never tempt to harm other, and therefore no moral rules are necessary. 
On the contrary, devils destroy things reckless of the cost to themselves, which makes morality 
impossible to uphold. Fourth, limited resources create problems on allocation of scarce resources. This 
fact introduces rules that guide people's way of allocations. Finally, many people are tempted to 
immediate interests and would succumb to temptation. Morality provides guidelines to their behaviors. 
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Edition (1997), pp. 192-198. 
428 j Y , 1 1 
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one's property, are widely shared in human world at least in times of peace. 
On Walzer's view, the thin morality constitutes a check on thick morality. A 
society that violated the thin morality, Walzer argues, would be a "deficient 
society".429 According to Walzer, appealing to thick morality of that society cannot 
justify violations of the thin morality. To Walzer, appealing to local customs and 
traditions can never outweigh appealing to be free from torture and gross cruelty. 
Walzer wants to argue that almost all forms of present and past societies share the view 
that certain activities should be banned. However, someone could raise an objection 
that the list of negative injunctions as proposed by Walzer seems too short. It should 
include at least the following: prohibition on rape, sexual assault, abuses of all kinds, 
robbery, theft, corruption, infringement of various types against property, abuse of 
public power for private gain. 
But actually Walzer has not attempted to offer a whole picture of thin morality. 
Walzer agrees that we can abstract the social practices of governments reiterated in 
many countries and cultures to bring with ideas about the responsibility of 
governments toward the governed. Similarly, the practice of war brings with it ideas 
about combat between combatants, the exclusion of non-combatants and civilian 
immunity. The practice of commerce brings with it ideas about honesty, fair dealing, 
and fraud.430 According to Walzer, these ideas are seen to be similar even though they 
are expressed in different principles that reflect different histories and cultures of the 
world.431 On this view, negative injunctions are not the only contents of thin morality. 
Positive injunctions as shown above are also included in thin morality. On my view, 
negative injunctions and positive injunctions are often inseparable. To claim that it is 
wrong to "grind the face of the poor" means that we should protect the right of the poor. 
To claim that we should be honest in the practice of commerce means that we should 
429 T T , 1 0 
• TT, 15. 
431 T T , 1 7 
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not tell lies in the practice of commerce. 
Nevertheless, either negative injunctions or positive injunctions across all 
human societies take exceptions. For example, an injunction that we should not 
murder may have different meanings in different societies, subject to various factors. 
Some countries think that abortion and euthanasia are forms of murder, while other 
countries think that they are not forms of murder. The thin morality only guides us in 
producing the culturally specific thick moralities in which we do not and need not 
shared. It contains only the barest minimum standards of decent behavior. It consists in 
principles and rules that are coincidently applicable in different times and places but 
working out in detail how to live together is a matter of thick morality. Thus different 
countries have their conceptions of murder. Despite this, they share the core or 
minimal content of murder. Murder has the minimal content that it is wrong to kill an 
innocent human being. But there can be different conceptions of innocent human 
being. 
In other words，thin morality has to be expressed in different ways to reflect 
different historical and cultural condition of different societies. Walzer indicates 
that people identify first in the ordinary course of their lives with the thick morality of 
their own culture. We do not in the first instance endorse "truth", "justice", "tyranny" 
and "oppression" as abstract propositions. We always fill our own developed 
understanding of meanings within our own cu l tu re .We only find within our own 
thick morality the same thin values emerging to express our common humanity. This 
means that thin morality does not appear independently away from thick moralities. 
Social structure and political arrangements are given and every society has its own 
history and culture. Its members share a common way of life, such as festivals, 
customary practices, memory of the past society, and they have a shared understanding 
432 � � y j 
433 TT, 7-8. 
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of different social goods. Americans have no rights to tell the Chinese or the Poles how 
to provide health care and education on the ground of American thick morality. The 
values of the long march of the Chinese communists and the social meanings of the 
exodus of Israel from Egypt are different. To Walzer, there is no reason to think that 
they are all heading in the same direction.434 He holds that our solidarity with the 
Chinese protestors in Tienanmen Square does not commit everyone in the world to 
support their understanding of democratic government. Walzer argues that we should 
define Chinese democracy with their own conception, in terms of their own history 
and culture.435 in this regard, thin morality cannot guide the people of a given society 
in detail how to distribute different social goods among the people. Hence Walzer 
thinks that the thin morality is not a foundation of thick morality. It only serves as a 
critical idea of constraints, reiterated in every distributive system."^ ^^  
Someone might disagree with Walzer's view that the thin morality is not a 
foundation of thick morality. We do not in the first instance endorse "truth", "justice", 
"tyranny" and "oppression" as abstract propositions is one thing, but whether these 
abstract propositions are more fundamental to our morality is another. To use an 
analogy, every cat has its set of DNA. But we cannot see the DNA, until we find a cat 
and examine its tissue under scientific experiments. We do not in the first instance 
identify the thin morality. It cannot guide the people of a given society in detail how to 
distribute different social goods among the people. However, all human societies share 
some minimal content of morality. Some injunctions, such as "do not murder innocent 
human beings" are more fundamental than some injunctions from thick morality, such 
as "bringing lecture notes into an examination room is wrong". This is because the 
latter injunction is not shared by all societies. 
The counter argument is that being widely held across human societies does not 
434 TT, 9. 
435 TT, 60. 
436 TT, 33. 
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make thin morality more fundamental. The reason is that thin morality only functions 
as a constraint in which the thick morality develops. Therefore, the former needs not 
be a foundation on which the latter grows. To use an analogy, a plot of land is 
constrained by the surrounding fences or walls (i.e. the thin morality). On this plot of 
land grows some plants (i.e. the thick morality). The fences or walls are constraining 
the growing plants, but are not a foundation of the plants. 
My view is that we need not debate over whether the thin morality is more 
fundamental than the thick morality. As long as the thin morality is shared among all 
the thick moralites, it can function as a constraint in which the thick morality develops. 
Walzer's universalism attempts to expand his arguments about distributive justice and 
social criticism in order to set limits to his own particularist account of justice. The 
revisions and extensions of his arguments help him to respond to his critics in two 
ways. First, Walzer can continue to endorse the politics of difference, which claim that 
members of different communities should govern themselves in accordance with their 
own political ideas. But at the same time, he is able to describe and defend a certain 
sort of universalism in order to prohibit local and international brutal repression of 
people. Second, social criticisms from other countries are possible so that his critics 
cannot challenge Walzer that his theory of justice supports Nazism's genocide in the 
Second World War. Before Thick and Thin, Walzer's distributive theory fails to reject 
exploitation of slaves by their masters, when the slaves endorse their slavery on pain of 
torture and pain. The revisions and extensions of Walzer's distributive theory have 
shown advancements in his theory. Recall the Indian caste society, Walzer would 
endorse the society only if its government does not conduct brutal repression of people. 
The thin morality criticizes societies even where slaves endorse their slavery on pain 
of torture or death. 
I think Walzer is correct to indicate that the thin morality is "embedded" in every 
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society. Weapon control is very important in keeping the social order in every society. 
But while weapon control can be part of the thin morality, it is also part of the thick 
morality. Weapon control appears to be part of the thin morality, because the 
ownership of weapon is threatening to those without them, and proliferation of 
weapon ownership is potentially harmful to the population, especially in cities. But at 
the same time, weapon control has to do with the thick morality. For it is concerned 
with the distribution of weapon, such as ownership and control. 
In Thick and Thin, Walzer holds that the thin morality is universal. Is this 
relevant or related to Walzer's universalism I claim to be there even in the beginning 
chapter of Spheres of Justice? Walzer's univeralism in Think and Thin deals with the 
morality across different cultures, while univeralism in Spheres of Justice deals with 
the distributive justice in our own society. Walzer wants to argue that these two 
different moralities are different but inter-related. 
In § 6.2,1 share with Geogia Wamke's view that Walzer's interpretation thesis 
cannot justify its own particular interpretation against others. It has no ground to 
criticize other societies. In this section, Walzer successfully defends his new idea of 
distributive justice. He holds that distributive principles should be made according to 
the social meanings of social goods. Nevertheless, the principles should be constrained 
by minimalism. They are to be constrained by truisms, such as "no one should murder 
innocent people", "no one should betray a country", "cruelty is wrong", etc, which are 
applied or reiterated across human societies.438 Therefore, Walzer can justify us to 
make moral judgments across cultural boundaries with the thin morality. However, as 
I have shown, different societies have different conceptions of the thin morality, 
though these conceptions have some overlapping areas that are shared among all the 
societies. So different societies can have different conceptions on murder, deception, 
4 3 7 TT, X i . 
438 tt, 26. 
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betrayal, torture, oppression, gross cruelty, robbery, theft, corruption, infringement of 
various types against property, etc., though these conceptions have some overlapping 
areas that are shared among all the societies. 
In this regard, Walzer's minimalism is different from his universalism I claim to 
be there even in the beginning chapter of Spheres of Justice. His universalism I claim 
to be there in Spheres of Justice can be divided into two groups: First, (1) the 
minimalism shared among different societies. For example, Walzer holds that it is 
wrong to grind the face of the poor, which appears to be part of the thin morality. For 
the wrongness of oppression and tyranny is shared among different societies. Walzer 
also holds that there is a list of blocked exchanges, which sets limits on the dominance 
of wealth in most societies. Second, (2) Walzer's universalism in Spheres of Justice, 
which are not shared among different societies. For example, Walzer holds that a 
given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a way faithful to the shared 
understandings of the members. This view is Walzer's own universal claim only. 
Despite this, Walzer's minimalism and his universalism are inter-related. They both set 
a constraint that rules out "unjust" distributive principles and upholds the thin morality 
and Walzer's universal claims on distributive justice. 
6.5 Improving Walzer's theory 
In the light of the weaknesses in Walzer's theory of social goods, interpretation 
thesis, and of the universal intention in his particularism, I would like to modify his 
distributive theory. 
In a nutshell, I would like to modify his theory in four main ways. First, (1) if 
Walzer wants to defend autonomous distributions, he has to forbid trade-off entirely 
between different spheres. His original view that we can only defend relative 
autonomous distributions would weaken his theory. Also, I shall argue that his theory 
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of social goods is problematic. Second, (2) Walzer has to concede that social meanings 
alone cannot determine distributive principles of social goods. Rather, it is plausible 
for him to hold that a moral consideration of consequence and utility is relevant in 
distributive justice. Further, (3) I think Nozick's natural rights and Kantian philosophy 
can be incorporated into Walzer's theory of distributive justice. (4) Finally, I would 
argue that Walzer is forced to revise or reject interpretation thesis, the idea of shared 
understandings, and even his theory of social goods. 
Walzer's idea that distributions must be autonomous is very important in his 
overall theory, as it is on this idea that his theory of justice and complex equality is 
based. However, Walzer finally concedes that different spheres can be traded off 
conditionally. According to Walzer, medical resources can be bought and sold if the 
distribution does not distort the distribution of communal provision to the needy 
persons. Besides, tertiary institutions are allowed to admit untalented students, as long 
as their educational certificates would not bring enormous social advantages."^ ^^ For 
the sake of ensuring autonomous distributions, Walzer has to forbid trade-off between 
different spheres completely. Although Walzer has said that there can only be a 
relative autonomous distributive principle for one type of social good, he would 
concede that not all types of social goods are exchangeable for other types of social 
goods.440 On my view, it is not clear why the purchase of some social goods would not 
violate their social meanings, but others would. Relative autonomy of distribution 
would weaken the distinctness of distributive spheres, and hence weaken his theory of 
justice. For Walzer's theory of justice can no longer hold that there is no particular 
good that is convertible to other social goods. As a result, Walzer cannot ensure that 
under the system of complex equality, all social goods are distributed in accordance 
with their social meanings. 
• Recall §3.2 and §4.4 of my thesis. 
柳 Spheres, 10. 
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Marx's philosophy has inspired Walzer in many things. However, unlike Marx, 
Walzer's theory of justice relies too heavy on social meanings. 44i I have argued in 
Chapter 3 that social meanings alone cannot determine their appropriate criteria of 
distributions. In Chapter 4,1 further argue that the fact that different social meanings of 
different societies lead to different sorts, different priorities, and different degrees of 
needs does not by itself show that (1) the ancient Greek government, for example, was 
correct or incorrect to provide public baths and gymnasiums for its citizens. This fact 
also does not show that (2) people had a correct shared understanding of the social 
meaning of welfare. The social meaning of a good may be a wrong idea. Richard 
Ameson is correct to point out that what most people believe in a society might be 
based on ignorance. In § 4.4, Walzer indicates that citizens share some sense of duty to 
taxation, and that citizens cannot live in isolation from their community. However, 
from the mere fact that citizens cannot live in isolation from their community, it does 
not follow that citizens should have a sense of shared duty to taxation. Nor does it 
follow that citizens have agreed on the extent or a specific form of tax. 
Furthermore, Walzer has to face some unanswerable challenges from his critics 
when a social good has two or more social meanings, leading to different distributive 
principles that conflict with each other. The main problem is that the link between 
social meanings and distributive principles are loosely related. To reply, Walzer only 
responds that education can have different social meanings, as he points out that basic 
education and higher education should constitute different distributive principles. But 
obviously his reply has not solved the doubt when higher education has more than two 
conflicting meanings. Therefore, I think that Walzer's theory of social theory is 
州 In §3.2,1 have shown that Walzer' main thesis in The Spheres of Justice is that distribution of social 
goods should be done in accordance with their social meanings, and only their social meanings. For 
Marx, means of production determines the social meanings. But Marx argues more. He thinks that 
people can be self-deceptive to a social meaning. What people recognize as needs may not really reflect 
their real needs. I do not wish to explore Marx's philosophy deeper, because this is far from the main aim 
of my thesis. 
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problematic. 
Walzer finally considers that personal responsibility should be taken into 
account in addition to social meanings. As I have argued in §3.2, Walzer is forced to 
modify his theory in such a way that consequence and utility become a relevant moral 
consideration in distributive justice, when there are more than two parties competing 
for a particular type of scarce resources. Walzer's theory of complex equality can 
incorporate a moral consideration of consequence and utility, which is a very 
important factor when we consider a concrete distributive issue.442 On my view, social 
meanings might change because of consequential considerations. For example, a 
public toilet with a male symbol in front of the door has a social meaning that no 
female should enter the toilet. Nevertheless, we would allow females in a tourist group 
to enter an empty male lavatory in order to save more time and facilitate the trip, when 
there are too many females waiting. I do not mean that consequence and utility are the 
only and ultimate consideration. Rather, consequential consideration is an important 
and undeniably factor in doing moral philosophy. Our morality changes over time but 
sometimes this is due to consequential considerations, rather than the fact that people 
have found a new way of interpretation. Thus Walzer is wrong to argue that 
interpretation is the only path of doing moral philosophy, and Walzer is wrong to 
assume that interpretation is the only alternative apart from discovery and invention. 
Walzer's theory of justice can be further improved by adopting some ideas from 
Nozick and Kant. To Nozick, a government should not do more than preventing its 
citizens from being murder, combating assault, breach of contract, fraud and such like, 
in order to protect the natural rights of the citizens and leave the citizens free to pursue 
their individual projects . In § 2.4, Walzer suggests that in supporting the communal 
442 It is far less plausible to maintain that taking away some of innocent terminal cancer victims' 
property is an impermissible means for saving a great government leader who would prevent a serious 
terrorist's attack, than it is to maintain that killing them is impermissible. 
• Nozick holds that every person has the right not to be murdered or harmed. Also, he or she has the 
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provision of a government, people who have greater ability to buy more consumer 
goods have to pay more taxes. According to Nozick, however, it is unjust to allow a 
government to tax millionaires in order to finance a subsidy to poor families, for this 
would violate the rights of the millionaires. The millionaires have the right to choose 
whether to transfer resources to help other people, but the government has no right to 
force them to do so.444 if Nozick is correct, we may further ask why political power 
should be permitted even when the interference is represented by progressive taxation, 
public provision of health care, higher education, and housing. It can be furthered 
objected that Walzer's theory is incomplete in the sense that it does not ask where the 
resources of a country come from.445 To support public provision of security and 
welfare, Walzer has to show who should bear the burden of providing this provision. 
Walzer gives the reader an impression that, given a condition of sufficient resources, 
Walzer's theory of justice would tell us how to distribute the resources appropriately. 
Unless Walzer could reply that allocation of limited resources does not involve 
violation of people's rights of self-ownership, he would be unable to refute Nozick's 
arguments. 
On my view, Walzer could incorporate Nozick's view that every person has a 
natural right not to work for any other, and it would be unjust to force him to do so.446 
right to protect one's property from fraud, theft, and breach of contract. 
444 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 169-70 & 348. Nozick's argument is that a man who chooses 
to work longer to gain an income more than sufficient for his basic needs prefers some extra goods or 
services to the leisure and activities he could perform during the possible nonworking hours. On the 
other hand, a man who chooses not to work the extra time prefers the leisure activities to the extra goods 
or services he could acquire by working more. Given this, if it would be illegitimate for a tax system to 
seize some of a man's leisure for the purpose of serving the needy, it would be illegitimate for a tax 
system to seize some of a man's goods for that purpose. The root of his argument is that forcing someone 
to work extra hours in order to support other people does not work, for they can avoid the tax or forced 
labor entirely by earning only enough to cover his basic needs. 
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in his paper on Walzer (written in Chinese). I would like to acknowledge this source in making this 
point.(詳見李翰林，〈沃爾澤的分配公正理論〉’《社會理論學報》，第四卷第二期’香港： 
香港理工大學應用社會科學學系，2001，頁427-429�) 
446 Nozick holds that an individual owns his or her body, labor and its fruits, which means that others 
may not infringe on him or her, on his or her body, labor or the fruits of his or her labor. Nozick should 
agree that a person has the right to do a thing is different from a view that it is morally right of a person 
to do a thing. Behaving within one’ right, such as smoking a cigarette, does not mean that the person 
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Nozick argues that if one is a slave, unless one contracted freely into slavery, one's 
right were violated. Walzer has no arguments on natural rights of human beings in 
support of his univeralism, which criticizes injustice, tyranny, and oppression. 
Walzer's thin morality only contains positive or negative constraints on human 
activities. It does not establish some positive maxims or principles for all human 
societies, such as virtues, maximizing utility, civil duties, treating a human being as an 
end-in-itself. Walzer can improve his theory by incorporate natural rights of human 
beings into his theory.^ ^^ Obviously, Walzer insists that it is wrong for the rich to 
oppress the poor, impose their poverty on them, and command their deferential 
behavior. Here I believe that Walzer has assumed a Kantian view that any human 
being should be treated as an end-in-itself. Walzer's negative injunction not to 
subordinate or dominate others surely has something in common with Kantian view. 
Concerning Walzer's interpretation thesis, I agree with Georgia Wamke that 
Walzer's interpretation thesis cannot justify its own particular interpretation against 
others. She argues that if we accept Walzer's interpretation thesis, we cannot criticize 
other societies. Wamke also correctly points out that aside from Walzer's 
interpretation, there are other perspectives that are also coherent to American society 
as well. Since we would have so many interpretive possibilities, thereby we would be 
unable to find out the best interpretation. Even if we can find out the core values in 
society, as I have argued in Chapter 5, they are too abstract to be useful as a guide for 
finding distributional principles of various goods. Thus, Raz is correct to say that we 
cannot find out the best interpretations among competing interpretations, when each of 
the interpreters claims that her interpretation is the best one. More importantly, Walzer 
admits that critics are subject to ongoing public debates, and they can be further 
revised or rejected in the future. Hence no one, including Walzer's interpretation, is 
should not be criticized for smoking. 
似7 In fact, Walzer had admitted that he needs a theory of human rights to set the basic parameters within 
which distributions take place. See Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, p. 293. 
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entitled to claim that her interpretation would be the best and the last one.448 
There are some other problems with Walzer's interpretation thesis. Walzer 
argues that distributive justice requires that citizens in society have really joined or 
acknowledged their distributive principles. As I have argued in Chapter 6, it is not easy 
to know whether a citizen really joins acknowledges his or her distributive principles. 
Walzer might respond that he does not require an agreement of everyone in society. 
Instead of convincing the citizens, another possibility is to convince the experts (in the 
case the moral and political philosophers, or political scientists). But I have also 
argued that the fact that there being some people protesting is neither a necessary, nor 
sufficient, condition for the distributive justice. On the other hand, even if there are 
many objections, it does not follow that the distribution should be very unjust. 
Finally, the evidences that Walzer's particularism has admitted universal 
elements undermine Walzer's original view that an interpreter needs not look for 
universal principles. Thus I think that Walzer's interpretation thesis does not 
sufficiently guarantee us to determine the appropriate distributive principles for our 
social goods. It should be completely rejected from his theory of distributive justice. 
Walzer argues that we find our way to distributive justice through an 
interpretation of shared understandings of social meanings. The failure of his 
interpretation thesis would undermine the idea of shared understandings. In the 
Dworkin-Walzer debate, Dworkin argues that shared understanding is not possible in a 
complicated and pluralistic modem society. Walzer replies that people agree about the 
reference, but not the social meaning of a good. In Chapter 5,1 have argued that this 
reply is rather trivial. Obviously, Walzer wants to defend the strong sense of shared 
understandings. Interpreters try to interpret the shared understandings of social 
meanings in order to find out a right distributive principle for the society. They do not 
448 IS, 28-32, TT, 103. Recall §5.3 of my thesis. 
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just want to know that people agree about the reference of a social good. Therefore, I 
think that Walzer's idea of shared understandings is not plausible, thus it should be 
rejected from his distributive theory, too. 
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Conclusion 
In the above chapters, I hope I have accomplished what I set out to do, namely to 
examine what distributive justice is, and to look into how Walzer attempts to solve the 
problem of distributive justice. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, Walzer wants to 
work out a theory of justice that avoids separating oneself at a great distance away 
from the social world in which one lives. Walzer defends equality because he wants to 
free people from the subordination or domination. He does not hope to eliminate all 
differences. 
Walzer holds that once we have the shared meaning of a social good, we will 
understand how it ought to be distributed. In this thesis, I have performed the 
following four tasks: First, I have argued that having the shared meaning of a social 
good alone is unhelpful for understanding how the good ought to be distributed. This is 
because Walzer cannot defend a strong sense of shared understanding. Second, as I 
have said before, there is no clear-cut distinction between different distributive spheres. 
In addition, Walzer conditionally allows trade-off between some types of social goods. 
Consequently, Walzer cannot hold the idea that all distributions must be autonomous, 
and complex equality cannot ensure that every social goods are distributed in 
accordance with their social meanings. Third, I present my views that Walzer's 
interpretation thesis and the idea of shared understandings are problematic and should 
be rejected. Fourth, I present my suggestions to improve his distributive theory. 
There are several charges to which I think Walzer does not answer. First of all, I 
have argued that Walzer is incorrect to criticize Rawls' theory of justice simply 
because it requires continual state of intervention. This is because in order to maintain 
a system in which dominance is impossible, I have noted that we must give power to a 
government to preserve the integrity of different distributive spheres. Thus Walzer's 
distributive theory requires continual state of intervention, too. I have argued that 
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continual state of intervention is not by itself a wrong or immoral activity. On the other 
hand, Walzer has offered no argument to explain why this power of intervention does 
not violate people's rights. Second, as I have argued in Chapter 4, Walzer is holding in 
saying that there is no way of ranking social goods, and there is no way of judging 
whether one just society is better than another. Third, as I have argued in Chapter 5, it 
is unconvincing to argue that every substantial account of distributive justice should 
only be an internal account. As a result, Walzer's interpretation thesis has no ground to 
criticize other societies. 
Since Social Interpretation and Social Criticism, Walzer has attempted to 
search for some minimal moral contents from different societies. In Thick and Thin, he 
further argues for thin morality, which is authoritative in different societies at different 
times. In Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, Walzer further concedes that ordinary 
morality has a role in shaping distributive principles. I have argued that moral 
considerations of consequence and utility are relevant to distributive justice. 
Consequence and utility are important and undeniably considerations in moral and 
political philosophy. Nevertheless, Walzer does not regard democracy in a society as a 
universal truth, because Walzer never denies that Indian caste system is just. 
In Chapter 1, I have pointed out that it is wrong to classify Walzer as a 
conventionalist, a relativist or a conservative. First, Walzer holds that the shared 
understanding of a social meaning is not identical to the common opinion of the 
majority of the citizens, and the appropriate arrangements of the social goods may be 
different from the overwhelming will of the citizens. 
Second, as I have argued, Walzer's position retains many universalist 
assumptions, despite his assertion to the contrary. In addition to his intention to 
acknowledge some minimal moral modes, there are other aspects of his thought that 
are in fact universalist. 
180 
Third, it is undeniable that Walzer wants to reject social criticisms from 
outsiders rather than social criticisms from a foreign society. In Chapter 6, I have 
argued that Walzer does not reject social criticisms from a foreign society. There is no 
reason to assume that foreigners would only make conservative criticisms. All in all, 
the above amounts to saying that Walzer is neither a relativist, nor a conventionalist, 
nor a conservative. 
I should acknowledge Walzer's contributions and achievements in moral and 
political philosophy. First, Walzer is correct to reveal the problems of relying on 
abstract and objective standards to justify moral values and political practices in all 
human societies. 
Second, it is very attractive and interesting to realize that anything that one can 
think of could be a subject matter for distribution, provided that it is social in nature. 
Third, although Walzer's idea of core values is too abstract to be useful as a guide for 
finding distributional principles of various goods, it is useful as a constraint against 
some distributional principles that are contrary to or incoherent with them. Fourth, 
Walzer successfully defends his new idea of distributive justice. He holds that 
distributive principles should be made according to the meanings of social goods. 
Nevertheless, the principles should be constrained by minimalism. They are to be 
constrained by truisms, such as "no one should murder innocent people", "no one 
should betray a country", "cruelty is wrong", etc, which are applied or reiterated across 
human societies.Therefore, Walzer can justify that we can make "thin" moral 
judgments across cultural boundaries. 
Finally, Walzer's idea of complex equality has positive contributions to 
contemporary social theories. According to Walzer, a man, a group of people, a 
community, or even a country monopolizing a specific social good should not by 
449 7T，26. 
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virtue of the monopoly dominate other goods and control their principles of 
distributions. Thus wealthy people should not dominate medical needs in a condition 
that poor people cannot afford to see a doctor. Countries with higher GNP should not 
claim for more territories from poorer countries. Walzer reminds us that every 
community and every part in a community has its own distinct value, which should not 
be overridden by other values. A government with political power should not 
intervene the freedom of speech in industry of mass media. Similarly, a country with 
world-famous financial hubs is not then better than another country with world-class 
universities. It is noted that Walzer has successfully criticized Rawls for trying to 
sustain simple equality, instead of complex equality. On my view, this alone would be 
a very significant achievement. 
But actually we are not satisfied with Walzer's thought, because of its weakness 
and difficulties. In Chapter 6,1 suggest that Walzer should modify his theory in four 
main ways. First, (1) if Walzer wants to defend autonomous distributions, he has to 
forbid trade-off entirely between different spheres. His original view that we can only 
defend relative autonomous distributions would weaken his theory. Also, I have 
argued that his theory of social goods is problematic. Second, (2) Walzer has to 
concede that social meanings alone cannot determine distributive principles of social 
goods. Rather, it is plausible for him to hold that a moral consideration of consequence 
and utility is relevant in distributive justice. Further, (3) I think Nozick's natural rights 
and Kantian philosophy can be incorporated into Walzer's theory of distributive justice. 
(4) Finally, I have argued that Walzer is forced to revise or reject his interpretation 
thesis. Also, I have indicated that the idea of shared understandings, and even his 
theory of social goods are problematic, too. 
In the light of the weaknesses of Walzer's interpretation thesis, the idea of shared 
understandings, and the theory of social goods, his idea of complex equality becomes 
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the most valuable part in his distributive justice. Walzer's idea of complex equality is 
inspired by Marx and Pascal's philosophy. Despite this, Walzer bridges philosophy 
and social policy in the most engaging and fruitful way, moving quickly from theory to 
practical issues, concrete examples, and hard questions. So Walzer has presented a 
sophisticated original theory of equality that gives us a new picture over how to 
fashion a just society. 
Perhaps Walzer will give us further modifications on his theory as a whole in 
future. We do not expect that there would be some independent standards of rationality 
to solve our distributive problems, but this does not mean that objective moral thinking 
is impossible. As Nagel concludes, "[p]erhaps someone will discover a way to reduce 
the socially produced inequalities (especially the economic ones) between the 
intelligent and the unintelligent, the talented and the untalented, or even the beautiful 
and the ugly, without limiting the availability of opportunities, products and services, 
and without resort to increased coercion or decreased liberty in the choice of work or 
style of life. But in the absence of such a Utopian solution, the familiar task of 
balancing liberty against equality will remain with us.,，— The process of ongoing 
debate over how to find out the best solution will continue. However, it is fair to say 
that Walzer's theory of distributive justice has marked a major contribution to this 
ongoing debate. 
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